



ANNEX 1

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2018 in favour of Georgia

Action Document for

"EU4 Security, Accountability and Fight against Crime in Georgia (SAFE)"

INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL GRANT APPLICANTS

WORK PROGRAMME FOR GRANTS

This document constitutes the work programme for grants in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation No 2018/486 and the action programme/measure in the sense of Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation No 236/2014.

1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number	EU4 Security, Accountability and Fight against Crime in Georgia (SAFE) CRIS number: ENI/2018/041-443 financed under European Neighbourhood Instrument	
2. Zone benefiting from the action/location	Georgia The action shall be carried out at the following location: countrywide.	
3. Programming document	Single Support Framework for EU support to Georgia 2017-2020	
4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area	Good Governance Security Sector Civil Protection Crisis Management	DEV. Aid: YES
5. Amounts concerned	Total estimated cost: EUR 29 111 111 Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 28 000 000	
6. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies)	Project Modality Direct management: - grants – call for proposals, including twinning - grants – direct award - procurement of services	

	Indirect management with International Organisations (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS))			
7 a) DAC code(s)	15210 Security System Management Reform 15110 Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management 15113 Anti-corruption Organisations and Institutions 15130 Legal and Judicial Development 15160 Human Rights 15170 Women Equality organisations and institutions 15180 Ending violence against women and girls 15250 Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war 74010 Disaster prevention and preparedness			
b) Main Delivery Channel	60000 Private sector institution 10000 Public Sector Institution 20000 Non-Governmental Institutions and Civil Society 21000 International NGO 41000 United Nations Agency, Fund or Commission			
8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)	General policy objective	Not targeted	Significant objective	Main objective
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X
	Aid to environment	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality (including Women In Development)	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade Development	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	RIO Convention markers	Not targeted	Significant objective	Main objective
	Biological diversity	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Climate change adaptation	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships	n/a			
10. SDGs	Main Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): 16. Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions Secondary SDG: 5. Gender Equality			

SUMMARY

This programme will contribute to increase the security of the Georgian citizens by strengthening good governance and the rule of law in Georgia, through support provided to (1) consolidating the prevention and fight against crime, (2) improving civil protection and (3) enhancing the oversight over the security sector.

The programme fully takes into account the priorities of the updated 2017-2020 EU-Georgia Association Agenda¹ as well as the recommendations proposed by the latest Visa Suspension Mechanism report².

The first report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism, issued by the European Commission in December 2017 noted that Georgia ensured continuous fulfilment of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP) benchmarks and demonstrated commitment to preventing and fighting organised crime, but that challenges remained, particularly with regard to the involvement of Georgian nationals in organised crime in a number of EU Member States. As reflected in the EU-Georgia Association Agenda, Georgia's efforts in the fight against corruption also need to be reinforced. These efforts can be supported to better address, *inter alia*, high level and complex forms of corruption. At the same time, the EU stands ready to mobilise different assistance tools to support resilience and capacity building in Georgia to counter hybrid threats, as well as to help improving the national capacities to protect citizens and the environment in cases of emergencies.

The main areas of support under the proposed programme are the following:

- Strengthening the capacities of relevant institutions to more effectively address corruption;
- Strengthening societal resilience and institutional and operational capacities to prevent and fight crime, including corruption and other serious crimes such as trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, money laundering and terrorism;
- Support to the consolidation of Integrated Border Management, while fully taking into account human rights and integration of the gender perspective;
- Strengthening institutional and operational capacities to counter hybrid and emerging threats;
- Developing civil protection and crisis management capabilities;
- Strengthening the oversight over the security sector.

In line with the EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (SSR)³ endorsed by the Council in November 2016 the proposed programme aims to improve governance and human security by supporting the development of accountable security institutions and the provision of effective security services to the population, thus providing the environment for sustainable development and peace.

On the basis of the "whole-of-society" approach the programme envisages to engage all relevant security sector state actors and civil society organisations in the implementation of the actions in accordance with their roles and mandates. A bottom-up approach to security sector reform is being promoted, including and targeting local communities through strengthening resilience and

¹ https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/annex_ii_-_eu-georgia_association_agenda_text.pdf

² Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: First report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism, COM(2017) 815 final

³ Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform, JOIN(2016) 31 final

community policing, complementary to the institutional approach. The proposed programme will pay particular attention to the principles of human security, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, national ownership, democratic control and oversight, rule of law, integrity, transparency, inclusiveness, accountability, sustainability, and gender sensitivity, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and subsequent resolutions on women, peace and security.

In line with the EU non-recognition and engagement policy towards Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, the potential, opportunity and feasibility of extending further actions to these regions will be assessed during the implementation of the programme, in accordance with the crisis declaration.

1 CONTEXT⁴

1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area

Strengthening security and resilience of Georgia across a wide range of areas from fighting and preventing crime to civil protection and emergency management, is a priority for the Government of Georgia. Major reform progress has been achieved in various areas of the security sector, not least under the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP). This followed earlier security sector reform efforts, in particular with regard to the country's law enforcement agencies, security architecture and more recently civil protection and emergency management.

While progress was achieved in protecting the rights of citizens, there are shortcomings to be addressed. Institutions need to be strengthened in the prevention of violations against citizens and in the development of a culture of accountability and respective mechanisms. Civil society (as rights holders) and mandated authorities (as duty bearers) should play an increased role in oversight and policy dialogue with security providers.

To further the approximation with international and EU standards and obligations, and the implementation of the commitments assumed under the Association Agreement and the VLAP, further gaps remain to be addressed in particular in the following areas:

- 1) Prevention of and fight against crime
- 2) Hybrid and emerging threats
- 3) Civil protection, Crisis management and CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear) threats
- 4) Oversight of the security sector and policy dialogue

⁴ It should be noted that the Government, following the taking up of duties of a new Prime Minister on 19 June 2018, has reorganised its structure merging certain ministries and agencies. Whilst the new Government is fully committed to their process of political association and economic integration with the EU, individual policy areas may be subject to changes as notably reflected in a new Government Programme and as a consequence of new appointments as well as of merger and reorganisation of certain ministries and agencies. The implementation of the present Annual Action Programme will adapt to these changes while following the overall directions set out hereafter.

1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework

The EU's 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy⁵ pledges that the EU will strengthen the resilience of states and societies by supporting good governance and accountable institutions and by working closely with civil society, in particular in the EU's surrounding regions in the East and the South. The Commission services and the EEAS are currently working on developing a Security Sector Reform (SSR) coordination matrix for Georgia – a pilot country for the new SSR approach.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Review⁶ conducted in 2015 set out a new framework for building more effective partnerships between the EU and its neighbours, as further reiterated in the 2017 report on the implementation of the ENP Review⁷. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit in Riga in 2015⁸, followed by the EaP Ministerial meeting in May 2016, confirmed the consensus of EU Member States and EaP partner countries to step up actions in four key priority areas: (1) economic development and market opportunities; (2) strengthening institutions and good governance, including security cooperation; (3) connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change and (4) mobility and people-to-people contacts. To maximise impact, a more focused approach was agreed so that tangible results for citizens can be delivered under each of the four EaP priorities. 20 key deliverables (the "20 deliverables for 2020"), agreed at the EaP Summit in Brussels in 2017⁹, have been identified in the framework of the four priorities, on the basis of already existing agreed commitments, accompanied by milestones and targets to be reached by 2020.

As part of the Single Support Framework (SSF) for EU support to Georgia 2017-2020¹⁰ the proposed programme reflects the EaP priorities as it defines actions in support of priority 9 (addressing rule of law and anti-corruption mechanisms) and priority 12 (strengthening resilience and cooperation in the area of civilian security); it also supports cross cutting issues such as gender, civil society and the rights-based approach.

The EU-Georgia Association Agreement (AA), including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)¹¹, was signed in June 2014 and entered into force on 1 July 2016 - setting the foundation for political association and enhanced economic integration between Georgia and the EU. For the period 2017-2020, the EU and the Georgian Government have prepared and adopted a revised Association Agenda, which sets new priorities for joint work and reaffirms both sides' commitment to closer association.

⁵ Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

⁶ Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN (2015) 50 final.

⁷ Joint Report to the European Parliament, the council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Report on the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Review, JOIN(2017) final

⁸ Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Riga, 21-22 May 2015): <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21526/riga-declaration-220515-final.pdf>

⁹ Annex to the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, (Brussels, 24 November 2017): <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/24/eastern-partnership-summit-joint-declaration/>.

