

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 10, 2018

Case No.: F-2016-17168

Ms. Scarlet Kim Privacy International 62 Britton Street London, Great Britain

Dear Ms. Kim:

I refer to our letter, dated September 21, 2018, regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (the "FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Department has processed 21 additional responsive documents to your request. We have determined that 7 documents may be released in part and 14 documents must be withheld in full.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. In some cases, two or more exemptions may apply to the same document. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released. The 14 documents withheld in full were withheld pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, 5, and 6 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5), and (b)(6). All released material is enclosed.

This completes the processing of your request. If you have any questions, you may contact Trial Attorney Marcia Sowles at marcia.sowles@usdoj.gov or (202) 514-4960. Please refer to the case number, F-2016-17168, and the civil action number, 17-cv-01324, in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

Susan & Weetman,

Chief, Programs and Policies Division

Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
 - 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(1) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

ARMSEXP Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c)
CIA PERS/ORG Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
EXPORT CONTROL Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c)
FS ACT Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004
INA Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f)
IRAN Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505

- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
 - (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

C06469329 RIP (b)(i)(b)(3)



National Security Agency/Central Security Service

29 July 2013

Information Paper

(U) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relationship with the United Kingdom

(U) Introduction:

(S//REL TO USA, GBR) The US/UK cryptologic relationship is the oldest and most productive of NSA's foreign partnerships. It is based on a formal agreement (known as UKUSA) signed in 1946 by the predecessors to NSA and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the UK's National SIGINT and Information Assurance Authority. Mr. Iain Lobban is the Director of GCHQ and he leads a workforce d

April 2011 - 31 March 2012

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) GCHQ continues to strengthen its ties and improve coordination with other intelligence partners within the UK: the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), an approximate counterpart to the CIA; the British Security Service (BSS), an approximate counterpart to the FBI; and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) of the UK Ministry of Defence (MODUK), which directs and coordinates the activities of the intelligence units of the British military services.

(U//FOUO) The Special United States Liaison Officer, London (SUSLOL), a senior NSA civilian, guides the continued success of the UKUSA relationship in the UK. is the SUSLOL serves as Deputy SUSLOL and is resident at GCHO Headquarters in Cheltenham.

(U) Key Issues:

(U//FOUC) The UK Parliament recently passed legislation (known as the Justice and Security Act (JSA)) that is intended to better protect sensitive intelligence material (including that of the US IC) from public disclosure in civil lawsuits. The legislation was largely driven by the 2008 UK court-ordered release of classified ClA information in the Binyam Mohamed case. The JSA allows for closed proceedings in civil cases that implicate sensitive, national security material and exempts the UK IC (and by extension, the US IC) from cases in which litigants allege the

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108

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
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(U) Problems/Challenges with the Partner

(U) None at this time

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(U) Prepared by:

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Dated: 20070108

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SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

6 July 1992

RiP (60)(63)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Allegations of UK COMINT Collection Against General

Motors (U) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(b) (1) (b) (3) - 18 USC 798(a) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(S-CCO) We have been in contact with GCHO regarding the 15 June Financial Times of London Article on Robert Maxwell.

If in the routine course of SIGINT operations either GCHQ or NSA were to encounter information in violation of the UKUSA agreement, specific steps would be taken to remove the data from the database, thus precluding any violation of the agreement.

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J. M. McCONNELL Vice Admiral, U.S. Nav Director, NSA/Chief, C

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page with held (b)(1),(b)(3), (b6)

Early intelligence files implicated Robert Maxwell

FINANCIAL TIMES, June 15, 1992

By Jimmy Burns

cepts international communica-

and Robert Peston in London

THE UK GOVERNMENT had intelligence information years before the collapse of Robert Maxwell's empire that suggested the late publisher was acting dis-

Maxwell was not seen as a risk to national security and was therefore not an "intelligence target" as such.

But it is understood that information pointing to his questionable activities existed within the files of the security services from Maxwell's early days as a businessman.

The Financial Times has also learnt that a full intelligence report was prepared for the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) at the time of Maxwell's death off Gran Canaria on November 5 last year. The JIC, which is part of the Cabinet Office, coordinates and assesses information from Britain's intelligence services, including MI5 and MI6.

Separately, a former JIC official has claimed that some data on Maxwell's more recent activities, gathered by the intelligence services from intercepted telephone conversations and faxes. were passed to the Bank or England in 1989.

The Bank is understood to have carried out an intensive search last week and can find no such information on its files. Its officials have no recollection of receiving such information.

Mr Robin Robison, who worked as an administrative officer for the JIC, claims that other major British and foreign companies, targely but not exclusively in the defence field, routinely have had their telephone and telex intercepted.

The companies under surveillance, he says, included GEC Marconi, Lonrho, Rolls-Royce, and their foreign competitors, and General Motors of the US.

Mr Robison, whose Job involved sorting signals intelligence from the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in Cheltenham, western tions, claims in a statement that, while working for the JIC, he sorted raw intelligence on Maxwell.

"The sigint (signals intelligence) I saw in the autumn of 1989 included intelligence data on Robert Maxwell taken from telephone conversations and faxes intercepted in Israel and the Mediterranean, probably from his yacht the Lady Ghislaine.

The information, according to Mr Robison, centred on Maxwell's businesses and his overpasses them to Bank departments which may have an interest in the contents.

In normal circumstances, the Bank would not expect to receive any information on Maxwell, since the late publisher did not own any businesses regulated by the Bank

If it had received such information, it would have been passed on to the industrial finance department under Mr Pen Kent or the banking supervision section under Mr Brian Quinn, both directors of the Bank. Neither department has been able to find any record of receiving such information.

The Bank of England is known to have received information passed to it by the intelligence services about the activities of the failed Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and its links with international terrorists.

Maxwell, who was born in Czechoslovakia, had high-level contacts with several former top communist leaders. There are also suggestions that Maxwell was under surveillance by the Czech secret services.

Mr Robison, a Quaker, resigned from the JIC over what he believed was the increasing unaccountability of intelligence gathering and the potential for the

misuse of power.

Mr John Major, the prime minister, has declared himself in favour of more open government. He has appointed Mr William Waldegrave as minister for "open government", and recently broke with Whitehall tradition by publicly naming the heads of MI5 and SIS (MI6).

Ivo Dawnay writes: The Cabinet Office refused to comment on the claims yesterday, insisting that Mr Robison was a "very Junior administrations officer who had worked on the JIC for a relatively short period. It did not, however, deny that such information might have been collated.

This refers to intercepts which obviously are part of intelligence systems," an official said. "We never comment on those for secu-

MAXWELL: THE BIG LIE

Page 9

m 'Tell the Queen I'm busy'

Page 17

■ Sir John Cuckney to seek Maxwell assets

Panini sale at advanced stage

seas trips although he cannot recall what the reports said in detail.

He says the information was evaluated and distributed to top government officials including the prime minister's office and cabinet ministers.

Mr Robison, who resigned from the JIC at the end of 1989, says he sent some GCHQ data on Maxwell to an economic subsection of the committee which included a seconded Bank of England official and others.

Classified intelligence material about Maxwell protected by code words was also sent regularly in a van to another official at the Bank's City headquarters in central London, he says.

The middle ranking official named in Mr Robison's statement is understood to act as a post-box within the bank for sensitive information. The official receives

COMINT Collaboration with Australia

RIP (6)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)

The United States collaborates with Australia in communications intelligence activities in accordance with the government-to-government COMINI agreement between the U.S. and the UK. The Australian COMINI effort is under the direction of the Defense Signals Division (DSD) in Melbourne, which functions as a Commonwealth activity, staffed by personnel from the UK and New Zealand as well as Australia.

The U.S. COMINT relationship with Australia is extremely close. The National Security Agency has a small group of technical people working in DSD; the Australians maintain technical liaison at NSA.

Exchanges of raw material and products are extensive within the area of Australian interests. (b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 · Declassified by D. Pierce, DOS Senior Reviewer RCI-5688-68 Copy 1 of 3 (b)(1)(b)(6)



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vitally involved bose in the Australian press. Cooksy, said that he based his lalayan oft w. 1.—A suggestion that a highly promygone mun an account from the blood secret United States "space re- the December issue of Austral-SYDNEY, Australia, Dec. 27 BY ROBERT TRUMBULL Spiedel to The New York Mages lerived from the Malayan oit vi-

The installation, said to have suspicions of the real purpose (cox \$225-million, is at Pine of the fistallation on material lives strain. Springs, a town at almost the space magazines. He said that Ferra, Dec. 28 prographical center of suscital, the \$225-million cost had been payment to be The United States was author montioned in the reputable to the United lized to set up the Ideility by American journal Acrospace by the Tennes, a treaty signed Dec. 9, 1966. Technology last Rebruary.

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lyould require the expenditure believe that the Government has also concealed the truth of \$225-million.

fairs at the Australian National University in Canberra brought the Pine Gay question into new prominance, with 'an article in

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Mr. Cookeey his made a about United States-Kustralian good point in a slightly tenden-joint research into chemical and about the validity of the write Australian, said that it Mr. er's speculations, the newspa-Cooksey's conclusions were per's speculations, the newspa-Cooksey's conclusions were per said that the secrecy sur-wrong, "the great secrecy over rounding the project was dis-pino Gap sooms inexplicable," if the assumptions being tious way," the Sydney Morn bacteriological wartare in this ticle. Though expressing doubtlathy circulated newspaper, The Quarterly ar! A long editorial in a nationing Recald said in editorial on country." the paper acided. the Australian

the importance of the American we have in effect become part differed and are prepared as in of the United States in making of the base at Northwestiters of strategic detense, whe cape to accept some influence acted. "Could servery risks for the sake of strengthen be justified in such circum. instructions will bring.

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The U.S. installation is at Cec. 29: 1942 Deserved Stallen Ocean Mallod AUSTRALIA The Key York Tipes Press!

Alice Springs,

the Australian Quarterly, December, 1968

PINE GAP

By Robert Cookseyel

For some years now Australia has been important to the U.S. in hemisphere. There are a number of American space-tracking stations in aero-space matters, including nuclear weapons systems. This does not mean that American bombers with nuclear payloads or missiles with nuclear weapons Systems as rockets and warheads, or the command post in the warheads are based in Australia. Rather, especially in the missile age, tracking and communications stations are as essential to U.S. nuclear Dr. Gelber points out that Australia is already the lurgest single centre White House. In his recent book, The Australian-Amédican Alliance,? for American missile and space operations outside the U.S.: with its rechoo-Australia, for example the twin stations at Honeysuckle Creek and Tidlogical and logistic facilities, its political smbility and external security, it is the most suitable piece of real estate for such operations in the southern binbilla near Canberra. Such stations are not only involved in satellife exploration of the moon or reception of programmes from TekStar, but also in controlling photo-reconnaissance ("spy in the sky") satellites and observing Soviet satellites and monitoring their communications.

Certainly the most important American installation now operational is the North-West Cape Communications Station, which was officially opened in September last year by the late Prime Minister and has since been tenamed in his memory "The Harold E. Holt Communications Station" by conflict within the A.L.P. over the station in the first half of 1963; there President Johnson. Readers will no doubt recall public controversy and is an agreement between Australia and the U.S. providing for consultation, but this is readered meaningless by an exchange of letters containing the understanding that consultation does not impinge on total U.S. control;

* Lecture in Political Science, Australian National University,

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Assistant, 1515 is an extremely valuable book; if who here to constant about options for of the alliance, at distinct from book if we have here to constant a manufacture and content of the alliance. of the alliance, is distinct from exteriors a fewinist interpression of heteries second of the ANGUS Fresh, and, with Dr. Gelber's second or responsible these of the U.S. Administration is provided interpretion and otherwise residing evaluate.

The Australian Quartecky", Volume 46, No. 4, December, 1968, pp. 12-26.