¹⁰ Single Support Framework for EU support to Georgia (2017-2020): https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/georgia_2017-2020_ssf_final.pdf

¹¹ Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, OJEU, L261, 30.8 2014

The EU and Georgia launched in October 2017 an annual high-level Strategic Dialogue - a framework to discuss issues of common interest in the field of foreign and security policy.

Furthermore, visa-free travel to the Schengen area for Georgian citizens holding a biometric passport entered into force on 28 March 2017. This visa-free regime is conditioned by the sustainable implementation of the benchmarks of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. While the first report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism concludes that the *visa liberalisation benchmarks continue to be fulfilled* it stresses the expectation of further addressing specific issues related to the implementation of anti-corruption reforms and fighting against crimes¹².

The EU Gender Action Plan 2 (GAP II, 2016-2020) envisages more involvement of women in decision making at political level and in conflict prevention, with specific emphasis on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2018-2020), through a consultative process with participation by Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), conflict affected women, civil society organisations (CSOs) and local government. The Action Plan was developed with EU support and covers work in different sectoral policies across the government structure.

The revised ENP calls upon the EU to continue working with partner countries on drug co-operation and to support them on the implementation of integrated national drug policies. Furthermore, the EU Drugs Strategy for 2013-2020¹³ and its recently updated Action Plan on drugs covering 2017-2020¹⁴ reconfirms the importance of international cooperation, giving special attention to neighbourhood partners. With regard to Georgia, the Government is in the process of reforming its drugs policies and legislation at national level.

Concerning the police, Georgia has undergone a major reform in 2004 and has been implementing further reforms in the areas of the judiciary system, prosecution, penitentiary system and public administration. In the context of the visa liberalisation process, Georgia progressed with the development of relevant legislative framework and improved inter-agency cooperation, migration management, border management, as well as data protection and exchange policies.

The 2017-2020 National Strategy on Combating Organised Crime and its 2017-2018 Action Plan focus on (a) combating the so-called “thieves-in-law”; (b) fighting transit of narcotic drugs; (c) fighting cybercrime and organised crime employing cyber methods, (d) using modern police methods to combat organised crime, and (e) international bilateral and/or multilateral operational and wider law enforcement cooperation in combating organised crime.

To support efficient implementation of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy and Action Plan (2014-2018), the Border Police Modernisation, Standardisation and Unification

¹² Concrete recommendations include: Effective implementation of the verification mechanism of asset declarations; Finalise the reform on intelligence-led policing and the creation of a unified crime analysis system as a matter of priority; Continue and further strengthen cross-border law enforcement and judicial cooperation; Step up efforts on enforcing money-laundering legislation, tracing, freezing and confiscating criminal assets, including across borders; Designate a national Asset Recovery Office; Align the legislation with the fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive; Operationalise the Cooperation Agreement concluded with Europol as a matter of priority and Conclude the cooperation agreement with Eurojust.

¹³ EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020), 2012/C4021/01, 29.12.2012

¹⁴ EU Action Plan on Drugs 2017-2020, 2017/C 215/02, 5.7.2017

Programme was approved by the Government. Georgia has also made progress with the implementation of the 2016-2020 Migration Strategy and its Action Plan, in particular the Unified Migration Analytical System (testing launched in October 2016), the Unified System of Risk and Threat Analysis at the borders, the Migration Risk Analysis methodology, and the Migration Profile update – thereby continuing the implementation of the visa liberalisation benchmarks in a sustained manner. Georgia has been also carrying out three phases of nationwide campaigns and trainings on the rules of the visa free travel and is monitoring travels to the Schengen area.

Adopted for the first time in 2005 and revised on yearly basis, and later accompanied financially with a Basic Data and Directions Document (BDD), the Criminal Justice Reform Strategy is the reference paper for further reforms in the criminal justice area. Its overall objective is to strengthen the rule of law and the protection of human rights. In addition, in 2017 the Prosecutor's Office and the High Council of Justice developed their own comprehensive sector reform strategies therefore employing a specific methodology for their particular field of activity. The Special Penitentiary Service (former Ministry of Corrections) then started developing its own strategy and action plan in early 2018 including measures aiming to manage and deter violent behaviour.

The Government developed and adopted the National Human Rights Strategy for 2014-2020 (NHRS) and three detailed Action Plans. These form altogether a comprehensive and binding set of regulations protecting and promoting human rights.

In 2005 the Government initiated a successful set of anti-corruption reforms¹⁵. It adopted the first Anticorruption Strategy in 2010, elaborated by the multi-stakeholder Anticorruption Council chaired by the Ministry of Justice and composed of state institutions, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and International Organisations. The strategy has been significantly improved since and it now covers prevention of corruption in 16 areas, including corruption prevention in municipalities. The strategy also addresses the fight against corruption, with emphasis on the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases as well as on the inter-agency coordination of law enforcement bodies. An asset recovery policy is work in progress and the system of declaration of assets is currently being reviewed.

The reform of the public administration (PAR) is considered a priority since the change of political majority in 2012. The new Government at that time broadened its ambition and adopted in 2015 the first overall PAR Roadmap 2015-2020, aiming to further improve the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public administration.

Georgia's first cyber security strategy dates back to 2012. The latest strategy covering 2017-2018 was adopted in January 2017. In 2015, Georgia introduced specialised national cyber security laws to develop effective and efficient security mechanisms.

A national Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy, including a plan of action with distribution of responsibilities and tentative budget, was adopted in 2017.

¹⁵ International ratings: Control of corruption Good Governance Index improved from 37/100 in 2004 to 74/100 in 2016. 2017 Transparency International corruption perception index: 56/100 ahead of several EU countries (though in slight decrease compared to 2016).

The National Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threat Reduction Strategy and its 2015-2019 National Action Plan, under the responsibility of the Interagency Coordinating Council for Combating CBRN Threats, both aim at effectively mitigating risks posed by chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear materials and related consequences. Georgia is currently undertaking a hybrid threat risk assessment.

1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis¹⁶

The security sector is inherently complex and composed of a variety of actors who are active across a number of areas. With citizens representing the key right holders of the programme, the following entities are essential stakeholders to develop the proposed actions:

1) Prevention of and fight against crime

The **Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA)** is one of the primary actors in the security sector, the functions of which include public order, traffic safety, crime investigation, preventative activities, state border protection, immigration and provision of public services (such as permits and licenses). The structural subdivisions of the MIA include, inter alia, the Office of the Minister, the General Inspection Department, the Central Criminal Police Department, the Patrol Police Department and the newly created Human Rights Protection Department. The 2017 institutional review of the MIA points to the need to separate operative and investigation functions within the Criminal Police. The International Law Enforcement Cooperation Centre, incorporates all MIA units responsible for international operational cooperation and serves as a single point of contact in charge of exchange of operative information.

Police capacity building and training are provided by the **Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs** (MIA Academy) including basic, re-training and promotion courses.

Also through its newly established **Human Rights Protection Department**, the MIA is a key actor under Georgia's 2018-2020 National Action Plan on the Implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security and the National Action Plan on the Measures to be Implemented for Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence which were approved by the Government of Georgia in April 2018. The **Inter-agency Commission on Gender Equality, Violence against Women and Domestic Violence** was established in June, 2017 and its mandate covers gender equality, violence against women and domestic violence and women, peace and security related issues. The said Commission has worked on the following policy documents: 1) National Action Plan on Ending Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (2018-2020); 2) National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (2018-2020); 3) Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Section of the National Human Rights Action Plan (2018-2020).

The **State Security Service of Georgia** (SSSG) was separated from the MIA and started functioning as an independent agency in August 2015 through the Law on the State Security

¹⁶ It should be noted that the Government, following the taking up of duties of a new Prime Minister on 19 June 2018, has reorganised its structure merging certain ministries and agencies. Relevant new state institutions have been reflected in this Annual Action Programme to the extent possible in August 2018.

Service. It defines its mandate as protecting constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the military potential of Georgia from illegal acts of certain individuals and special services of foreign countries; fight against terrorism; fight against transnational organised crime and international crime, containing threats to state security; protecting state secrets and protecting the country from foreign threats. This Law also includes provisions on internal and external oversight mechanisms over the activities of the SSSG. A number of international and local observers have voiced concern that these mechanisms do not sufficiently meet the standards of accountability and transparency.¹⁷ The SSSG-Anticorruption Agency is also competent for detection and investigation of corruption cases in the public sector, in particular on cases touching upon national security.

The **Prosecutor's Office (POG)** conducts investigation in selected cases, exercises procedural guidance over the investigation of all crimes, follows up on violations of rights of imprisoned, detained or arrested persons, undertakes criminal prosecution, participates in criminal law cases at courts, coordinates the fight against crime, takes measures to protect human rights and carries out international judicial cooperation in criminal matters. A special Unit investigates complex corruption and money-laundering crimes. There is risk of overlapping competencies on this specific topic with part of the SSSG work.

The **Special Penitentiary Service** (former Ministry of Corrections) (SPS) is in charge of prison management bearing the responsibility for the security of prisoners and for human rights' observance. The Ministry of Corrections is being merged with the Ministry of Justice.

An **Interagency Coordinating Council for Combating Organised Crime** was established in 2013 and consists of the MIA (chair), POG, MoC, **Ministries of Justice (MoJ), Finance** and Education and the SSSG. Its functions include among others: drafting the national strategy and action plan against organised crime, elaboration of respective legislative proposals to fight organised crime. The Coordinating Council has thematic working groups organised at the operational level. The **National Bank of Georgia** as well as the Ministry of Finance's Financial Investigation Unit also implement tasks related to anti-money laundering.

The **National Drug Situation Monitoring Centre** (Monitoring Centre) was established in March 2018 by decision of the Interagency Coordinating Council for Combating Drug Abuse to which it will be accountable but it is not yet fully functional. Its mandate aims to independently monitor unlawful consumption and illegal turnover of substances subjected to the special control, and the general drug situation within the country, undertake research and analysis to determine the most recent trends with respect to the drug situation in Georgia. The Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from Occupied Territories, Labour, Health and Social Affairs (MILHSA), Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Special Penitentiary Service, Ministry of Education Science, Culture and Sport, Office of the Chief Prosecutor are represented at the Centre. The Centre cooperates with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and regularly exchanges relevant information related to the drug situation in the country. The MILHSA is also in charge of drug rehabilitation programmes and services. The Integrated Border Management concept presumes the engagement of a number of stakeholders. The Georgian Border Police operates under the MIA and is responsible for the

¹⁷ https://emc.org.ge/uploads/products/pdf/State_Security_Service_1529327873.pdf

protection of green and blue borders, whereas the Patrol Police Department controls the flows of passengers at border crossing points. The Revenue Service under the Ministry of Finance inspects goods transiting at the border and also has the responsibility for passport control for large vehicles at land borders. Migration management framed within the national Strategy on Migration for 2016-2020 is implemented by the State Commission on Migration Issues chaired by the Ministry of Justice and coordinated through the Secretariat within the Public Service Development Agency.

2) Hybrid and emerging threats

Cybersecurity and cybercrime are cross-cutting topics, which are dealt with by a number of agencies, with the **Data Exchange Agency** under the MoJ (with a Computer Emergency Response Team), the **Ministry of Defence's (MoD) Cyber Security Bureau**, the Cybercrime Division under the MIA and the Prosecution Service being the main actors.

The **Ministry of Internal Affairs** is expected to obtain responsibility to develop the new legislative framework for the protection of critical infrastructure. For this purpose, it would liaise with and coordinate different agencies managing critical infrastructure, covering different sectors such as energy, transport, health, information and communication technology, finance, food safety, water supply, sanitation, hazardous waste, etc. Additionally, the **Georgian National Communications Commission (GNCC)** covers the Critical Information System Infrastructure.

3) Civil Protection, Crisis Management and CBRN

The newly established **Emergency Management Service (EMS)** is a special state organisation directly subordinated to the Prime Minister, which coordinates the functioning of the national system of civil protection and is responsible for policy planning and implementation in the field of civil protection. The EMS is about to sign an Administrative Arrangement with DG ECHO, which should facilitate its cooperation with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. The **Legal Entity of Public Law (LEPL) 112 – Emergency and Operative Response Centre** operates under the MIA. LEPL 112 acts as first responder, receiving and directing relevant information and emergency service resources to ensure prompt response to emergencies, natural and man-made disasters.

The **Ministry of Defence (MoD)** ensures the implementation of the state policy in the defence sector, including in the area of civil protection and emergency management, cyber security and strategic communication. The MoD is also one of the lead agencies contributing to the 2018-2020 National Action Plan on the Implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. Capacity building and training are provided by the **Defence Academy**. The **Military Police** is performing law enforcement tasks within the military, but occasionally interacts with civilians e.g. when escorting convoys or in relation to protected premises.

The **SSSG** is mandated to coordinate the implementation and monitoring of the CBRN Threat Reduction Strategy. The EMS is responsible for CBRN on operational level as first responders, while the SSSG is responsible for detection of illicit trafficking cases of radioactive/nuclear materials and initiation of any criminal case and the MIA is responsible for detection of CBRN threats at the borders and at the Administrative Boundary Line. The **LEPL Agency of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (ANRS)**, under the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture,

provides preliminary assessments of suspicious materials detected by SSSG or other relevant law enforcement agencies. ANRS as a regulatory body supervises all activities related to radiation safety and annually inspects all sites with radioactive sources. Together with the EMS, MIA and other competent authorities, ANRS participates in responses to cross-border nuclear and radiation incidents/emergency.

4) Oversight of the security sector and policy dialogue

Along with other supervisory functions via its Committees (Legal, Human Rights, Budgetary) the Parliament's **Defence and Security Committee** has the authority to create a **Group of Trust**, composed of 5 members of the Parliament. The Group is tasked with the budgetary control of special programmes and the undisclosed activities of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Security Service and the Intelligence Service. The Parliament also plays an important role in overseeing the overseers (which is one of the aspects targeted by the proposed programme).

Following recommendations of international and national organisations and respecting the commitment undertaken under the Association Agreement, a Law on a new **State Inspector Service** was adopted in July 2018. The new body will incorporate functions of the existing Personal Data Protection Inspector and of a **new investigative body** for crimes committed by law enforcement officers; it will become operational in 2019.

As Georgia does not have a military ombudsman, violations of human rights in the armed forces are currently dealt with by the special department of human rights protection in defence of the **Public Defender's Office (PDO)**. The PDO also carries out functions of a National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), envisaged by the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). Its role is to examine places subject to restriction of liberty (e.g. custody and pre-trial detention facilities) and observe the protection of human rights. The **State Audit Office (SAO)** oversees procurements.

Civil Society as a whole is very active in Georgia but would benefit from further support and resources in order to be able to continue playing its role in policy formulation and acting as a watchdog over the reform of the security sector. Furthermore, the civil society organisations play an active role in preventing crime and potentially terrorist activities through their ground work on shaping the resilience of grass-root communities, in particular vulnerable ethnic groups. The civil society organisations actively participate and support the 2018-2020 National Action Plan on the Implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security and the National Action Plan on the Measures to be Implemented for Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence.

1.1.3 Priority areas for support/problem analysis

Component 1: Prevention and fight against crime

The Public Administration Reform Roadmap covers all sectors of public administration. The Ministry of Interior has set out ambitious plans to enhance its effectiveness from organisational to operational and training aspects. In the security sector however, institutions such as the MIA and SSSG (the MoD makes an exception) operate with human resources management policies

that remain largely covered by specific legislation outside the PAR legal framework. The implementation of the Law on Public Internal Financial Control in the security sector is limited.

Georgia has been addressing shortcomings stemming from Georgia's past where criminal law was in some instances enforced without sufficiently considering fundamental rights such as the prohibition of torture, the right to liberty, the right to a fair trial and the right to privacy. In particular, steps have been taken as regards internal control mechanisms, including the General Inspectorates in charge of supervision of and disciplinary proceedings against law enforcement officers, in order to increase the efficiency and accountability of the security sector actors. Achievements should be sustained and potential gaps closed notably at implementation level.