PINE GAP

submerged Polatis submarines in the western Pacific and in the Jadia Ocean, deployed against parts of the Soviet Union and against Chini of target information and that instructions. As is well known, Polar missiles and their Soviet equivalent are relatively inaccurate and can there population and instity, unlike highly accurate ICBMs which can b used as well in a counter-force strategy directed at the other's missil sites. For both the U.S. and the Soviet Union Polaris-type missiles con stitute a second-strike capability (ICBMs are the "never-to-be-used" first strike capability), virtually invulnerable in submorged nuclear-powere submarines, able to be launched even if there is a first-strike against th homeland. Thus, so goes the conventional wisdom, the two Super Power of world polities—that is, if we assume total rationality in decision-making ate in a relationship of mutual desorrence; and North-West Cape conti butes to the U.S. capability and hence deterrence and therefore the stabilit spinore, technological change and forget the emergence of China as a nuclea fore only be employed in a counter-city strategy directed at dentres the station's main function is transmission by very low frequency Power (see A.Q., June, 1968, p. 100).

North-West Cape was the subject of persistent questioning from a fer members of the Labor Opposition from September, 1960, until th Government made the station's muta function clear carly in 1963. Later the same month the ALP, held a Special Commonwealth Conference to decid on its policy towards the station. In May the agreement with the U.S. debated and, of course, passed, Pine Gap has led a much quieter life aero-space installation at this picturesquely named spot twelve miles south to the establishment of a joint defence space research facility" (Australia defence election was introduced into parliament as a tall, vigorous From the early 1960s there have been rumours of an American military west of Alice Springs. On 9 December, 1966, the Minister for Externa Affeirs and the American Charge d'Affaires signed an agreement "relating ment and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the U.S. secondity, the various American space-tracking stations in Australia reland Iveaty Series, 1966; No. 17): apart from placing the facility near Alice Springs, providing for joint operation by the Australian Defence Depart nothing of interest in the text of the agreement not contained in its title the provision for joint operation makes no stipulation about actual controls not to ARPA but to the National Acronauties and Space Administration (NASA); and, thirdly, ARPA is part of the Office of Defense Research and was signed and—vonocessatily in constitutional law but usefully for Even so, three issues athing out of the agreement must be noted! firstly, Defense Department, and requiring stringent security measures, there

Engineering, responsible for research and development of missile systems and for some aspects of their operation—the Director of this Office is Dr. Yohn S. Foster Jar., who with four of the Deputy Directors visited Carbetra for discussions with the Minister, acuior officials and scientists of the Australian Defence Department from 29 September to I October of this year. Mr. Fairhall announced, the project and the agreement 11 December, 1966; the Government made to attempt to bring the agreement before parliament, as a bill or otherwise.

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Springs in the Northern Terrifory Legislativa Council, Mr. C. Otr, tele-Immediately after Mr. Fairhall's anaeoneement, the Member for Alice grammed the then Prime Minister, Mr. Holt, expressing concern that in the event of world war Pine Gap could become a target for nuclear attack and consequently Alice Springs might be destroyed. In a question upon notice Senator Bishop (A.L.P.) asked Mr. Holt through the Minister representing him in the Senate if certain subsequent allegations made by Mr. Or were correct: inter alia, that the co-operation of people in the Alice Springs district about making land available was sought on the understanding that a space research project was lavolved ".... but in fact it was a United States defence project—a spy in the sky—and the biggest outside the United States of America The Prime Minister replied on 13 April, 1967, denying any deception of the people of Alice Springs, mentioning "defence space research facility" but stressing space research, and adding—perhaps innocently—that, chiefly because missiles would not be launched from the site, it would not be a target in time of war. The next reference in parliament to Pine Gap came on 2 May of this year from Mr. Barnard, Deputy Leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party and shadow Defence Minister. He cited an article in the American fournal Actospace Technology (12 February, 1968, p. 3) which stated military space installation outside the U.S. and suggested that it might play an important role in foture American detection and interception of that the facility would cost \$U.S.225m, described it as the most sophisticated missiles—the article in fact referred to detection and interception of bombardment system" (FOBS-see below). Mr. Barnard noted that the cost was about three times that of the North-West Cape Communicas significance of the facility; but for the defence correspondent of Tha missiles forming part of the new being developed Soviet "fractional orbital tions Station. He attacked Mr. Fairhall for giving no indication of the he added, the public would remain completely unealightened about the dissibiling Financial Review reading the unicle and publicising its content, significance of Pine Gap.

In a number of articles published in August, The Australian Financial

defence correspondent referred to by Mr. Barnard, appeared on 2. Aug page story and also with on editorial headed "A right to know". Re Review attempted an expose of Pide Gap, apparently to press the Minis for Defence to explain and justify the functions of the facility. The first ; as the main page one news item; it was taked up that afternoon by I Sun (Sydocy), another pewspaper in the Fantax group; again as a fro Rodigson commented on the secreey surrounding the project; that we the Paptagon had declined to give any information about Pino Gi Peter Robinson was able to report that the facility occupied ten squa as this was the prerogative of the host government, and suggested that inquiries should be addressed to the Department of Supply in Canber miles and, although not yet operational, construction was almost finish more than SA200m, of which Australia's outlay was about SA700,0 buildings, from the U.S. via Adelaide, through Alice Springs; mo most important article, under the by-line of Peter Robinson who is about 150 feet in diameter, protecting sensitive tracking automate, oth anti-Sovier-FOBS system. Poter Robinson concluded that the Pine Ga Department of Defence; and Defence refused to say anything. Neverthel and testing of equipment was underway. Its cost was understeed to previous twelve mouths there had been a steady flow of prefabrical recently, highly sophisticated electronic equipment, including radar a computers, had passed through. On the site were two radomes, ea insinflations included more than fifteen in-conditioned buildings house laboratory" (MOL), designed to test man's capacity to live and work fi lengthy periods in orbit, but with military implications for the contr of orbital weapons; secondly, "spy in the sky" satellites on orbits difficu editorial in his newspaper on S August, although highly critical of th Supply denied any connection with the project and recommended for acquisition of land, fencing and various minor public works. In other sensitive electronic gear. The facility, he suggested, is involved three major American space-defence projects; firsily, the "manned orbiti to monitor from the U.S.; and thirdly, as already mentioned above, sacility is of strategic importance to the U.S. but not to Australia. Government, was not quite so dogmatic:

ments in the Western alliance would quiedly sten away rights over 10 squirt miles of their own territory for a U.S. defence project of which the which the control of which the public knew nothing or that any Opposition parties would permit their to do so. It is quite possible that hine Grap may be of findlament in prortance to the fittine of Australian defence, or that it will be of citical importance in maintaining the "balance of ferror" which has star maintained world peace. If this is so, however, nothing has been don't or make the Australian public aware of the fact.

Was published. He represented Pine Gap as an "experimental" and not an "operational" station, in which Australia and American scientists together investigate "upper atmosphere and space phenomena"; but he did not say this Plac Gap would remain experimental, not did he so much as mention any projects to be undertaken. On the question of cost, a Defence Department official stated in ambiguous terms that this was \$A13m, of which Australia was contributing \$A3m.; as The Australian Financial Review pointed out, this \$A13m, covered only fixed installations and not the extremely expensive electronic equipment which takes the cost to about \$A200m. Mr. Fairhall said much the same in the House on 22 August in response to a question without notice from Mr. Calwell—a question so inceptly phrased as to appear like a "Dotothy Dixer".

O2p. Apart from the Government's refusal to explain and justify the That is all of significance on the public record in Australia about Pine functions of the Acilliy, the sorriest aspect of the affair is the performance of the A.L.P. The agreement was sunounced two years ago yet, apart from Senator Bishop's and Mr. Calwell's questions, and Mr. Bamard's the Opposition. Since early this year some of the science policy advisers passing remarks, the facility and its functions have not been queried by to the Labor Party have from time to time discussed Pine Gap with front-bench members of the parliamentary party; these advisers, and others who brief on foreign and desence policy, have been especially active since Front-benchers, including some conventionally labelled "Lest Wing", have The Austrolian Financial Review made an issue of Pine Gap in August. declined to take up this issue; they are unwilling even to place questions upon, notice that go beyond asking about the cost of the facility—and no questions have appeared on House or Senate "Notice Papear" in 1968, This possilianimity can be attributed to the 'Nonth-West Cape syndrome" in the party.

Leaders of the parliamentary party plainty look back with horror on the Special Commonwealth Conference of March, 1963: the photograph of the then Leader and Deputy Leader, Mr. Calwell and Mr. Whillam, waiting outside the Holel Kingston in Canberra to learn of the conference's decision and the lag applied by the Liberal Party during the Federal Election campaign the lag applied by the Liberal Party during the Federal Election campaign the lollowing November to the delegates inside—"the thirty-six faceless men"; the narrow margin for a policy of qualified acceptance of the ration by 19 votes to 17; and, above 30, fear of the party being identified as against the American alliance, so providing the Government with a potent issue in a defence election. But, now that the leaders and deguty leaders in the House and the Senate are members of the Federal

Executive and the Federal Conference, the "faceless men" tag cannot be the circulation of position papers to members of Caucus and of the state applied, even if it did affect voting as distinct from reinforcing pirtjudice. Again, a graduated approach, with a series of probing questions on nolice, executives, and a carefully prepared speech in the House by the Leader could prevent the development over Pine Gap of the confusion that surrounded North-West. Cape and so bedovilled the special conterence. Further, public opinion over the North-West Cape Communications Station was in any event mixed and, indeed, not unlike the resolution of the special conserence, however impracticable that might have been, In an Australian Gallup Polf taken in April, 1963, 80% favoured building the station, 11% opposed and 9% were undecided; but in June 65% opied for joint control of the station, 25% said that joint coatrol would not work and 10% did not know; and, also in June, 71% chose the olicinative that the U.S. should "get our consent first" before sending via the station a message that might involve Australia in war, 21% said "no oced" and 8% did not know. Although in the House Elections of 30 November the ALP's 46:7% on 9 December, 1961, the infultions of politicians and fournalists share of first preference votes declined to 44.7% of the total vote from aside, there was no evidence that North-West Cape, the American alliance and defence generally were significant in voting behaviour. Besides, although surveys show overwhelming support for the American alliance, this does not mean that Australians accept that the confeat of the alliance should be determined solely by the U.S. Eyen so, this is the de Jacto policy. of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, at least over Pine Gap,

Although there is little on the record in Australia relevant to the functions of the facility at Pine Gap, there is a great deal in the American hero-space magazines: * read in conjunction with cognate areas of the literature of futernational Relations, some interesting tentative conclusions emerge. It seems likely that the first U.S. space-defence facility at Pina Gap (the one of which there were rumours in the first half of the 1960s) was concerned with a project for an "orbital bombardment system", involving satellites caterying nuclear weapons in othit around the earth which on signal can drop on appropriate targets; this, first facility was probably designed to monitor such satellites on paths hard to control from North America. After analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the orbital bombardment system in comparison with ICBMs, it was abandoned by the former U.S. Defense Secretary, Mr. McNamata: And, under Article IV of the Outer Space Trenty, which was begotiated by the U.S. and the Soviet

^{3.}Sec exectably, "Aerograve Technology" (formerly "Technology Week", which imporposated "Aftistics and Rectesty", "Aviation Week and Space Technology" and "Att Force sed Space Digery".

Union and came into effect in October, 1967, signatories "..., undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons ..." It steems that this first facility never went beyond experiments in satellite control.

a Congressional committee last year, the Director of ARPA said that his egency was looking at the feasibility of any space-based ABM (anti-The present Pine Gap facility, which one imagines incorporates the functions. The "manned orbiting laboratory" (MOL) mentioned in Peres although still very much in the experimental stage: in testimony before ballistic-relisatio, system. It may well be, as Robinson suggested, that first, clearly can, like lesser acro-space stations, perform a number of Rosinson's article is certainly an ARRA project with military implications, "spy in the sky" satellites are to be monitored from Pine Gap. Of course, satellites of this kind are already monitored by other space-tracking stations in Australia. But there are now satellite ICBM detection systems that probably require more sophisticated equipment: one system now being deployed involves satellite-borne radar in communication with a computer detecting and identifying ICBMs from the cross-section signatures of their rocket plumes; in advanced development is a satellite ICBM earlywarning system based primarily on infra-red sensing techniques. Even so, \$U.S.225m, monitoned in February, this year by the reputable Aerospace these new detection systems would not require a facility costing the Technology.

That magazine (12 Rebriary, 1968, p. 3), and Perer Rebinson no doubt relying on this source, saw as the main function of Pine Gap ICBMs follow a ballistic trajectory along a great circle route: for both tional orbital bombardment system. ICBMs are fired in the opposita the U.S. and the Soviet Union this means that ICBMs deployed against the other would follow a route across the North Polar region. In a "fracdirection, on a great circle route across the South Polar region. The Soviet Union has been testing FOBS since September, 1966; Mr. McNamara early warning system" (BMEWS) would provide no warning for a FOBS attack from the South; and over-the-horizon radar would provide only involvement in a system for the detection and interception of Soviet FOBS. announced this early in November last year. For the Soviet Union against the U.S. FOBS would have the advantage of surprise: the "ballistic missile three minutes warning. Besides being subject to interruption during sunspot activity and relatively vulnerable to jamming. But Soviet FOBS would have two main disadvantages: firstly, decreased payload, although at three megatons, this would still be twice the payload of the U.S. Minuteman CBM or Polaris, and, secondly, there is an increase in targeting error

by a factor of three to four over notinal ICBMs, so that Soviel FOBS could only be used against the U.S. in a counter-city strategy. Now the atvaninge of surprise can be used to take out American ICBMs in their silos and also the communications station for Polaris submarines at Maine-the one at North-West Cape can be taken out by a standard ICBM; otherwise, the U.S. second-strike capability is hunched and the result is multual descruction—and if over-the-honizon radar is working, this might be activated even if there is no time for Presidential decision. There are two possible ways, of increasing the arcuracy of Soviet FOBS; one is by inertial reference! within the FOBS vehicle, but the probability of rargeting error is still high; the other is to set up a monitoring facility in Caba—but this would surely lead to another October, 1962—or to station trawlers along FOBS approach routes in the Caribbean to perform this monitoring function.

The installation of BMEWS in Western Australia, islands of the British warning against an attack by Soviet FOBS on the South Polar route compared with 15-20 minutes for ICBMs fired on the traditional North ladian Ocean Territory and Bast Africa would give the U.S. 45-60 minuted Polar route. However, there is no evidence that such a system is being set up; instead, apparently tealising that the Soviet FOBS is not yet as operational system, the U.S. is relying upon those two new satellite ICBN detection systems mentioned above that are in part monitored from Pini Gap. And advanced detection, of course, means that surprise is no longe possible: that is, unless the Pine Gap facility is taken out by a Soviet ICBM Cartainly, with North-West Cape, it no doubt has a high priority of Sovier target lists in a number of contingencies; and this would b singularly infortunate for Alice Springs—at least the North-West Capi Station is in a preity much uninhabited area. As for interception of Sovie FOBS, data from the Pine Gap facility can be fed to the ABM system being set up around major American cities is of virtually no use fo have ABMs capable of intercepting missiles from the South. For th Pinc. Gap as a target to the Soviet Union and also make it a priority targe for China when that country has a modest force of ICBMs in the mid on Johnston Island, mainly consisting of Spartan missiles, and specifically designed for intercepting orbital weapons; the "light" ABM system nor interception of FOBS, because until 1973 any Washington, D.C., wil future, there is the ARPA project that might lead to space-based ABM controlled from the Pine Gay facility: this would increase the importance o

There is one other function that the Pine Gap facility might well under

take; and the high cost does suggest that some other function is being undertaken. At the montent the U.S. esta depioy only Polatis missiles in a counter-city strategy against China: ICBMs, following a great cárcle some ever the North Polar region, must cross the Soviet Union and, without prior arrangement, this might lead to a certain embarrassment. But if the U.S. developed FOBS, it could launch missiles on a South Polar route against China.4. The Pine Gap facility could perform this function, more dustralia, American FOBS could be employed in a conner-force strategy against China. The Pine Gap facility could perform this function, more particularly as it is equipped with four Cary spectrophotometers,5 which can enable the facility to pick up the missiles with precision, allowing standard monitoring equipment to take over and place them with accuracy on Chinese ICBM sites.

If this is so, then Australia is even more deeply involved in the U.S. very sophisticated: it might take four ICBMs with thermonucloar watheads. to be certain of taking out Pive Gap—and if a westerly is blowing, there nuclear weapons system. Chinese missile guidance systems are not yet might be considerable radio-active fall-out over Queensland. Then there is the possibility of China making hostages of our cities for Pine Gap, can be penetrated by Chinese ICBMs, then the American deterrent is no longer credible for Australia. The U.S. would still control North-West or attempting nuclear blackingil, And once the light ABM net in the U.S. Cape and Pine Gap, but might well not act if one of our major enties were threatened or destroyed.

Presumably Soviet and Chinese intelligence units rend the American acrodefence planners in the Soviet Union and China are well aware of the strategic options open to the U.S. By refusing to explain and justify the space magazines—and more thoroughly than this writer, perhaps too, own electorate. The Government simply retuses to acknowledge the extent functions of the Pine Gap facility, as distinct from revealing secret technical detail, the Government is not confusing possible enemies so much as its of Australia's involvement in U.S. nuclear weapons systems and thus, with the assistance of a weak-kneed Opposition, prevents public debate on the central issue of Australian foreign policy—more important than Australlan involvement in the Vietnam Wax. The nuclear question is central to world polities, to the relations between states and the survival of peoples.

An distriction are commented for the process of the process of the first four four standard with a first four four sections of the first four sections and they commented from them, and the four first four first for the first first four first four first for the first first first four first four first four first Evol before Me Meddamura less the Descriment there were reports that the U.S. was developing FOBS, he was shought to be resided, as for a line he resided, present to citablish an AIM system ("A.Q.", June, 1968, p. 2018. Since Mt. Menanara's departure

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THE LETHAL KNIFE.

by Sydney D. Rubbo.

Can man continue to benefit from Science and yet excape the abuses that Joom so large from its misuse? This is not a rheterical question. Science is as deutral as a knifer it may may be a diessing or a curse depending on the heart and mind of the man who holds it.

Not so long and the Reverend T. M. Hesburgh, President of the sciediisis cannot be. Vie need only temember Nazi Germany, where University of Notte Dame, U.S.A., said, "Although Science is neutral, great Universities allowed themselves to be prostituted to inhumanity in the name of moral neutrality . . . Those who feel concern should become more dedicated to establishing their bearings in their own scientific specialities and in society in general, hobing to impregnate the world with intelligence and love. We must be men of courage, unashamed of attaid to speak out, whether it is popular or not, knowing whore we our commitment, dedicated to justice, to the great human values, unsland and why."1

It seems to me that this view elegantly expresses the position of responsible scientists throughout the world and explains my stand on C.B.W. — Chemical and Biological Warfare. Having quoted this philosophy, to which I adhere, I sincerely hope that this aniche shall be inferpreted as a sincere comment on an ethical issue, unlied to pollities or territorial interests.

That C.B.W. must be listed as one of tomorrow's weapons is evidenced by such statements as: "A future war will be characterised by the massive use of air forces, various rocket weapons and various means of logical weapons", and "in modern warfate the intentional prestuction of mass destruction such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical and bacterio-

was told they were in a military installation. No further information was siven,

Professor of Merobiology, University of Meropura.

¹ Rev. T. M. Herburth, 1965, "Scientific energy be orwited, Scientific Acteur, 19 Avgust,

² G. K. Zhukov, Ministie of Defence, U.S.S.R., 1956.

[&]quot;The Australian Quaricity", Volume 10, No. 4, Degember, 1968, pp. 21-28;

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	THE PINE GAP
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THE HON ALEXANDER DOWNER MP

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PARLIAMENT HOUSE
CANBERRA ACT 2600

4 June 1998

Her Excellency Mrs Genta Holmes Ambassador Embassy of the United States of America YARRALUMLA ACT 2600

Madam,

I refer to the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America relating to the Establishment of a Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap, done at Canberra on 9 December 1966, as amended and extended (hereinafter "the Agreement").

The Government of Australia proposes that the Agreement be extended for a period of ten years from 16 November 1998 and thereafter remain in force until terminated. The Government of Australia further proposes that after this extension has been in force for a period of seven years, either Government may at any time notify the other in writing that it desires to terminate the Agreement in which event the Agreement shall terminate three years after such notice has been given.

If the foregoing proposals are acceptable to the Government of the United States, I have the honour to propose that this Note and your confirmatory reply thereto shall together constitute an Agreement between our two Governments concerning this matter which shall enter into force on the date that the Government of Australia notifies the Government of the United States of America that all domestic procedures as are necessary to give effect to this Agreement in Australia have been satisfied.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

ALEXANDER DOWNER

EMBASSY OF THE United States of America

Canberra, June 4, 1998

No. 67

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to your note dated 4 June 1998 which reads as follows:

"I refer to the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America relating to the Establishment of a Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap done at Canberra on 9 December 1966, as amended and extended (hereinafter "the Agreement").

The Government of Australia proposes that the Agreement be extended for a period of ten years from 16 November 1998 and thereafter remain in force until terminated. The Government of Australia further proposes that after this extension has been in force for a period of seven years, either Government may at any time notify the other in writing that it desires to terminate the Agreement in which event the Agreement shall terminate three years after such notice has been given.

"If the foregoing proposals are acceptable to the Government of the United States, I have the honor to propose that this Note and your confirmatory reply thereto shall together constitute an Agreement between our two Governments concerning this matter which shall enter into force on the date that the Government of Australia notifies the Government of the United States of America that all domestic procedures as are necessary to give effect to this Agreement in Australia have been satisfied."

The Honorable

Alexander Downer, M.P.,

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Parliament House,

Canberra.

I have the honor to confirm that the Government of the United States of America accepts the proposals contained in your Note and that your Note and this reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments concerning this matter which shall enter into force on the date that the Government of Australia notifies the Government of the United States of America that all domestic procedures as are necessary to give effect to this Agreement in Australia have been satisfied.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

EWA WEEREN WEEREN

Australia
Australian Capital Territory
City of Canberra


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Embassy of the United States of America

I, the undersigned consular officer of the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and faithful copy of the original/certified copy exhibited to me the same having been carefully examined by me and compared with the said original certified copy and found to agree herewith word for word and figure for figure.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the Embassy at Canberra. Australia this day June of 1998

Latora de Welel





National Security Agency Office of Foreign Relations, N5F COUNTRY HANDBOOK IGDOM



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· COUNTRY PROFILE

Capital:

London

Official Language.

English

Population:

58.5 Million (1996 est.)

Type of Government:

Constitutional Monarchy

U.S./U.K. Relations:

Full Diplomatic

Defense Budget:

USD 35.1 billion (3.1% of GDP (FY95/96))

Demographics:

Labor force is 28 million: services 62.8%, manufacturing and construction 25.0%, government 9.1%, energy 1.9%,

agriculture 1.2% (June 1992)

CRYPTOLOGIC ORGANIZATIONS (U)

(FOUO) The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is the UK National SIGINT Authority, as well as the home of a fee-for service INFOSEC organization, the Communications and Electronics Security Group (CESG). GCHQ falls under the ministerial authority of the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. (FCO), and its policy guidance comes primarily from the London Signals Intelligence Board (LSIB). Key oversight is administered by the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, who reports annually to the Prime Minister.



intelligence partners within the UK include the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS - also known as MI-6) an approximate counterpart to the CIA, and the British Security Service (BSS -(also known as MI-5) an approximate counterpart to the FBI.