The anticorruption efforts are clearly steered at national level by the Ministry of Justice, in close coordination with all relevant agencies. The Prosecution Service has a primary investigation competence, while SSSG is competent where it detects the case of corruption, in particular with regard to complex corruption. The division of tasks and responsibilities might lead to overlapping competences. As reflected in the national anti-corruption strategy 2017-2018, coordination between law enforcement agencies needs to be further improved. In this context, it is to note that the Anti-Corruption Network (ACN) of the OECD calls for stronger attention to the effective operationalisation of anticorruption policies at sectoral level. As part of the VLAP, the asset declarations verification mechanism was introduced in January 2017 alongside the necessary amendments to the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in the Public Institutions. The 2017 exercise reportedly led to a high ratio of administrative sanctions and several cases referred to law-enforcement agencies. The effectiveness of this mechanism requires good inter-agency coordination and proper follow-up of sanctions. It is monitored through the policy dialogue between EU-Georgia. The legal framework for seizure, confiscation and management of crime proceeds is defined under the Criminal Code of Georgia, Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia and Civil Procedure Code of Georgia. An Asset Recovery Office (ARO) is not yet established in Georgia but Georgia has designated the Unit of European Integration and Cooperation with International Organisations (EU Integration Unit) of the Chief Prosecutor's Office as an Asset Recovery Office which is in the process of reviewing its capabilities as an ARO to identify areas of further improvement.

The efficiency of the enforcement of anti-money laundering legislation, including across borders, needs to be further improved in view of the need to align Georgian legislation with the latest version of the EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive. It is important that the necessary financial investigation tools are established and introduced in the circuit, as provided by the mentioned Directive.

Serious and organised crime not only constitutes a threat for society but, given its cross border impact, it could also have the potential to affect negatively the country's obligations under the visa liberalisation process. The first report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism highlighted that *"Georgia remained a transit country for various illicit commodities trafficked to the EU, in particular drugs. Georgia had been increasingly used to launder illicit proceeds generated by various organised crime groups in the EU and outside the EU and that it had been emerging as a transit country for laundered criminal proceeds."*

The MIA defined its new priorities in early 2018 focussing on community, intelligence led policing and the distinction between operational and desk investigations. In order to strengthen the fight against crime, the criminal police reform requires further support to strengthen the

institutional set-up and the operational capacities, including through international cooperation with Europol and Eurojust. The Interagency Coordinating Council for Combating Organised Crime needs further substantial support to be able to meet commitments to fight organised crime undertaken within the EU-Georgia cooperation framework, including through the gradual establishment of a unified crime analysis system. Intelligence led and community policing also need to be fully operationalised for the same purpose.

Drugs constitute another multi-faceted problem in Georgia. Its geographical location creates risks for drug trafficking leading to increasing numbers of drug users. There is a high number of injecting drug users but at the same time limited treatment options. While state funded treatment programmes are available on voluntary and not obligatory basis their coverage throughout the country needs to be further increased. Drug-related felonies often result in disproportionately long sentences, prohibitive fines, and deprivation of other rights. The police are reported to have compelled thousands of people to take drug tests, in some cases by detaining them for many hours. A legislative package to modernise the drugs legislation was recently blocked in the Parliament due to alleged lack of rehabilitation possibilities. A draft amendment to the law on Combating Drug-Related Crime, which regulates the deprivation of the rights to sentence people for drug-related crimes, is under discussion in Parliament. Cases of drugs planted allegedly by law enforcement officers are reportedly on the rise in 2017 with no charges filed against law enforcement authorities. The Ministry of Justice concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and implements now a joint programme to enhance the monitoring and the knowledge base on the drug situation and responses to it, particularly through harmonising key indicators in areas of supply and demand.

Drug abuse constitutes a particularly serious problem in Abkhazia. The territory is believed to play a role in drug trafficking and makes up a "black hole" with no effective measures in place to prevent illegal trade and transiting. With easily available drugs and narcotic substances, adolescents and young adults are especially vulnerable to exposure, and addiction is reported to have reached alarming levels. According to *de facto* health authorities, there were 949 registered drug addicts as of late 2016, and every year around 200 individuals are reportedly becoming drug abusers. Civil society demands that the leadership takes serious measures to fight drug trade and abuse. Under pressure to respond, the Abkhaz *de facto* authorities have declared 2018 the "Year of the Fight Against Drugs", but expectations are low that any measures carried out by the *de facto* structures, in fact, will have more than an insignificant impact. In line with the EU engagement policy towards Georgia's breakaway regions and taking into account the recent peace initiative "A step to a better future" launched by the Government of Georgia, the potential, opportunity and feasibility of extending further actions from this component to these regions will be assessed during the implementation of the programme.

In recent years, as many other countries, Georgia has experienced radicalisation among its Muslim population (10% of overall population). According to various estimates, 80-120 Georgian citizens have joined Daesh (with a peak in 2015), mostly from Pankisi valley. Poverty and unemployment are regarded as contributing factors, but also religious preaching, feelings of isolation, exclusion and discrimination. Most of recent Imams/Akhoons have been educated in foreign countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Iran and often depart from the Islamic traditions as practiced in Georgia over recent centuries. Despite calls to introduce policies aiming to combat the ideological appeal of groups such as Daesh, no comprehensive counter-radicalisation programmes currently exist in Georgia. The end-2017 counter-terrorism operations

triggered wide-spread criticism, not only for the death of a civilian but also for the way authorities communicated about the operations. Attention should be paid to the potential instrumentalisation of the fight against terrorism to the detriment of specific target groups (i.e. the Muslim community) in the country.

Radicalisation does not only refer to religious based groups. Georgia has been experiencing recently a surge in activities of right wing radical groups, referring often to openly fascist and anti-western slogans. These groups employ violent rhetoric and hate speech. They are growing both in numbers and extremism of views. It cannot be excluded that the process would continue and culminate in using violence against their political (or social) opponents. These groups, equally as radical religious groups, require attention and dedicated counter-radicalisation programmes.

The SSSG is the main authority for combating terrorism, together with the Ministry of Defence, the Intelligence Service and the Special State Protection Service. Georgia has joined the counter-terrorism conventions and protocols of the UN and actively cooperates on counter-terrorism at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. A counter-terrorism strategy is planned to be adopted in 2018.

The implementation of the IBM Strategy and Action Plan 2014-2018 has been steady but would further benefit of additional support and guidance. Appropriate coordination with and engagement of relevant state actors in the IBM sector are essential for a successful implementation. Various stakeholders should be constantly connected to one another when tackling the multiple challenges of modern border management. Areas identified for further support include the modernisation plan covering infrastructure development, fleet and equipment procurement as well as maintenance and human resource management. This covers the remaining stretches of the green border, enhancing surveillance of the blue border and completing upgrades at remaining border crossing points. Detection and protection of women and children victims of trafficking is an area to be further addressed. Discriminatory rejections of entry for certain foreigners have been reported. Legal remedies in such cases are difficult to obtain due to the classification of information.

Prison management has improved over the past years, including through developing risk and needs assessments and rehabilitation and resocialisation oriented policies, as well as much better treatment and health conditions, starting with halving the prison population in 2012-2013 (although the incarceration rate remains very high to date). However, better results have been somewhat undermined by criminal subcultures ruled by crime bosses ("thieves-in-law") in and outside the prison system.

The fight against crime should be accompanied by adequate measures for prevention – this being one key aspect that needs due attention. The civil society, with its wide network of local organisations and a wealth of national and international experience accumulated over the last decade, is in good position to contribute to strengthening communities' resilience to counter such threats, e.g. by engaging youth and vulnerable communities in activities of prevention of drug use or in activities that would keep them away from negative coping behaviour such as involvement in criminal activities and/or terrorism.

Specific emphasis on the rights-based approach and gender sensitivities for duty bearers will be exercised in the design phases of concrete actions in the areas of fighting serious and organised

crime, including trafficking of drugs and human beings, due to the serious implications for rights holders, in particular victims, suspects and perpetrators.

Component 2: Hybrid and emerging threats

Strong cyber resilience needs robust and effective structures to prevent and counter diverse threats. The Georgian Government recognises hybrid threats as a major challenge in the country and the region. Georgia has a comprehensive legal framework covering information and cyber security and its overall cyber security capacity is well organised¹⁸. Nevertheless, it would benefit from further capacity building (cybersecurity, security standards and response to hybrid warfare) and also from a compliance assessment with the relevant EU legislation (namely, the Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems – NIS Directive, adopted in July 2016) and increased cooperation with the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). Georgia is in the process of undertaking the EU's Hybrid Threat Survey and the proposed programme will take into account during its implementation the results of this threat risk assessment. There is also a need to strengthen inter-agency coordination among the various actors.