CONTENTS -	
Country Profile	1
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Future Prospects & U.S. Goals	4
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August 1998

CRYPTOLOGIC RELATIONSHIP (U)

Background (U)

relationship is the oldest and most productive of NSA's foreign partnerships. It is based on a formal "UKUSA Agreement," signed in 1946, and includes numerous supporting agreements signed over the years with GCHQ. This agreement is the basis for comprehensive cooperation on SIGINT and, to a lesser extent, INFOSEC activities.

Key Elements of Cryptologic Relations

(TS CCO) Under the UKUSA Agreement, each side agrees to share all SIGINT-related information; the exchange is unrestricted except for those areas that are specifically excluded (e.g., U.S. ONLY information) at the request of either party.

(TS-CCO) NSA's and GCHQ's intelligence priorities are largely convergent and GCHQ's SIGINT collection and processing capabilities often complement our own.

(S) The cryptomathematics exchange with GCHQ is at the heart of our INFOSEC relationship. GCHQ is highly capable in the

field of cryptomathematics and many major advances within the field of cryptography have occurred as a result of our mutual sharing

As NSA supports U.S. Government efforts towards achieving a secure global information infrastructure, GCHQ stands as an influential foreign partner in advancing INFOSEC policies in the international arena.

(FOUO) Official liaison representation is maintained at each national center and a significant number of integrees, usually analysts and technicians, work at each others' facilities. This includes a small, but increasing contingent of GCHO representatives at the Regional Security Operations Centers in Ft. Gordon, Georgia; Medina, Texas; and Kunia, Hawaii. The Special U.S. Liaison Officer, London (SUSLO London or SUSLOL) is appointed by the Director, NSA, with the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board, as appropriate. SUSLO London is accredited from the DCI to the London Signals Intelligence Board (UK National SIGINT Policy Authority) and is the senior authority for all cryptologic liaison in the UK.

PARTNER CAPABILITIES/ TECHNOLOGIES (U)

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August 1998

(FOUO) Other current initiatives include the following:

ENCRYPTION POLICY (U):

PERSONNEL AND FACILITY INITIATIVES (U)

(U) Readoption of Unions. The new UK Government lifted the 13-year ban on unions at GCHQ in May 1997. NSA was initially concerned about the impact this might have on GCHQ employees assigned to Menwith

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Hill Station, but no major issues have surfaced. NOTE: While GCHQ employees are civil servants and can now belong to civil service unions, Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and British Security Service (BSS) employees (plus some law enforcement personnel) are "Crown Servants" and are, therefore, barred from belonging to a union.

(U) Private Finance Initiative. GCHQ has undertaken a significant initiative to use private sector capital to achieve a major facilities upgrade and colocation of its Headquarters operations into a single site in the Cheltenham area.

FUTURE PROSPECTS & U.S. GOALS (U)

(6) The U.S.-UK Cryptologic Relationship will continue to be broad and deep well into the 21st Century. The relationship continues to be viewed as the most enduring and comprehensive of foreign partnerships for both parties.

(S) The most recent supporting agreement to the UKUSA partnership is a joint policy statement, signed by the Directors of NSA and GCHQ in December 1997, reaffirming both agency's commitment to maximize the exchange and sharing of information, and where that is not possible, to notify the other of those exceptions.

RECOMMENDATIONS (U)


(FOUO) GCHQ has demonstrated a willingness to invest in its relationship with NSA, and a strong link exists between NSA's Unified Cryptologic Architecture and GCHQ's program. NSA will continue to urge GCHQ to keep apace with

the implementation of NCS-21, particularly as UK global requirements continue to virtually match those of the U.S.

PERSONALITIES (U)

UNITED KINGDOM (U):

Director, GCHQ (DIR) Mr. Francis Richards



Director CESG (DC) Mr. Andrew Saunders

Foreign Secretary/Foreign and Commonwealth Office Sir Robin Cook

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Chief, Defence Intelligence Staff VADM Alan West

Ambassador to the U.S. Sir Christopher Meyer

UNITED STATES (U):

Ambassador to the UK Mr. Phillip Lader

Special U.S. Liaison Office, London



IDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS OF

NSA EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISIO

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MEMORANDUM FOR STATE/INR (Attention: Mr. Kicharl E. Curl)

THRU: NSAZOSS REPRESENTATIVE STATE DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: Technology Transfer Cooperation with Australia

A. Background

Australia is not a member of CoCom and has never been invited to participate directly. Nevertheless, an Australian interdepartmental committee recommended in June/July 1984 that general CoCom guidelines be followed when license applications for export of Australian goods are being considered by the Australian Government. The Prime Minister accepted the committee's recommendation.

B. Current Action

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C. Comment


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Technical information will be limited to that necessary for DSD to perform its SIGINT and COMSEC missions. We believe these actions to be in accordance with existing SIGINT and COMSEC relationships with Australia.

- D. Action Requested
- (U) Your concurrence.



External Affairs

Approved by: Director of Policy, Mrs. Julia B. Wetzel

STATE/INR Determination:

____ Concur

____ Non-concur


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
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NSA Legal Opinion:

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March 20, 1985



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WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 June 1949

Mr. G. C. Crean Chairman Communications Research Committee Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. Crean:

Your letter of 27 May 1949 was received and presented to USCIB at its regular meeting on 17 June 1949.

I am pleased to advise you of the acceptance, by USCIB, of the proposals set forth in your letter.

For the members of our Board, I wish to express the highest hope that the agreed arrangements will prove satisfactory and mutually beneficial to our future efforts in this field.

FOR THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD:

/s/ C. P. Cabell C. P. CABELL Major General, USAF Cheirmen

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Ottawa, Ontario

27 May 1949

Major Coneral C. P. Cobell, Chairman, United States Communication Intelligence Board, Washington, D. C.

Dear Ceneral Cabell:

During the past eighteen months a number of informal discussions have taken place between various members of the United States Communication Intelligence Soard (USCIB), and members of the Canadian Communications Research Committee (CRC) concerning the present relations of the two bodies on Signals Intelligence matters. It has, I think, been the general view of United States officials that our mutual arrangements should be clarified.

- 2. We have accordingly given coreful consideration to the motter, and we suggest that our arrangements should be set out in an exchange of letters between you, as Chairman of USTR, and myself as Chairman of the Canadian CRC. I feel that the guarantee as to security can be equally well met in the same way.
- 3. I am therefore writing to you setting out the proposals which we feel would lead to satisfactory arrangements for both the United States and Canadian Communication Intelligence authorities.
- 4. The following arrangements are proposed by the Communications Research Committee of Canada representing all Canadian Communication Intelligence authorities which now function or may function in the future. If you agree with these arrangements, your agreement would similarly be on behalf of the United States Communication Intelligence Board representing all U.S. Communication Intelligence authorities which now function or may function in future.

5. Scope of these arrangements

These arrangements will govern the relations of the above mentioned authorities in regard to Communication Intelligence which will be understood to comprise the unevaluated product, and all processes involved in the collection, production and dissemination of information, derived from the communications of countries other than the USA, the British Empire and the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is realized that colleteral material is often required for technical purposes in the production, and the proposed arrangements for exchange of such material are dealt with separately in this letter.

6. Extent of Exchange of Information Related to Communication Intelligence

The two Communication Intelligence authorities will exchange information on the bases indicated, provided such release is not considered by the producing authority to be prejudicial to its antional interest:

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- (a) Translations, gists and summaries will be exchanged on the specific request of each authority, or when determined by the producing authority to be of interest to the other:
 (i) Mean necessary to meet the technical requirements of the Comint Contres for the accomplishment of the tasks which they are undertaking.

 (ii) To meet the intelligence requirements of the agencies represented by each authority.
- (b) Decrypts will be exchanged as required for technical aids.
- (c) Intercepted traffic will be exchanged on the basis of Comint activities or requirements undertaken by the respective Comint Centres.
- (d) Cryptanulysis
 - (1) All information regarding methods, machine aids, techniques and processes pertinent to the tasks undertuken by either Centre will be supplied to that Centre by the other.
 - (ii) Information regarding methods, machine sids, techniques and processes not specifically applicable to tasks undertaken by either Centre may be exchanged when such exchange is considered by both Centres to be in their mutual interest.
- (e) Traffic Analysis and information on practices, procedure and equipment of foreign communication services

The full exchange of such information is required by Centres controlling intercept facilities in order to ensure the maximum efficiency and elasticity in the event of an emergency. All information necessary for muking rapid changes in intercept assignments and its corollary Traffic Analysis will therefore be exchanged

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8. Channels between United States and Canadian Agencies

- (a) USCIB will make an arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any Canadian agency except through or with the prior approval of Canadian CRC.
- (b) The CRC will make an errangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any U.S. agency except through or with the prior approval of USCIB.

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COLLUCTUL

The torm "collateral material" is defined as any material obtained from sources other than Communication Intelligence exploitation and which is applicable for technical purposes to Communication Intelligence operations. Any request for such material will specify the technical purpose for which it is to be used. Either authority may withhold collatoral material when,

- (a) it considers that exchange would be prejudicial to the national interest, or
- (b) the Ministry, Department, Agency, office or person which originally made the collateral material available, or which bears the responsibility for its control, has placed a limitation on its circulation.

11. Dissemination and Security

Communication Intelligence and technical matters connected therewith, which are SECRET or above, will be disseminated in accordance with accurity policy to be mutually agreed upon and kapt under review by USCIB and CRC. Within the terms of this policy, dissemination by alther party will be made to U.S. recipients only as approved by USCIB, and to Canadian recipients only as approved by USCIB, and to Canadian recipients only as approved by CRC. Collateral material which is exchanged will be neither used by nor its existence roweled to others than the personnel of the Ottama COMINT Centre and the Washington COMINT Centres without the specific consent in each case of the party supplying the collateral material.

12. USCIB and CRC undertake not to reveal the existence of any of these arrangements, even in the most general terms, to anyone who is not indoctrinated in accordance with the agreed security policy, and then only to those who, by virtue of their official duties, require such knowledge.

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13. Dissemination and Security -- Commercial

USCIB and CRC will ensure that without prior astification and consent of the other authority in each instance, no dissemination of information derived from Communication Intelligence sources will be made to any individual or agency, governmental or otherwise, that will exploit it for commercial purposes.

14. Previous Communication Intelligence Arrangements

These arrangements supersede the existing arrangements between Canadian and U.S. authorities in the Communication Intelligence field.

15. Alteration and Termination of these Arrangements

These arrangements may be altered completely or in part at any time by mutual consent. It is understood, however, that these arrangements may be terminated completely at any time on reasonable notice by either authority, should national interests require such action.

- 16. If these errengements are satisfactory, I suggest that implementation should take place when you have notified me as Cheirman of CRC that they are acceptable to your Board. Implementation can then be arranged by the Communication Intelligence authorities responsible to USCIB and CRC respectively.
- 17. In order to implement these arrangements as effectively as possible, each authority may establish lisison officers at the COMINT Centres of the other authority with such freedom of action as is agreeable to the host authority.
- 18. I shall look forward to receiving notification from you that the arrangements set out in this letter are satisfactory to your Board.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ G. C. Crean Choirmon, Communications Research Committee

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APPENDICES

FOR THE DAPLEMENTATION OF THE CANADIAN - U. S.

COMINT AGREEMENT

(Drafted at Canadian - U. S. Technical Conference - 7 - 15 November 1949)

(Revised at Canadian - U. S. Technical Conference - 11 - 14 April 1951)

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Appendix D

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Cooperation in Intercept and Traffic Analysis, and Exchange of Pertinent Materials and Information.

Cooperation in Cryptanalysis, and Exchange of Pertinent Materials and Information. Appendix E

Cooperation in Translation, and Exchange of Pertinent Materials and Information. Appendix F

Appendix G' Combined Communications.

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Annexure B Communications for Re-located ... Activities.

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APPENDICES

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CANADIAN-U.S.

COLUNT AGREEMENT

INTRODUCTION

- 1. The following arrangements governing the collaboration between the U.S. and Canadian COLINT Agencies are in implementation of, and are appendices to, the Canadian-U.S. COMINT Agreement of 29 June 1949. These Appendices were originally produced at the Canadian-U.S. Technical Conference, 7-15 November 1949. At the Canadian-U.S. Technical Conference, 11-14 April 1951, the following changes and additions were recommended: Appendix C was revised, and Annexures A through F were added; Appendix C was revised, and Annexures A and B were added. None of these arrangements shall be construed as contravening any clauses of that Agreement, but shall take effect within the scope and limitations established thereby.
- 2. In accordance with these arrangements, each party will furnish on a continuous and current basis such information related to Communication Intelligence as is pertinent to the tasks undertaken by the other party, subject to the provise contained in para. 6 of the Agreement. In addition, each party may maintain licison personnel at the Agency or Agencies of the other party.
- 3. The two parties will continue to effect such standardization, e.g.; of technical terminology, layout, procedure and organization, as may be practicable.
- 4. By the close collaboration thus established, and by means of discussion, agreement, and arrangement as to changes to be made, the two porties will continue to effect elimination of undesirable duplication in order to insure the namimum exploitation of foreign communications. However, the activities undertaken by each party must be basically suited to its own needs and capabilities, and therefore neither is in a position to accept any formal and fixed commitments for the allocation of specific tasks to its respective Agencies. It is agreed that an informal and flexible allocation of certain tasks is advisable, subject to alteration by either party at need and sometimes without prior notification. If the party which accepts an informal allocation is compelled to relinquisn it, it will inform the other party as soon as possible, and will make every effort to maintain its intercept coverage on the task surrendered if that party has been obtaining unique material.
- 5. It is agreed that each party will keep under review the problem of the provision of adequate COMINT telecommunications facilities and the associated problem of safe hand routes for the passage of COMINT material of all kinds, and will take all reasonable steps toward further improvement.

Revised, April, 1951

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INTRODUCTION

- 6. The two parties recognize the need for combined emergency plans ready to be put into operation at or before any outbreak of hestilities involving both parties. They have therefore gone into considerable detail in planning for re-location of threatened intercept stations.
- 7. Each party will provide the other with two or more copies of all reports mentioned in the following Appendices (and of like documents) which pertain to the agreed tasks undertaken by the other.
- 8. In the conveyance of any information in any manner by one party to the other, pursuant to the basic Agreement, the fact that the disclosing party may have the privilege of using a method or technique, or a device or apparatus pertaining thereto, on a royalty-free basis shall not of itself relieve the receiving party of the obligation to pay royalties.
- All these implementing arrangements are subject to review and to modification by mutual agreement.
- 10. These implementing arrangements concluded at the 1951 Conference will become effective immediately after approval by both Communications Research Committee (CRC) and United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).

NOTE: Appendices approved at the Canadian-U.S. Technical Conference 7-15 November 1949 and not mentioned here remain unchanged by the Canadian-U.S. Technical Conference, 11-14 April 1951.

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APPENDIX A

DEFINITION OF TERMS

- CHAMMEL: A unit or sub-division of a circuit will be known as a channel.
- CIRCUIT: A telecommunications system between two points will be known as a circuit.
- 3. COLLATERAL MATERIAL: Collateral material is any material obtained from sources other than Communication Intelligence exploitation which is applicable for technical purposes to Communication Intelligence operations.
- 4. COMINT [COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE]: Refer Appendix B, para.].
- 5. COMINT AGENCY or COMINT CENTER or AGENCY where used in this document will be understood to mean a government body organized for and engaged directly in the collection and processing of foreign communications for intelligence purposes.
- 6. COMINT ITEM: Any item of Special Intelligence or of Traffic Intelligence which is distributed or released by a CCHINT Agoncy will be known as a COMINT Item.
- 7. COMINISUM: A summary or commentary produced by a COMINITAGE of based on related COMINIT items, which may interpret those items in the light of one another or of 'nformation from other sources, will be known as a COMINISUM.
- COMMENT: Information appended to COMMIT items either in emendation or clucidation, or in expansion of the information contained therein, will be known as a comment.
- CRYPTO-INTELLIGENCE: COMINT produced or obtained which bears on foreign communications will be known as crypto-intelligence.
- DECRYPT: A foreign communication which has passed through the stages of cryptanulysis and decryption and is in its original language prior to translation will be known as. a decrypt.
- 11. DIGRAPH: A two character group will be known as a digraph.
- EXTRACT: A translation in part only of a decrypt or plain text will be known as an extract.
- GIST: A statement of the essential substance of a decrypt or plain text or an abridged version of a translated text or extract will be known as a gist.
- 14. HEADINO: Communication instructions for the delivery of a foreign communication, such as cell-signs, serial numbers, external addresses, delivery instructions, indications of priority, group counts, date/time of origin, etc., will be known as a heading.

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APPENDIX A

- 15. LARGUAGE EQUIVALENT: A word or phrase and its proposed or ogreed rendering in English as found in a Supplemental Clossary will be known as a language equivalent.
- PLAIN TEXT: An unencrypted foreign communication will be known as a plain text.
- 17. POSITION: The total assemblage of equipment used as a unit for an interception or trunscription purpose will be known as a position.
- 18. <u>SCARNING</u>: The process of examining decrypts or plain texts to determine if they shall be issued and, if so, in what form and with what priority, will be known as scanning.
- 19. SIGINT (SIGNAL LITTLLIGENCE): Synonomous with COMINT (COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE).
- 20. SPECIAL DITULLIGING: Refer Appendix B, para. 4.
- 21. SUPPLEMENTAL CLOSSARY: A list prepared by a COMINT Agency containing the proposed or agreed renierings in English of words or phrases which, though appearing in Stondard Dictionaries, have additional meanings not given in those dictionaries, and of words or phrases of which the meanings are not to be found in a Stondard Dictionary, will be known as a Supplemental Glossary.
- 22. TRAFFIC INTELLIGENCE: Refer Appendix B, para. 5.
- 23. TRANSLATED TEXT: A translation of a decrypt or plain text will be known as a translated text.
- 24. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: A remark or remarks added to a translated text, extract or gist by the translator, in expansion, clarification or annotation of his readering of the text, will be known as a translator's note. (It differs from a "Commont" in that it should not bear upon the latelligence implications of the text.)

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APPENDIX B

PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

INTRODUCTION

- 1. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the security and dissemination of Communications Intelligence issued by or under the authority of USIB or DCS and other appropriate authorities of the Governments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such regulations may vary in accordance with requirements of the parties, agencies, departments, and ministries to whom they are designed to apply, but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect and shall observe the standards herein as a minimum. As an aid to uniform interpretation, each party shall forward all pertinent USIB and DCS regulations and directives to the other for information.
- 2. Conservation of COMINT sources is of supreme importance and there is no time limit for their safeguarding. It is essential that the production, emploitation, and dissemination of COMIMT, resultant intelligence, and related technical information and material be specially controlled as specified herein.

DEPINITIONS

3. Communications Intelligence

- a. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) shall be construed to mean technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications and communications systems by other than the intended recipients.
- b. CCRINT activities shall be construed to mean those activities which produce COMINT by the interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, by the study of foreign communications systems and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted.


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Interception comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results.

- 3. c. Foreign communications are defined as all communications except:
- $\mbox{(1)} \ \ \, \mbox{Those of the Governments of the U.S. and the British} \label{eq:commonwealth.}$
- (2) Those exchanged among private organizations and nationals, acting in a private capacity, of the U.S. and the British Commonwealth.
- (3) Those of nationals of the U.S. and British Commonwealth appointed or seconded by their Governments to serve in inter-



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- f. 'Y' is tactical COMINT produced by units which are designated to provide close support for the Commanders of combat forces.
- g. COMINT and COMINT activities is defined herein shall not include:
- (1) Intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, except written plain text versions of communications which have been encrypted or are intended for subsequent encryption.
- (2) Intercept and processing of press, propaganda and other public broadcasts, except for encrypted or "midden meaning" passages in such broadcasts.
- (3) Certain operations conducted by U.S., Canadian, or Commonwealth security authorities.
 - (4) Censorship.
- (5) The peacetime exercise of 'Y' resources in MATO commands, which involves the interception, analysis and exploitation only of radio transmissions (albeit "foreign") on networks established or used for exercises within or between those commands, provided that:
- (a) 'Y-type' information produced during the exercise or rovesled in post-exercise analysis, and information about the 'Y' resources involved, is adequately safeguarded by NATO security regulations paralleling those for wartime 'Y' operations, and the U.S. and Canada retain the right to express their views to the Command concerned as to the adequacy of the security classification applied.
- (b) Techniques used in the production of exercise 'Y'
 during the exercise do not exceed in complexity the COMINT techniques involved
 in producing Category II(X) CANINT as defined in Annexure EL.
- (6) The interception and study of non-communications transmissions (ELINT).

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4. Types of CONINT

There are two types of COMINT: Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence. They are defined as follows:

- a. <u>Crypt Intelligence</u> is that COXINT which results from cryptanalysis or decryption including the solution of speech and facsimile security systems.
- b. <u>Troffic Intelligence</u> is that COMIMT produced by all means except cryptanalysis or decryption of intercepted communications.

5. Categories

For purposes of security handling and control COMINT is divided into categories and sub-categories. (See Annexure EL)

- a. COMINT is assigned to one of the following three categories as agreed between USIB and DCS.
- (1) Category III COMINT is that COMINT the unauthorized disclosure of which would risk extremely grave damage to national interests and specifically to COMINT activities and which, therefore, requires handling under special rules affording the highest degree of security protection. It is classified TOP SECRET, and is designated by a distinctive codeword.
- (2) <u>Category II COHINT</u> is that COHINT the unauthorized disclosure of which would risk serious damage to national interests and specifically to COHINT activities, but for which a less rigid standard of security is adequate. It is classified SECRET and is designated by a distinctive codeword.
- (3) Category I CONINT is that CONINT the unauthorized disclosure of which would risk little or no damage specifically to COMINT activities and for which, therefore, normal security classification procedures may be used. It will be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL and will not be designated by a codeword.
- b. As mutually agreed by USIB and DCS, separate sub-categories of CCHINT may be established within Categories III and II in order to permit

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differentiation in the processing, dissemination, exchange or use of material.

6. Technical Material

Technical material is understood to mean data concorning:

- a. Cryptographic systems.
- b. Communications systems, procedures and methods.
- c. Hethods and equipment designed for COMINT activities and information related to any of the above.
- 7. Information related to COLINT or COMINT Activities That information, other than COMINT itself, which reveals, directly or by implication, the existence or nature of any U.S. or Canadian COMINT activity.
- 8. <u>COMINT Channels</u> A method or means expressly authorized for handling or transmission of COMINT and information related to COMINT activities whereby the information is provided exclusively to those persons who are appropriately cleared and indoctrinated for access to COMINT.

9. Codewords

Codewords, as used herein, are designators assigned to identify the source as COMINT; to distinguish between the COMINT categories and sub-categories; and to facilitate the application of regulations for the dissemination and use of COMINT.



.(b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

11. Proper Authority

The term "proper authority", as used herein, shall be the level of authority permitted to authorize usage of the several categories of COMINT during hostilities and in special and emergency situations. The determination to make these exceptions and the authority to grant these exceptions shall lie only with senior officers and officials at levels to be established by USIB mar DCS.