In a context of continuous technological advancement, cybercrime is one of the most serious challenges that law-enforcement agencies face in Georgia. The MIA lacks sufficient software capacity and equipment to properly counter cybercrime cases. To ensure that investigators are well equipped to address and effectively investigate cybercrimes, MIA needs to further expand and professionalise its cyber-forensics, both through upgrading of its equipment and through professionalising the MIA Academy's training programmes. Institutions involved in fighting cybercrime are expected to enhance their operational capacities and deepen cooperation with international partners, in order to achieve full implementation and alignment with the Budapest Convention on cybercrime. As recent reports show, women were most targeted by cyber bullying that led to cyber-crime in some instances. Gender sensitivities in tackling cybercrime will benefit from special attention in the fight against this crime under the proposed programme. Furthermore, in terms of fighting crime in the digital era and considering the current global challenges in the security system, it is equally important to enhance capacities for law enforcement and for combating cyberterrorism, in particular at the lead agency, the SSSG.

Based on the EU's approach towards critical infrastructure protection Georgia is in the midst of completely revising the regulatory framework for the protection of critical infrastructure (CI), including providing a new definition. A special feature of Georgia is a rather high private ownership (around 90%) of CIs. The State Security and Crisis Management Council (SSCM) under the Prime Minister developed a draft framework in 2017; this will be continued by MIA following the abolition of the SSCMC.

Component 3: Civil Protection, Crisis management and CBRN

The new Emergency Management Service (EMS) was established in reply to the sub-optimal response to the 2017 Borjomi forest fires. As a relatively new agency, it faces challenges in terms of capacity; functionality of the disaster response system; procedures for inter-institutional

¹⁸ The 2017 Global Cybersecurity Index ranked Georgia on the 8th place in the world

cooperation and international assistance under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; standardised training courses and simulations for first responders, including equipment and local emergency plans. The opportunities to mainstream gender in civil protection, disaster prevention and response are lacking and are not addressed in respective policy papers or strategies.

Georgia has received substantial donor assistance to tackle radiological, nuclear and biological threats and some infrastructure support for nuclear and hazardous waste management. Still the area of fighting chemical threats is lagging behind in terms of the legal framework and safe management of hazardous chemicals (including their storage and disposal), as well as training and equipment. There also remain some concerns over the lack of overall preparedness, identification, reaction, investigation and disposal capacities regarding CBRN threats, including the lack of standard operating procedures, clear-cut response plans or MoUs to share equipment between various actors in this area.

Following the detonation of an ammunition storage in Primorsky in Abkhazia (under the control of the *de facto* authorities in Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia) in August 2017, over 4,500,000 m² of land are contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO). While some areas have been cleared of these UXO, an estimated 75,000 UXO items remain (March 2018) and continue to pose danger to the communities living in the neighbourhood. Close to the explosion site, local people harvest wood, hunt small game and search for mushrooms and berries and are therefore putting their lives at risk. Freely available explosives are being stolen and may be used for criminal and/or terrorist activities, inside or outside Abkhazia. While clearing is ongoing, it requires more resources to make the area safe for the population and to prevent the collection of idle ammunition to be potentially used for criminal purposes. There are other ammunition storages under the control of the *de facto* authorities which are in equally unsafe conditions and include a number of unserviceable ammunition items. In line with the EU engagement policy towards Georgia's breakaway regions and taking into account the recent peace initiative "A step to a better future" launched by the Government of Georgia, the potential, opportunity and feasibility of extending further actions from this component to these regions will be assessed during the implementation of the programme.

Component 4: Oversight of the security sector and policy dialogue

Georgia has been addressing shortcomings stemming from its past where criminal law enforcement and security policy were in some instances implemented without sufficient oversight. However, allegations of some cases of ill-treatment of detainees and inmates, drug planting or illegal surveillance by law enforcement agencies have been voiced. Denial of or delay in granting victim status, which would directly impact the right to a fair trial, continue to be reported. A large number of cases brought under investigation from earlier and more systemic violations have not yet been resolved. This situation has contributed to the public perception of underserved impunity and to a low level of public trust in justice in opinion surveys. It has also shown the need to strengthen civilian, democratic oversight over law enforcement bodies.

A number of steps have been taken. The Department for Investigation of Crimes Committed in the Course of Legal Proceedings of the Chief Prosecutor's Office, operational since 2015, has worked on cases taking place before 2012 but there still remains a considerable backlog. Amendments made to the Criminal Procedure Code created more effective mechanism for reviewing the court judgments, which the Prosecutor's Office made use of in several cases.

Effective and democratic oversight over law enforcement officers has been a long-standing obligation that the Government has committed to address. It adopted the Law on the State Inspector Service in July 2018 introducing the State Inspector's Office, which will incorporate the Personal Data Protection Inspector seeking to address recommendations from various institutions such as the Council of Europe, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as from the Universal Peer Review (UPR).

Oversight over the SSSG and the intelligence services has progressed but remains to be further improved. The Inspector of Personal Data Protection can conduct oversight over covert investigative activities. Moreover, the State Audit Service conducts oversight on using and spending funds of the state budget and other material values by the SSSG. Steps taken in 2015 to bring more transparency to public procurement in the security sector resulted in the reduction of cases of undisclosed procurement but further work on this front is necessary.

Albeit the Parliament seems to have the necessary legal means to conduct an effective and democratic civilian oversight over the security sector actors, this oversight is not up to its full potential, partly due to lack of experience, lack of understanding and expertise to do so. Other institutions such as the Public Defender, the State Audit Office, the Personal Data Protection Inspection (to be converted into State Inspector's Office) as well as civil society organisations play an important role in such oversight and can be further supported to perform even more efficiently.

The gender dimension in the work of the majority of oversight bodies remains also to be addressed. The Gender Equality Action Plan developed by the Parliament of Georgia provides good entry points for strengthening this direction under the umbrella of the Parliament – given that the Parliament oversees all the supervisory bodies of the security sector in Georgia.

Oversight of the security sector should be organised through various mechanisms. Public involvement in democratic oversight is crucial to ensure accountability and transparency across the security sector. The engagement of civil society organisations in the security policy domain strongly contributes to accountability and good governance: CSOs act not only as a government ‘watchdog’ but also as an index of public contentment with the performance of institutions and agencies responsible for public security and related services.

2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Risks	Risk level (H/M/L)	Mitigating measures
External political tensions, social or economic problems in Georgia or a further recession in the global economy divert the Government's attention and resources away from the reform agenda	M	Continued policy dialogue with the Georgian authorities; Support to the implementation of EU-Georgia bilateral and regional agreements
Weakening of Government's commitment to reforms related to	L	Continued political and policy dialogue with the authorities; Information and

EU-Georgia agreements		awareness campaigns to the institutions and to the general public
High turnover of staff in public institutions and associated loss of institutional memory	M	Continuous policy dialogue with the government; Efforts aimed at sustainable institution building instead of short-sighted and short-term measures
Limited capacity of Government to effectively perform functions of policy coordination, policy analysis and impact assessments, inter-ministerial coordination and public consultations	M	Policy dialogue and technical assistance to ensure strengthening of policy coordination function, to improve evidence-based policy and legislative development, to develop outreach capacities
Due to sensitivities of the security sector Government institutions may be reluctant to engage in cooperation with external actors	M	Implementing partners will require a high level of expertise and credibility to secure a high level of trust; the EU should facilitate the interaction between the implementers and the beneficiaries and stand ready to provide accompanying support as necessary
Support to fighting crime, in particular serious crime and terrorism, can impact and limit fundamental rights of detainees and ordinary citizens	M	Actions will be implemented in full observance of the rights-based approach principles; oversight mechanisms will be strengthened in parallel
Political tensions, limited engagement with and access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia	H	Continued dialogue with the Government of Georgia and with the <i>de facto</i> authorities and also with the Russian Federation; continued support and cooperation with the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia; continued engagement with partner organisations
The Government does not pursue the course set out in the recent peace initiative on further engagement opportunities for residents of Georgia's breakaway regions	H	Continued dialogue with the Government of Georgia; continued support and cooperation with the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia; continued engagement with partner organisations
Assumptions		
<p>The Government of Georgia remains committed to the fundamental values of democracy, rule of law and human rights and will continue to support and pursue actions for political, economic and trade integration with the EU, notably in the framework of the AA, DCFTA, EaP and VLAP. In particular, the Government pursues public administration reform in line with international and EU good practice.</p> <p>The EU and the Government maintain the current high level of cooperation and continue to communicate and coordinate on reform efforts.</p>		

The beneficiary institutions are willing and able to implement and benefit from the proposed actions. The institutions' capacity in maintaining staff, planning and coordination is sufficient for a sustainable implementation of the actions. If need be, accompanying enabling and facilitating measures will be designed and put in place.

The Government of Georgia is committed to implement the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and in particular the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1325, 1888, 2151 in order to ensure the meaningful and inclusive participation of women in the security sector reform processes.

3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

3.1 Lessons learnt

- There is a need for projects that can produce tangible and visible benefits for citizens and as a consequence contribute to gathering popular support and visibility for EU funded actions;
- It is of importance to ensure that assistance programmes match the EU agenda therefore the cooperation team needs to closely follow the development of the bilateral EU/Georgia political dialogue to identify and derive the right broad priorities from there;
- Throughout the cycle of interventions results and recommendations of the evaluation of EU support of security sector reform in enlargement and neighbourhood countries (2010-2016) regarding the enhancement of EU's role as a strategic actor, the strengthening of national ownership, the improving of effectiveness of funding modalities and the achievement of greater results should be adequately taken into account and addressed. The findings of the Security Sector Reform Matrix should equally be taken into account for the further definition of this programme
- The Government should effectively coordinate external assistance, ensure coherence between the budgetary processes and the policy agenda, and monitor the implementation of the AA/DCFTA and VLAP benchmarks, while avoiding duplication of mandates of different state actors; continued EU support should be provided to develop the government capacity in this sense;
- There has to be a clear distinction between policy development and policy implementation functions in Georgia, as well as clear accountability lines and coordination between Ministries and enforcement bodies;
- A functional monitoring system enabling the Government to report to the public audience against its policy objectives is instrumental in securing transparency and support for the reforms. If based on performance indicators, reports can also represent valuable strategic communication instruments;
- Participation of the wider citizenry in security sector reform through involvement of a broad range of different societal actors throughout the entire cycle of interventions should be ensured;
- It is important to mainstream cross-cutting issues, notably civil society engagement, youth, gender, a rights-based approach, social inclusion, environment and climate change, key principles of public administration including on inclusive and evidence-based policy and legislative development but also employing confidence building measures in post-conflict situations, taking into account the needs of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and other

conflict affected persons;

- It is crucial to step up the EU's policy of engagement (while respecting the principle of non-recognition) towards Georgia's breakaway regions of and to promote confidence and peace building measures, as well as to mainstream this engagement throughout the different programmes where relevant;
- Gender sensitivities should be well reflected in the documents and practices developed by the MoD, MIA and the Prosecution Service. There are opportunities to build on previous work supported by the EU to advance gender equality mainstreaming across the security sector institutions and their oversight bodies.

3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

The proposed programme builds on past and existing EU assistance and has been designed to maximise synergies and cooperate with ongoing and upcoming programmes.

Under the global EU Security Sector Governance (EU SSG) Facility, managed by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and implemented by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in consortium with *Folke Bernadotte Academy* (FBA) and *Justice Coopération Internationale*, technical expertise to support and underpin national policy planning, implementation and dialogue on SSR can be provided on a demand basis.

The EU is supporting the public administration reform, which also applies to the security sector. The main objective of the ongoing EUR 30 million programme (2016-2021) is to improve the efficiency, accountability and transparency of the central public administration of Georgia. It principally addresses policy development, the implementation of civil service reforms, anti-corruption and transparency. These areas are part of the sector reform contract benchmarks and are accompanied by technical assistance and support to civil society to monitor reforms implementation. The EU also supports strengthening e-governance in Georgia, through which support to cybersecurity was provided. The EU/OECD programme on Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) supports general PAR and, in relation with public finance management, amongst others, the Ministry of Defence in developing and implementing public internal financial control rules and procedures.

The EU4Justice programme addresses the development of criminal justice policies, prosecution, criminal investigation, judiciary and penitentiary sectors and is divided into budget support tranches (up to EUR 30 million over 2015-2018) and complementary support (EUR 20 million over 2015-2018) including technical assistance to the MoJ, MIA, the Prosecutor's Office, SPS, and judiciary institutions – comprising managerial, professional and institutional development. It also supports access to justice and provides grants to NGOs to ensure rehabilitation and resocialisation of (ex)prisoners and probationers, as well as monitoring of the implementation of reforms respectively in the judiciary, prosecutorial, juvenile justice and penitentiary areas.

An upcoming EU technical assistance project will support the MIA in fighting organised crime through strengthening its institutional capacity and that of the State Security Service in international law enforcement cooperation.

Under the regional programme EU4Monitoring Drugs, the MIA is further supported on action against drugs, organised crime and cross-border crime with a view to building trust and developing cooperation networks amongst countries along the so called “Heroin Route”.

The EU has been supporting Georgia in border and migration management in the context of visa liberalisation, covering technical assistance and equipment and infrastructure upgrades. This has mainly been done through regional and bilateral envelopes of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI).

A current twinning project with the Georgia National Communications Commission (GNCC) supports regulatory approaches related to internet governance, net neutrality, cyber-space and network security. Under regional programmes, work is ongoing on developing cybersecurity guidelines for the EaP region for assessing threats, risks and vulnerabilities of information systems and resources from cyberspace and on international cooperation on fight against cybercrime and on public/private cooperation (through the EU-Council of Europe Partnership for Good Governance as well as specific actions under the EaP Police Cooperation Programme). A new regional Cyber East Programme divided between a cybersecurity and a cybercrime component is under preparation.

The EU has funded a UN Women implemented "Innovative Action for Gender Equality" to contribute to evidence gathering on how the absence of gender considerations in policy and budget planning processes limits their efficiency in addressing poverty alleviation and social inclusion of certain vulnerable and marginalised groups in society (such as prisoners and former prisoners, disabled, those belonging to ethnic minorities, IDPs and those residing in isolated mountainous regions). The EU is currently supporting UN Women to implement a project on fighting violence against women. Further to this, the EU has been supporting CSOs in this field and also on domestic violence and promoting gender equality.

Through the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, the EU works on strengthening regional security by increasing local CBRN ownership and expertise. Georgia hosts one of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Secretariats. In addition, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) has been contracted in 2017 to support improvements to nuclear waste management, and ENI support through the Neighbourhood Investment Platform has been earmarked in 2017 for hazardous waste management, including for legacy disposal sites.

The clearance of the explosive-contaminated area around Primorsky, in Abkhazia, is ongoing through the specialised NGO HALO Trust. While ongoing activities are funded under COBERM (Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism) and UK funding, they will not suffice to finalise the clearance as needed.

An ongoing project supporting the Parliament in carrying its civilian and democratic oversight tasks over the security sector aims to improve parliamentary control and increase transparency, by ensuring effective parliamentary oversight over defence and security agencies.

The separate bilateral ENI 2018 programme on Support for the Implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement will also support the government in strategic communication, providing support training and opinion polling as well as for open source social media

monitoring. Furthermore, additional support for strengthening the Parliament's democratic oversight role, judiciary and prison management is envisaged.

Since 2008, the EU has supported the Public Defender of Georgia (PDO) to effectively and independently implement its mandate, in particular for strengthening the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM).

Under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) a total of 160 projects have been implemented since 2003, addressing *inter alia*, issues such as strengthening and integrating most vulnerable persons and communities; trainings of school teachers from regions of Georgia to promote cooperation between public schools and CSOs to reduce incidence of early marriages, child labour and school drop-outs.

Regional initiatives with the Council of Europe under the Partnership for Good Governance in the EaP region include projects on "Fight against corruption and money-laundering" and "Criminal justice action on cybercrime". They are complemented by a country-specific project on combatting money laundering in Georgia.

The proposed programme is also complementary to activities implemented or planned by other donors supporting public administration reform, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UK Aid, GIZ (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*), the Czech Development Cooperation and USAID. The United Kingdom and Estonia are expected to remain active in the area of cyber security, while Germany, Sweden and the US are expected to continue supporting activities in the field of CBRN. In addition to USAID, the US Department of Justice provides assistance to the Prosecutor's Office and to judiciary institutions in the criminal law area, while the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provides targeted assistance in the prosecution, police, and penitentiary sectors as well as in Trafficking in Human Beings (THB) investigations, cybercrime and fight against illegal drugs.