12. Indoctrination

Indoctrination is instruction as to the nature of COMINT and the security regulations and practices which govern the handling of COMINT.

13. Debriefing

Debriefing is the process of reminding persons no longer authorized to have access to CCNIMT or CCNIMT activities that they continue to be bound by all security regulations pertaining thereto. The debriefing shall include cautions that there is no time limit on the requirement to maintain security and that public disclosure does not free the individual from his obligation.

14. Hazardous Activities

Mazardous activities are those which place a person in a position where he runs a substantial risk of being captured or otherwise subjected to interrogation.

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ASSIGNMENT OF COMINT TO CATEGORIES

- 16. In assigning CCHINT to Categories (see paragraph 5), the following considerations will apply:
 - a. The difficulty of solution or intercept to include:
- (1) Sensitivity of techniques employed in solution and exploitation.
 - (2) Sensitivity of source of intercept.
 - (3) Relationships to other COMLINT.
- b. The advantages to be gained versus the risk of disclosure and consequent damage through utilization under a given category taking into consideration the following factors:
 - (1) The potential loss of intelligence.
- (2) The extent to which the target country is capable of improving the security of the communications in question.
- (3) The security grading given to contents by the country originating the traffic involved.
- (4) How wide the dissemination of certain CONINT should be to permit essential use of the intelligence contained therein.
- (5) The capability of certain Third Party COMINT groups to exploit the COMINT in question with the attendant security risks beyond the direct control of U. S. and Canadian authorities.

17. USIB and DCS shall have prepared and maintained in current status mutually agreed lists to indicate CONINT placed in the several categories and in such sub-categories as may be established.

CLASSIFICATION AND CODEWORDS

18. Separate and distinctive codewords shall be employed to designate Category III and Category II CCHIN7 and each sub-category thereof.

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(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

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Category I COMINT shall not be designated by a codeword. Codewords shall be replaced when in the opinion of either USIB or DCS a requirement exists for a change.

- 19. <u>Documents and Technical material</u> which reveal actual or prognosticated success, progress, scale and direction of effort, or other sensitive details about the production of COMINT shall bear the classification or the classification and codeword appropriate to the highest category or sub-category of COMINT to which they relate and shall be handled accordingly, even though such documents and technical material may not contain COMINT as such.
- 20. Raw traffic (i.e., intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for CCNINT purposes beyond sorting by clear address elements, elimination of unwanted messages and the inclusion of a case number and/or an arbitrary traffic designator) shall be classified not lower than CONFIDENTIAL, and is understood not to be any specific category of COMINT and need not be designated by a codeword.
- 21. Codewords. The fact that codewords are used to designate COMINT categories shall not be made known to non-indoctrinated persons nor shall these codewords be used in the presence of non-indoctrinated persons.

SECURITY

- 22. All persons, including intercept operators, to be assigned to duties involving categories of COMINT other than Category I shall be indoctrinated. Recipients of Category I COMINT only will not be indoctrinated. Producers of Category I COMINT only need not be indoctrinated.
- 23. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of persons indoctrinated for CUMINT to the essential minimum.
- 24. It shall be permissible for persons who have access only to a lower category or sub-category of COMINT to work within Agencies or Centers in which there are located other persons engaged in the production or exploitation of a higher category or sub-category of COMINT, only so

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long as due precaution shall be taken (by providing segregated, secure areas or otherwise) to ensure that the activities and knowledge of such persons are confined to the CCHINT material and activities to which they are authorized to have access.

- 25. Except as agreed by USIB or DCS, all persons to be assigned to duties involving CIMINT shall be the subject of security investigation and clearance. As an aid to promoting uniform minimum standards of eligibility, each party shall inform the other of the standards prescribed by it for this purpose.
- 26. Under extraordinary conditions, as determined by USIB or DCS, it may be essential for an individual to take up duties involving CCMINT before the requisite investigation can be completed. In such cases, the person concerned may be suitably industrinated on the authority only of senior officers or officials as designated by the respective parties. In all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure that security investigations and clearances are completed as soon as possible after indoctrination.
- 27. All persons who have been indoctrinated for COMINT shall be debriefed when they no longer have the requisite need-to-know.
- 28. Each party shall ensure that complete lists of indoctrinated persons are maintained.
- 29. USIB and DCS shall keep each other fully informed of the approximate number of indoctrinated persons in each of the departments, ministries, agencies, and offices receiving CONIMT, by category or subcategory where applicable.
- 30. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the COMINT organizations or to the Categories III and II COMINT of the other party, unless he has been approved by his parent organization or Board and has been properly indoctrinated. Such access shall be limited to the categories or sub-categories of COMINT agreed by his parent organization or Board.

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- 31. Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has a knowledge of current value about COHNT, except recipients of Category I only, such that his capture or interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of COHNT, shall be assigned to or engage in hazardous activities. All possible action shall be taken to discourage or prevent any individual with a knowledge of current value about COMINT, except recipients of Category I only, from engaging in hazardous activities in any unofficial capacity at any time. Security principles governing participation in hazardous activities are set forth in Annexure B2.
- 32. Collection, processing, and dissemination of CCHINT in exposed areas shall be undertaken only after a careful evaluation of the advantages to be gained and the risk to the security of CCMINT. Security principles governing the conduct of CCHINT activities in exposed areas are set forth in Annexure B2.
- 33. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of paragraphs 34-37, and 39 below, codeword material shall remain exclusively in the custody of indoctrinated persons, secure from examination by non-indoctrinated persons.

DISSEMINATION AND USE OF COMINT

34. General

- `a. The basic principle governing the dissemination of COMINT is the "need-to-know". Each item of COMINT shall, therefore, be made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties and, except as specifically provided in paragraphs 34d and 35-37 below, are indoctrinated and authorized to have access to the particular category or sub-category of COMINT to which such item appertains.
- b. Except as specifically authorized by USIS or DCS, Category III or Category II (including sub-categories thereof) CCMINT may be disseminated only to persons who have been cleared and indoctrimated for access to such material. Such persons may include nationals of collaborating British Commonwealth countries (U. K., Australia and New Zealand).

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34. c. Except as provided hereafter, no action which could compromise the CCMINT source may be taken on the basis of Category III or Category II (including sub-categories thereof) CCMINT.

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(b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

e. The need may arise, in individual cases of special sensitivity, or more generally, for either party to handle COMINT items, or information related to COMINT or COMINT activities, in a more restricted manner than required by the provisions of this Appendix and its Annexures. In such cases the other party will, on request, provide similar handling for the specific items concerned.

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ASSIGNMENT OF COMINT TO CATEGORIES

- 16. In assigning COMINT to Categories (see paragraph 5), the following considerations will apply:
 - a. The difficulty of solution or intercept to include:
- (1) Sensitivity of techniques employed in solution and exploitation.
 - (2) Sensitivity of source of intercept.
 - (3) Relationships to other COMINT.
- b. The advantages to be gained versus the risk of disclosure and consequent damage through utilization under a given category taking into consideration the following factors:
 - (1) The potential loss of intelligence.
- (2) The extent to which the target country is capable of improving the security of the communications in question.
- (3) The security grading given to contents by the country originating the traffic involved.
- (4) How wide the dissemination of certain COMINT should be to permit essential use of the intelligence contained therein.
- (5) The capability of certain Third Party COMINT groups to exploit the COMINT in question with the attendant security risks beyond the direct control of U. S. and Canadian authorities.
- 17. USIS and DCS shall have prepared and maintained in current status mutually agreed lists to indicate COMENT placed in the several categories and in such sub-categories as may be established.

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
CLASSIFICATION AND CODEWORDS

18. Separate and distinctive codewords shall be employed to designate Category III and Category II COMIST and each sub-category thereof.

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(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)

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
d. As specified by USIR or BCS, technical instructions based upon Category II or Category III CORINT may be issued to min-inductionated intercept operators (including D/P, RFP operators, and the like) without use of the appropriate codeword, if in such form and of such nature as to give no indication of the specific CORINT origin, and provided they are essential to the tasks of those concerned.

e. Category II or Category III CCMINT material, exclusive of end product, may be hundled by injectrimated pursues within CONINT collection

or processing agencies without the use of the appropriate codeword.

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provided the form of issue gives no indication whatever of the COMMI origin.



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- 36. c. The decision to execute the provisions of paragraphs a and b above shall be made only after a determination that the advantages to be gained clearly justify the risk of compromise of the source. Due regard shall also be given to:
- (1) The relative value of the particular COMINT source involved and the possibility that its compromise may lead to the loss of other COMINT sources.
- (2) The possible repercusaions on current and future operations and also on other commands and areas.
- d. In order to minimize the risk of compromise the following precautions shall be observed:
- (b) (l)
- (b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)
- (b) $(3)^2$ P.L. 86-36

- (2) A minimum number of non-indoctrinated personnel shall be given the information, and
- (a) when practicable the information shall be so presented that it cannot be traced to COHINT as a source, or
- (3) The minimum amount of information necessary to justify the contemplated action shall be revealed.
- e. If communications by electrical means are involved they must be enciphered in the most secure cryptographic system available.
- If time permits the commander or official making this decision should consult with his supporting COMINT authority for technical advice.

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h. Sub-paragraph 35g above, applies with respect to emergency usage of the material in the sub-category of Category II described therein.

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(b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

 Sub-paragraph 34d, above, applies with respect to emergency usage of Category I CONIMY.

37. Hostilities

a. It is recognized that in the event of boatilities certain material will be dommgraded. In connection with the mutually agreed lists referred to in paragraph 17, USIB and DCS will agree upon types of materials suitable for downgrading during hostilities. When hostilities appear imminent or occur USIB and DCS will immediately consult upon downgrading

incident or occur USIB and DCS will immediately consult upon downgrading measures to be taken.

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- f. Whenever any of the provisions of sub-paragraphs 37d and 37e, above, are executed, USIB and DCS will keep each other informed. This information shall contain a description of the COHINT materia, involved, and, in general terms, the extent and nature of the action taken.
- g. In the event of hostilities the proper authority may direct the appropriate CONIMT organization responsible for providing him support to domegrade to Category I that material in the sub-category of Category II described in paragraph 35g which is relevant to the situation. Such information may then be disseminated or action be taken thereon in accordance with the precedures established for Category I CONIMT. The cognizant COMIMT organization will immediately, without prior consultation with higher authority, make available as Category I such material of this sub-category as is required. USIB and DCS will keep each other informed of domgrading actions taken.
- h. Sub-paragraph 3kd, above, applies with respect to wartime usage of Category I CCHINT. Whenever suitable 'Y' channels are available, they will be used for this dissemination.

PROCEDURES

- 38. The appropriate classification and codeword small:
- a. Appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses
 Category III or II COMINT or a sub-category thereof, and be applied to
 documents and technical material as defined in paragraph 19. Except as provided in paragraphs 35-37, above, this rule applied to maps and charts on
 which are plotted data and information derived from these categories of
 COMINT.

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- 38. b. Be encrypted in the text of every encrypted communication conveying Category III or II COMINT and appear in plain language at the head of the decrypted version. This rule shall apply in all instances except as provided in paragraphs 35-37, above, and under the following conditions:
- (1) COLINT organizations may, without encrypting the appropriate codeword in the encrypted text, transmit TOP SECRET and SECRET technical matter over cryptographic channels or ciphers expressly and exclusively provided for such technical matters.
- (2) CCHIMT organizations and intercept or D/F stations may, at the discretion of the officer in charge and after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, omit the classification and the appropriate codeword from its work-sheets and similar documents used exclusively within each agency or station. The classification may be emitted from raw traffic passed between agencies or from intercept and D/F stations to agencies.
- 39. Category III COMINT and related technical material shall not be transmitted in plain language except as follows:
- a. Sealed, by safehand channels, over routes specifically approved by USIB and DCS.
- b. Over completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to agencies or offices producing or utilizing CONIMT.
- c. Over landlines specifically approved in each instance by USIB or DCS.
- 40. Category II CG:INT and related technical material shall not be transmitted in plain language except as provided in paragraph 39 above, or by protected postal channels internal to, or under exclusive control of, the U.S., Canada or other collaborating British Commonwealth countries.
- Al. Category I COMINT and related technical material should be transmitted by COMINT or 'Y' channels wherever possible, but may be transmitted by conventional channels used for intelligence materials of similar classification.