Implementation and coordination of EU assistance remains on Georgia's side the responsibility of the EU Assistance Coordination Department/Programme Administration Office (PAO) which has recently been moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the EU Delegation ensures coordination with EU Member States through regular meetings, also inviting Georgian authorities to attend when relevant. The EU Delegation coordinates and chairs sectorial donor coordination groups in a variety of sectors, such as Governance, Human Capital Development, Rule of Law and Justice. A Security Sector Reform donor coordination group might be also established, pending the findings of the ongoing SSR donor coordination matrix exercise.

3.3 Cross-cutting issues

All activities under this programme will be designed and implemented in accordance with the principles of good governance and human rights, gender equality, the inclusion of socially or economically deprived groups and environmental sustainability, wherever these issues are of particular relevance to the institutions and beneficiaries to be assisted.

Gender equality issues will be mainstreamed into the design of reforms to be supported under this programme in line with GAP II and the "20 deliverables for 2020". Particular attention shall be paid to considering gender equality elements in the security sector reform assessment, monitoring and evaluation as well as gender training for security personnel, in line with the

European Union's Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy and the European Consensus on Development. Where relevant an intersectional perspective will be used in the programme.

The projects funded under this action will be designed and implemented according to the rights-based approach methodology, as outlined in the 2014 Tool-box "A Rights-Based Approach encompassing all human rights for EU development cooperation" and the respective Council Conclusions¹⁹.

4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1 Objectives/results

The overall objective of this action is to increase the security of people in Georgia by strengthening good governance and enhancing the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of security related actors.

Component 1: Prevention of and fight against crime

SO 1.1: To boost public administration reform, as well as the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the institutions in the security sector, in particular in the fight against corruption and money laundering

Expected results (indicative):

- Development, implementation and monitoring of policies, human resource management including disciplinary and ethics aspects, professional capacities, internal processes, controls and oversight, public relations and human rights protection of the MIA, SSSG, POG, MOD, and their dependent entities, are further strengthened;
- Anti-corruption reforms at sectoral and local levels and effective prevention measures are in place, on track and implemented; mechanisms for asset declaration are further strengthened; asset recovery is further advanced;
- Fight against money laundering is enhanced through the alignment to and implementation of the latest version of the EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive; relevant corresponding financial investigation tools are introduced in the system.

SO 1.2: To strengthen institutional and operational capacities of law enforcement agencies to prevent and combat crime

Expected results (indicative):

- Management and conduct of prosecution and criminal investigation are further strengthened, in line with a victim-centred approach, including through enhanced intelligence-led and community policing, investigative techniques and methods, and the establishment of a unified crime analysis system, without encroaching on human rights, including privacy and protection of personal data;
- Fight against corruption and organised crime, in particular related to drug trafficking, trafficking of human beings (THB), and terrorism is enhanced including through the use of a fully operationalised risk analysis system;

¹⁹ The tool-box "A Rights-Based Approach, encompassing all human rights, for EU development cooperation" and the respective Council Conclusions of 19 May 2014 are available here: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/rights-based-approach-development-cooperation_en

- International law enforcement cooperation is strengthened, including through the implementation of the Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation with Europol, the action of joint investigation teams, and effective national and international data exchange under respect of data protection mechanisms; the International Law Enforcement Cooperation Unit (ILECU) is reinforced; coordination with Eurojust is strengthened;
- Capacities to develop, monitor and implement evidence based drug policies are strengthened; for purposes of crime prevention, drug policies are oriented towards proper medical treatment of drug users, balanced with efficient policies towards producers, distributors and dealers of precursors and drugs;
- Capacities of integrated border management agencies are further strengthened at all borders, blue and green;
- Management in relevant prison facilities is strengthened to prevent and counter criminal actions occurring in and outside prisons, in particular with linkage to imprisoned and to-be-released crime bosses;
- Capacities are strengthened to apply a rights-based approach in law enforcement operations towards all parties and rights holders involved (victims, offenders, witnesses etc.), and in particular women, children and other victims of violence and domestic violence.

SO 1.3: To strengthen the resilience of citizens to avoid engagement in criminal activities and the use of drugs

Expected results (indicative):

- Georgian citizens, and in particular young boys and girls, are more aware of the risks of drug use and the disadvantages of negative coping behaviour such as engagement in criminal activities;
- Drug users have better access to medical treatment and rehabilitation;
- Communities, in particular vulnerable communities, are capacitated to offer alternative activities and consultation services to their members as to prevent radicalisation, criminalisation and the abuse of drugs.

Component 2: Hybrid and emerging threats

SO 2.1: To strengthen cyber security capacities

Expected results (indicative):

- Cyber security capacities of the Data Exchange Agency and the Cyber Security Bureau of the MoD are strengthened, including through improving the coordination between the relevant agencies, strengthening cooperation with ENISA and ensuring compliance with the NIS Directive.

SO 2.2: To further improve resilience against cybercrime, cyberterrorism and other threats against critical infrastructure

Expected results (indicative):

- Cybercrime and cyberterrorism investigative capabilities (including via relevant programmes/system support) of law enforcement authorities are strengthened, as well as the capabilities to address cyber-enabled crimes, including child sexual exploitation, in line with the Budapest Convention on cybercrime;
- The critical infrastructure protection framework is further developed and implemented.

Component 3: Civil Protection, Crisis management and CBRN

SO 3.1: To improve preparedness and emergency response to disasters and prevention plans for the protection of citizens

Expected results (indicative):

- An emergency management system is effectively put in place and operational, based on disaster risk assessment and mapping (including risk register, GIS(geo-information structures)); national crisis management and the disaster response and preparedness capabilities are strengthened taking into account the specific needs of children and women in emergencies; coordination with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is strengthened;
- Information sharing tools and Early Warning System (EWS) to reduce risks, assess anticipated threats and allocate necessary assistance for eluding victims and reducing human, financial and material loss caused by emergency situations in case of major risks (such as floods), including national regulation and hazard monitoring, are developed;
- A set of local emergency plans is further developed and tested, with the engagement of local authorities and civil society;
- Efficient Management of Emergency situations is strengthened through developing response capabilities of the first responder to emergency calls – MIA LEPL 112;
- Capacities of Georgia's Agency of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (ANRS) for efficient response on (including trans-border) radiological incidents/emergency are strengthened;
- The implementation of the CBRN National Strategy and Action Plan, including through improved Interagency Coordinating Council for Combating CBRN threats, is supported.

SO 3.2: To reinstate and improve human security around ammunition storages in Abkhazia

Expected results (indicative):

- Explosive remnants in and around the Primorsky site in Abkhazia are cleared;
- Surplus and unserviceable ammunition is demolished adequately.

Component 4: Oversight of the security sector and policy dialogue

SO 4.1: To enhance the understanding of the role and value of oversight, to consolidate the role and activities of independent institutions

Expected results (indicative):

- The role of external oversight is improved and capacities of and coordination among the Parliament, PDO, SAO, the State Inspector to be established (including the personal data protection inspection functions) are further strengthened;
- The Government engages in policy dialogue with all stakeholders and communities and develops dialogue on security matters.
- Effective oversight of public procurement in the security sector is strengthened;

SO 4.2: To strengthen the understanding and role of citizens and civil society in the oversight of the security sector

Expected results (indicative):

- Civil Society, media, universities and think tanks, as well as citizens, are empowered and capacitated to independently monitor the security sector;

- Institutions mandated with the oversight of the security sector and civil society, including media, universities and think tanks, as well as citizens engage in a policy discussion.

This programme is relevant for the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. It contributes directly to the achievement of SDG Goal 16 – Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, but also contributes towards Goal 5 – Gender Equality. This does not require a separate commitment by Georgia as beneficiary of this programme.

4.2 Main activities

The activities conducted under this programme can be grouped into the four components outlined in the sections above and can indicatively be summarised as follows:

Component 1: Prevention of and fight against crime

To achieve the objectives set out above, the programme will provide comprehensive support to address the prevention and investigation of crimes, corruption and money laundering, the protection of human rights and victims of crime, the execution of criminal sanctions, prevention of drug abuse, criminal engagement and radicalisation. This will be conducted through working across relevant public sector actors and hand in hand with civil society and citizens. To this end it will provide support to the improvement of the legal framework, policy development, implementation and monitoring of operational capacities and techniques, analytical skills development and further professional development and outreach, through training, advice, monitoring as well as relevant supplies of equipment.

The programme will seek to improve the efficiency of actors by improving strategic planning, human resources management and coordination of public institutions and of law enforcement agencies to allow for an early identification of key threats and risks, pro-active measures in their response and of relevant planning of budgetary, material and human resources. In addition, it will seek to further strengthen internal accountability and oversight to better address violations of professional conduct and rights of citizens.