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It may be transmitted in plain language by a means exposed to interception only when there is no suitable means of secure communications available and when there is an urgent operational need to do so. Whenever possible such plain language transmissions should be in the form of operational orders so worded that the subject matter cannot be traced specifically to COMINT as its origin.

- 42. Raw traffic may be transmitted in plain language as provided in paragraph 39, above. Raw traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL may also be transmitted in accordance with the normal procedure for this classification, except that when transported across the territory of the country originating the traffic, it shall be with the express sanction of USIB or DCS. This sanction will be granted only in cases of compelling need.
 - 43. Except as provided in paragraphs 35-37, above:
- a. Category III CORINT and related technical material transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels expressly provided for these subjects.
- b. Category II CHIMT and related technical material transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels expressly provided for these subjects, those listed in paragraph a., above, or in the most secure cryptographic channel available.
- c. However, in the case of cryptographic systems mutually approved for the purpose, the transmission of CCHINT, related technical material and rew traffic over the same channel is authorized, provided that such channels are reserved for these subjects exclusively.
- 44. In order to facilitate a concerted effort directed toward the determination and assessment of the causes and effects of known or presumed COMINT compromises or losses, it is agreed that:
- a. Whenever any breach of its COKINT security regulations or any other circumstance which in fact has, or can be presumed to have, compromised COMINT or COMINT codewords, or to have revealed COMINT successes to unauthorized

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persons, becomes known to either party, it shall inform the other by means of a report embodying the pertinent facts and conclusions in each case, except that when the party concerned concludes that there is a good reason to believe that such compromise or revelation has not reached and will not, in fact, reach foreign nationals, no report need be made to the other party.

b. Whenever a significant change occurs in foreign cryptographic or communications security, the party discovering such change shall notify the other. Each party shall then analyze and assess the known and suspected circumstances having a bearing upon the change; these analyses and assessments shall be exchanged by the parties; and each party shall thereafter keep the other fully informed of any additional information bearing upon the case.

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APPEIDIX B

AMNEXURE BI

THE ASSIGNMENT OF CONINT

TO CATECORIES AND SUB-CATECORIES

- 1. This Annexure delineates the basis for (a) the establishment of sub-categories, (b) the assignment of COMINT to categories and sub-categories, (c) the classification of COMINT assigned to categories and subcategories, and (d) the application of codewords to categories and subcategories. This Annexure is not intended to accomplish the detailed categorization of all COMINT. However, along with the criteria described in Appendix B, it governs the preparation and maintenance of current, mutually agreed lists to indicate the precise assignment of all COMINT to categories and sub-categories.
- 2. Category 1 COMINT shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET as appropriate in accordance with national security classification procedures and shall not be designated by a codeword. It shall contain the following, provided that interpretations of material of higher categories are not included:
- c. Such COLINT from the less sensitive sub-category or category II as may be so assigned in accordance with Appendix B. (See paragraph 35h)
- d. Such additional COMINT as has been or may be specified and mutually agreed by USIS and DCS.

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- 3. Category II COMINT shall be classified SECRET and shall be designated by a distinctive codeword. It shall contain all CONINT not otherwise assigned to Categories I or III or Sub-categories established within Category II.
 4. Category III COMINT shall be classified TOP SECRET, and shall be
- designated by a distinctive codeword. It shall contain:
- a. Crypt Intelligence derived from high-grade systems, involving the application of sophisticated cryptanalytic techniques, as specified and mutually agreed by USIB and DCS.
- b. Traffic Intelligence derived from callsigns or message headings encrypted in codes and ciphers of high security or complexity, as specified and nutually agreed by USIB and DCS.
- c. Traffic or Crypt Intelligence which reveals success against unusual, sensitive, or complex transmission procedures or devices.
- d. Material obtained from special sources or against targets considered by the procuring organization to be so sensitive as to warrant the protection afforded this category.
- f. Other Crypt or Traffic Intelligence which USIB or DCS by mutual agreement determine should be given the highest degree of security protection because of the potential loss of intelligence which would result from compromise.
 - 5. Sub-categories of Category II shall be established as follows:

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- b. Sub-Category II(I) COMINT is that Category II COMINT which is considered less sensitive than other Category II COMINT and may, therefore, be given more extensive dissemination in order to provide for effective utilization. It is classified SECRET and is designated by a distinctive codeword. It is this sub-category which is described in paragraph 35g of Appendix B. Provided that no information obtained from Categories II and III COMINT, such as complex changing callsign and frequency systems or unusual, sensitive or complex transmission procedures or devices, is included, this sub-category shall contain the following:
- (1) Information derived from the following elements of foreign military, naval, air police, border guard and guerilla communications or communications systems:
 - (a) Communications data
 - (b) Plain Text
 - (c) Any grid or zone references
 - (d) Cover Words
 - (e) Procedural codes used for brevity purposes
 - (f) Jargon codes
- (2) Plain Text and associated communications data obtained from international commercial and foreign internal or external non-military circuits except that specifically assigned to other categories as mutually agreed by USIB or DCS.
- (3) Such additional COMINT as may be specified and nutually agreed by USIB and DCS.

21 March 1960

APPENDIX B

ANDEXURE B2

SECURITY PRINCIPLES COVERNING THE COMDUCT

UF COMENT OPERATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS

INTRODUCTION

1. It is recognized that effective interception of foreign communications and effective support of field commanders may require the establishment of CURINT activities in locations which may suddenly fall under hostile control with consequent loss of CCKINT personnel and/or associated classified materials. It is agreed that, in addition to the partinent, general provisions of Appendix B, the specific provisions which follow shall govern the conduct of CUMINT activities in such locations.

DEFINITIONS

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- 3. Hazardous activities as defined in paragraph 14, Appendix B include:
- a. Duties behind enemy lines, or in-shore operations off an enemy or unfriendly country.
- b. Flights over enemy or unfriendly territory unless on recognized corridor routes.
- c. Haids, minor formation attacks, underwater demolition operations, and service with a unit or formation forward of Division HQ.
- d. Duty in or visits to unfriendly countries and also other areas where from time to time local conditions are considered to involve an unacceptable risk.

SAFECUARDS FOR ASSIGNMENT OF FERSONNEL TO HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES

- 5. As an aid to controlling assignment of personnel to hazardous activities, persons who are or have been indoctrinated will be divided into three groups:
 - a. Group U (Unrestricted)

Individuals who are producers of Category I COMINT and have no knowledge of other Categories, or persons who, although indoctrinated for other Categories of COMINT, have so little access that they do not possess knowledge of current value, and are not subject to restrictions against hazardous activities.

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b. Group M - (Minimum Restriction - one year) Individuals who have knowledge of current value about Categories II or III COMINT or their subcategories, who shall not be assigned to hazardous activities for a minimum period of one year following debriefing.

c. Group P - (Permanent Restriction) Individuals with precise knowledge of CCMINT processing

techniques, competence or potential regarding the more sensitive Category III CCMINT who shall not be assigned to hazardous activities at any time.

6. Exceptions to the above safeguards may be authorized by senior officers and officials at a level prescribed by USIB or DCS. In considering such exceptions the protection offered by diplomatic status should not automatically be considered sufficient, but should be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances involved. In the case of Allied Commands to which CANUSA CUHINT is provided through an SSO or GCU, the senior CLMINT indoctrinated U. S. and Canadian officers shall be authorized to make such exceptions.

EVALUATION OF SITUATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS

- 7. The decision whether a given situation is risky or dangerous shall be made by USIB or DCS or by such other authorities as are responsible for the security of the CCMINT activities concerned, and shall be made in the light of the political, military, and other factors affecting the safety of the CUMINT personnel and materials involved. FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS TO CONDUCT CONINT OPERATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS
- 8. CCMINT operations shall be conducted in exposed areas only after due consideration of the CCHINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly attacked, and of the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of CUMINT activities elsewhere.

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SAFEGUARDS FOR RISKY SITUATIONS

- 9. In the case of COMINT activities established in risky situations, the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions thereto are authorized by senior officers and officials at a level established by USIB or DCS:
- a. Only intercept, analytic and reporting tasks which cannot be performed satisfactorily in safe or protected situations shall be assigned.
- b. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held except those essential to the assigned task and of current application thereto, and the latter shall be maintained in such condition as to insure immediate destruction, if necessary, upon sudden threat of seizure.
- c. No person in Group P, as defined in paragraph 5c above, shall be assigned, unless required by technical considerations.
- d. Sufficient means of destruction shall be provided in order that complete destruction of classified COMINT materials may be carried out in the shortest time possible by the minimum number of personnel.
- c. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

SAFEGUARDS FUR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS

- 10. In the case of COMINT units established in dangerous situations the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions thereto are authorized by senior officers and officials of a lovel established by USIB or DCS:
- a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished elsewhere shall be assigned, and only such analysis as is locally required to support these tasks and permit essential technical reporting shall be performed.
- b. Only COMMIT documents or technical aids essential and of current application to these tasks shall be held.

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- c. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held.
- d. Personnel technically informed in COMINT of a higher level or broader scope than is required for the limited mission of the unit should not be assigned if avoidable.
- e. No person in Group H as defined in sub-paragraph 5b above shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective functioning of the unit.
- f. No person in Group P as defined in sub-paragraph 5c above shall be assigned in any circumstances.
- g. Sufficient means of destruction shall be provided in order that maximum destruction of classified COHINT material may be carried on in the shortest time possible by the minimum number of personnel.
- h. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

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APPENDIX B

ANNEXURE 83

CLASSIFICATION AND HANDLING OF INFORMATION

RELATED TO CONINT OR CONINT ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

- 1. This Annexure establishes minimum standards with respect to the handling and classification of information which is neither CCMINT nor that contained in the "documents and technical material" as described in paragraph 19 of Appendix B, yet reveals, directly or by implication, the existence or nature of CCMINT or of CCMINT activities.
- 2. The nature of CCHINT and CCMINT activities and their susceptibility to loss require that certain information regarding these activities and their product be restricted to persons who have been cleared and indoctrinated for access to CCMINT. Certain other information concerning these activities and their product may be handled within conventional channels for information of similar classification. It is essential, however, that reference to the existence or nature of CCMINT or any CCMINT activity, either direct or indirect, be avoided except among those to whom the knowledge is necessary for the proper performance of their duties.
- 3. Information related to COMINT or COMINT activities which indicates a degree of success or progress in the production of COMINT, a sophisticated COMINT technique or the scale and direction of COMINT effort to a degree which may stimulate countermeasures, as specified in Annex A hereto, must be safeguarded precisely as though it were COMINT. Except as provided for hereinafter, documents containing such information, including messages transmitted electrically, shall be transmitted only via COMINT channels, and shall boar the classification and COMINT codeword appropriate to the most sensitive category or sub-category of COMINT to which they relate.
- 4. Information related to COMINT or COMINT activities, specified in Annex B hereto, shall be kept exclusively within COMINT channels, except as provided for hereinafter and in that Annex. Documents which contain such information,

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including messages transmitted electrically, shall bear the appropriate classification but no COMINT codeword, and shall be clearly identified by the caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY", stamped, typewritten, or printed on each page. In the case of bound documents, the identification will show on the cover and title page, if any.

- 5. Information portaining to COMINT or COMINT activities, specified in Annex C hereto, may be handled in accordance with normal practice for other information of similar classification. However, nothing herein should be construed as prohibiting an authority from passing such information in COMINT channels. (In such cases, the caveat "MANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY" will not be used.) SPECIAL USAGE
- 6. Should it become necessary to furnish information of the types listed in Annex A to non-indoctrinated persons, such action will be taken only after specific authorization in each case by proper authority designated by USIB or DCS. When a document containing such information is released from COMINT channels, the codeword must be removed. NSA and CBNRC, through technical channels, will undertake to keep the other party informed, at least in general terms, of the material involved.
- 7. Information related to COMINT or COMINT activities of the types listed in Annex B may be furnished to non-indoctrinated persons, only with the prior approval of the originator or proper authority and in accordance with the procedures established by USIB or DCS. When a document containing such information is released from COMINT channels, the handling caveat must be removed or rendered illegible.
- 8. Every reasonable precaution must be taken to ensure that documents released from COMINT channels are given minimum distribution and receive the security protection their contents warrant.
- 9. Working papers and similar documents containing information of the types listed in Annexes A and B need not, at the discretion of the officer in charge and after full consideration of the risks involved, bear the classification, codeword or handling caveat when handled exclusively within a COMINT secure area by indoctrinated persons.

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CLASSIFICATION

10. The classification of each document containing information related to COMINT or COMINT activities must be determined individually, after due consideration of the damage which unauthorized disclosure of its contents could cause to national security, national interests, and the capability of either party to continue to produce communications intelligence.

PUBLIC STATEMENTS

11. Maximum feasible administrative action will be taken to require that all public statements which may contain information related to COMINT or COMINT activities are submitted, for preliminary review and advice, to the appropriate COMINT authority, as specified by either Board. In the event that such information already publicly revealed is included in a document submitted by a private source for review, an attempt by persuasion shall be made to eliminate such information or to express it in such general terms as to conceal, to the maximum degree possible, specific associations with COMINT activities. In the event such a document is submitted by an official source, that document will be classified in accordance with paragraph 10 above.

APPENDIX B

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ANNEX A

TYPES OF IMPORDATION TO BE CIVEN THE SAME PROTECTION AS COMMIT

- When information which is neither CCKINT nor that contained in the "documents and technical material" referred to in paragraph 19 of Appendix B, indicates:-
 - (a) a degree of success or progress being made in the production of communications intelligence, or
 - (b) a sophisticated COMINT technique, or
 - (c) the scale and direction of the COHMT effort to a degree which may stimulate countermessures.

it must be accorded the protection of the classification and CULINT codeword appropriate to the highest category of CGillT to which it relates, and will be kept within CONIET channels unless released therefrom by proper authority designated by USIS or DCS. If the category of COHERT to which the information

relates is not known, it will be accorded the protection of the highest category. Examples of the kind of information which may reveal (a), (b) or (c) above

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(a) Consumer requirements for information from a specific bource

- (c) Detailed characteristics and capabilities of equipment as applied in the exploitation of COMINT.
- (d) Details of COMMINT-developed techniques used in COMINT research or production.

(b) (1)

(b)(3) - 18 USC 798(a)

(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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APPENDIX B

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ANNEX B

TYPES OF INFORMATION TO HE HANDLED VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

 Information which does not require codeword protection but which relates to COMINT or CUMINT activities will bear the classification indicated (but no codeword), will carry the caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY" and be retained in COMINT channels unless exempted or released in accordance with procedures established by USIB or DCS.

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- 2. Information relating to COMINT or COMINT activities will be classified TOP SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of it could result in exceptionally grave damage to national security, national interests or the continued conduct of COMINT operations. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:
 - (a) A plan, doctrine or policy or information on tasking or control which reveals specific COMINT operations of major importance.
 - (d) Construction and budgetary information of major importance relating to COMINT collection and processing organizations and installations.
 - (e) Safe combinations permitting access to CONINT or information regarding COMINT activities.

SECRET

3. Information relating to COMINT or COMINT activities will be classified SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of it could result in serious damage to national security, national interests or the continued conduct of COMINT operations. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:-

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(b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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- (a) A plan, doctrine, or policy or information on tasking or control which reveals important specific CCHINT operations.
- (b) Base rights negotiations for COMINT sites, which involve disclosure of the specific purposes for which the sites are intended.
- (c) Important construction and budgetary information relating to CONINT collection and processing organizations and installations.
- (d) Individual intercept assignments.
- (e) Detailed D/F plans and overall operational effectiveness of D/F organizations.
- (f) All personnel reports and documents, civilian and/or military which indicate authorized and/or actual agency CONIM strength in total, by job designation or by organizational element title where such designation or organizational element title would indicate details of the CONIMY mission.

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(b) (3) - P.L. 86 - 36

CONFIDENTIAL

- L. Information relating to COMINT or CCMINT activities will be classified CONFIDENTIAL if the unauthorized disclosure of it could be prejudicial to national security, national interests or the continued conduct of COMINT operations. Examples of the kind of information which may current this classification are:
 - (a) A plan, doctrine, or policy or information on tasking or control which reveals specific CCMINT operations of a minor nature.
 - (b) COHINT indoctrination and debriefing statements.
 - (c) Lists of COHIRT indoctrinated and debriefed personnel. .
 - (d) Information which reveals extent of effort or special purpose features of electronic computers as utilized for COMINT processing, without revealing COMINT techniques.

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APPENDIX B

ANNEXURE B3

ATTNEX C

TYPES OF INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE

WITH NORMAL SECURITY REGULATIONS

1. Information pertaining to CCHINT which neither requires codeword protection nor the caveat "HANDLE VIA CCHINT CHANNELS ONLY" will be classified and handled in accordance with U. S. or Canadian governmental security regulations in effect for information unconnected with CCHINT or CCMINT activities.

SECRET

- 2. Information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to national security or national interests, will be classified SECRET. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:
 - (a) Construction and budgetary matters pertaining to CCHINT collection or processing organizations and installations, provided no reference is made to their specific functions.
 - (b) Base rights negotiations for CCHINT sites, provided no mention is made of actual purposes for which the sites are intended.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3. Information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to national security or national interests, will be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

 Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:
 - (a) Personnel reports and documents, civilian or military, which indicate authorized or actual COMINT agency strength in total, by organizational element, short title or symbol, by primary element, or by function.
 - (b) Regulations stating the general mission and functions of CCHINT activities that do not reveal specific CCHINT techniques or procedures.
 - (c) Correspondence on hazardous duty restrictions pertaining to individuals released from COMINT assignments.

UNCLASSIFIED

4. Examples of the kind of information which is UNCLASSIFIED are as follows:-

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- (a) Cover names assigned to "Rapid Analytic Kachinery" (RAK) when used out of context.
- (b) The terms "Communications Intelligence" and "COMINT", "Signals Intelligence" and "SIGINT" when used out of context.
- (c) References in broad, general, non-specific terms to intercept, direction finding, norse operator analysis and radio finger printing as sources of intelligence.
- (d) Elementary principles of traffic analysis, military cryptanalysis and cryptography.
- (e) Mantion of interest in computer type circuits, if no indication is made to type of systems in which they are to be used.
- (f) Individual job titles and descriptions that do not contain information otherwise listed above as requiring classification.
- (g) Project numbers and titles used in justification of purchase of materials when no technical usage is specified.
- (h) The fact of association between any U. S. or Canadian CCCINT agency providing it is not shown to be in the CCMINT field.

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APPENDIX C

EMERGENCY PLANNING

- 1. The word "Hostilities", whenever used in this Appendix or Annexures thereto, is defined as a state of war or a similar situation in which both the United States and Canada are actively involved.
- 2. Both parties agree to the necessity for combined COMINT emergency plans to be placed into effect at, or before, the outbreak of hostilities. It is understood that such plans are liable to modification in whole or in part by governmental or stoff agreements or decisions made at a higher level.
- It is agreed that a threat of hostilities, or developments after hostilities begin, may necessitate:

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
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



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
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
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
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
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



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





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
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
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
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
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
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




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
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
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
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


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APPENDIX P

COOPERATION IN TRANSLATION, AND EXCHANGE OF PERTINENT

MATERIALS AND INFORMATION .

- 1. Translated texts, extracts, gists, (unless excepted by pars. 5 below), items of Truffic Intelligence, COMINTSUMS, and comments eppended thereto, will be exchanged uron the specific request of each party, or when determined by the producing party to be of interest to the other. This exchange normally will be effected through the regular liaison channels, although such exchange may be effected by electrical communications when specifically requested by either party.
- 2. If either purty considers the decrypts or plain texts serve its intelligence needs without translation, such decrypts or plain texts will be required by the other as if they were translated texts and their exchange between the porties will be precisely the same as that of translated texts and extracts (see pura. 1 above). It is the intention of each party to limit such cases to the minimum.
- 3. Decrypts will not be exchanged between the two parties, except as above, or as may be arranged for cryptanulytic or other technical reasons. Any decrypts or series of decrypts will be made available on specific request by one party to the other, if not prohibitively inconventient:
- 4. Inasmuch as the purties to this Agreement will probably be unable to translate all decrypts or plain texts in full or even in part. ench will corry out a process of scanning such as will meet its own requirements. The liaison officers will be free to some this material to insure that any particular interests of their own party are being served.
- 5. Class which are made by a party for its own use but not issued will not be exchanged but will be at the disposal of the limison officers as may be required.
- 6. CB and AFSA will constitute the channel through which all Communication Intelligence items produced by Agencies of one party will be forwarded to Agencies of the other. Any exceptions to the foregoing will be under only with the specific approval of both CB and AFSA in such case.

STANDARDITATION OF TRANSLATION PORM

7. To avoid embiguity and to promote ease of reading, reference, and recording, it will be the aim of the Canadian and U.S. Agencies to adopt a standard style and layout for headings, translated texts, gists, extracts, comments, and translators' notes.

STANDARDIZATION OF TRANSLATION CONTENT

8. Each Agency will furnish to the other upon specific request, copies of Supplumental Closseries and other compilations which it prepares as a result of end for use in its translation processes. The materials thus exchanged will be the basis for con-

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APPENDIX P

tinuous discussion between the Agencies with a view to increasing standardization.

- 9. In order to develop a common standard of validity grading in language equivalents, each Agency will inform the other of the significance of such gradings as it currently uses in its Supplemental Glossaries.
- 10. Translated texts will be assumed to be in full unless labelled "gist" or "extract".
- 11. Comments will be clearly distinguishable as such and will be prefaced by the word "Comment".

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APPENDIX C

COMBISED COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS ORGANIZATION

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
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ANNEXURE A
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CANADIAN-U.S. COMINT COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS



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ANNEXURE B

COLLUNICATIONS FOR RE-LOCATED ACTIVITIES

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
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
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APPENDIX. I

EXCHANGE OF RAY TRAFFIC

AND STANDARDIZATION OF RAY MATERIAL FORMAT

EXCHANGE OF RATI MATERIAL

- 1. Each porty will furnish to the other, es promptly as practicable without request and as a matter of routine, one copy of every item of raw traff'c collected by its operating Agencies which is of a type required by the other party. Either party may request expedited delivery, or additional copies, or specific categories of raw troffic and each shall endeavour to meet the needs of the other in this respect.
- 2. Insofar as practicable raw truffic exchanged will be in the forms indicated in paragraphs $4\,-\,8$ below.
- 3. The inclusion of a case-number in an item of raw traffic is not duemed to show evidence of processing for Communication Intelligence purposes and therefore the material may still be classified COMFIDENTIAL.

STANDARDIZATION OF RAT TRAFFIC FORMAT

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