Moreover, the programme will seek to further improve national and international coordination through strengthening the cooperation of the different actors and clarification of their respective mandates, in particular with regard to anti-corruption, financial crimes and terrorism as well as through improving the integration into international law enforcement cooperation mechanisms and policy cycles.

In addressing the multi-faceted drug situation in Georgia, the programme will support the development of evidence-based drug policies through strengthening the capacities of the specified drug monitoring unit of the Ministry of Justice and the relevant participating actors. This will include actions in order to increase and improve treatment and rehabilitation opportunities for drug users.

In order to complement all actions geared towards the duty bearers, the programme will seek to address and engage citizens and communities directly in preventive measures through raising awareness of young and vulnerable groups of society of the harmful consequences of drug use and engagement in criminal activities. Communities will be strengthened in offering consultation

and rehabilitation services as well as alternative, productive and integrative ways of engaging citizens to provide for better future perspectives.

Component 2: Hybrid and emerging threats

The programme shall provide support to agencies in charge of fighting against hybrid and emerging threats in order to strengthen cyber security capacities and to further improve resilience against cybercrime and threats posed to critical infrastructure.

It will contribute to establishing relevant policies and the legislative framework, strengthening coordination capabilities within and among the public authorities as well as supporting establishing the coordination framework with service providers in the private sector (e.g. banks, medical institutions, energy sector, internet service providers, etc.). The programme will address the needs to be identified in the ongoing Hybrid Threat Survey and contribute to further advancing the data exchange environment. It will further seek to facilitate the cooperation with ENISA and assist in achieving compliance with the NIS Directive. To this end, procurement of relevant hard and software is envisaged.

Furthermore, the programme will support the further elaboration and implementation of the legal framework relevant for the protection of critical infrastructure and services, alongside advancing investigation capacities of cybercrime and cyberterrorism cases through provision of trainings as well as relevant hard- and software. The programme will also support standardisation by advancing and promoting the implementation of the ISO/IEC 27001 family of standards on information security management systems. Particular attention will be devoted to public awareness raising campaigns on the possible threats of cybercrime including child sexual abuse issues.

Component 3: Civil protection, crisis management and CBRN

The programme will contribute to improving preparedness for emergency response to disasters and prevention plans for the protection of citizens, taking into account the special needs of women and children. To this end, and to align with European policies, the Emergency Management Service (EMS) will be supported, among others, via advancing its human resource management and technologies, through the provision of trainings for all relevant professionals, the conduction of simulations as well as provision of equipment. Coordination with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism will be strengthened through joint approaches and coordinated actions.

Specific actions and supply of equipment will address some of the priority needs of the LEPL 112, the Emergency and Operative Response Centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to advance its response services.

Furthermore, the EMS will be supported to participate in missions and exercises led by international organisations as well as to introduce the standards of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group under the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and to attain respective classification and accreditation. Alongside supporting the advancement of a volunteering system in civil protection, the development of information sharing tools as well as an Early Warning System to reduce risks and to assess anticipated threats will be supported. Capacities to deal with a crisis situation and to allocate necessary assistance for eluding victims to reduce human, financial and material loss caused by emergency situations will be strengthened, including national regulation and hazard monitoring.

With regard to addressing CBRN risks, support will be provided to improve the relevant legal framework, in particular in the area of chemical threats, and to boost the regional response capacity. Special attention will be paid to clarifying the responsibilities of various CBRN actors and improving their practical cooperation (including by developing local emergency plans, MoUs to share equipment and standard operation procedures). Various CBRN response units will receive further training and equipment, including to address smuggling of CBRN substances. The programme will also support the advancement of the analytical, reaction and monitoring capacities of the responsible state agencies.

The programme will provide for a specific and targeted action in Abkhazia to reinstate human security around ammunition storages. Experienced staff will continue the clearing of explosive remnants around Primorsky following a strategic plan of priority zones. Mixed ethnic teams will also continue their outreach work in awareness-raising concerning the security risks around the contaminated region. The implementing partner will also seek to expand their activities to reduce the security risk of the remaining ammunition storages by identifying and demolishing surplus and unserviceable ammunition.

Component 4: Oversight of the security sector and policy dialogue

Mandated bodies with oversight functions will be targeted with various capacity building activities to fulfil their roles that will allow evidence-based reports and analysis. Mechanisms to hold responsible bodies accountable will be strengthened. Different actions will be designed to promote a policy discussion over the security sector with the engagement of all relevant actors. For such a dialogue to take place in a meaningful manner all stakeholders will be capacitated and accompanied in the process. In order to promote a policy of zero sexual harassment and violence against women by security staff, respective incidents should be adequately monitored and addressed.

While the Government with its security sector providers will be supported in designing a policy discussion platform, civil society actors including NGOs, media, universities and think tanks will be trained in specific issues of the security sector architecture and mechanisms. In order to prepare and support civil society actors further to fulfil a watchdog role over the security sector, grants will be offered to civil society actors to monitor and evaluate the implementation of relevant policies, strategies and action plans of the security sector, or to conduct research, raise awareness, advocate for policy change or provide services to the population around security issues. The support aims therefore at preparing all actors through technical support to understand their roles of oversight institutions being able to engage in policy formulation.

4.3 Intervention logic

The intervention logic for this action is based on the context and problem analysis described under Section 1 of this document. Georgia and the EU enjoy close relations and are both committed to further deepening and strengthening their coordination in the good governance and security sector. This programme envisages interventions under four components, all contributing to the overall goal of increasing the security of Georgian citizens.

Component 1: Prevention of and fight against crime

Output: Support will be directed towards the different Government institutions and the POG to better prevent crime, violence and fight criminal activities and corruption in an effective and accountable manner, but also towards civil society to increase its resilience to these threats.

Outcome: The Government will be better placed to actively prevent crime and violence and to investigate and fight criminal offences, also as a result of cooperation with EU Member States and law enforcement agencies. Civil society will feel more resilient and at the same time empowered in this area.

Impact: Communities will be more resilient against engaging in criminal activities and strengthened in dealing with people addicted to narcotics. Effective crime prevention and combating will lead to crime reduction and a secure environment which will improve the life of Georgian citizens, including particularly persons in a vulnerable situation such as women victims of violence, victims of domestic violence and THB. It will contribute to mobility of Georgian citizens through sustaining the fulfilment of the VLAP benchmarks and hence upholding the visa-free travel regime to the EU (Schengen).

Component 2: Hybrid and emerging threats

Output: Support will be directed to increasing capacities of and coordination among different Government stakeholders to safeguard critical infrastructure and to counter hybrid threats and fight cyber-crime, also with a view of closer alignment with the Budapest Convention on cybercrime.

Outcome: Stronger cyber resilience and capacities, which will allow institutions to better prevent and respond to cyber-attacks, and a new framework to protect critical infrastructure.

Impact: Increased resilience will contribute to sustaining the core state functions in case of actions that may negatively affect it and minimise consequences for citizens and the economy.

Component 3: Civil protection, crisis management and CBRN

Output: An effective emergency response management system (including Flood Risk Management, Disaster Risk Assessment or Disaster Loss Data collection) will be developed. Georgia will better coordinate with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and contribute to implementing the CBRN Threat Reduction Strategy and corresponding action plan. Further support will be directed to clearing remnants of unexploded UXOs and demolition of unserviceable ammunition in Abkhazia.

Outcome: Government structures will be better coordinated in their response to disasters and emergencies and hence capacitated to more effectively manage response operations, which include specific vulnerabilities of women in emergencies. The Primorsky area in Abkhazia will be cleared of dangerous UXOs.

Impact: Effective emergency response and the reinstatement of an UXO free environment will better protect lives and well-being of citizens and their environment and maintain sources of livelihood.

Component 4: Oversight of the security sector and policy dialogue

Output: Support will be directed towards capacity building of the democratic and independent institutions mandated with the oversight of the security sector. In addition, civil society will be capacitated to monitor the security sector.

Outcome: Through the increased oversight activities, security stakeholders will be more aware of their obligations towards citizens and directly held accountable for misconduct and offences and other wrongdoings.

Impact: Increased accountable institutions will increase a citizen-oriented approach in security actor operations and increase trust of citizens in the institutions. Civil society and particularly women will be better represented in policy formulation and monitoring.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.1 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 60 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

5.3 Implementation modalities

The envisaged assistance to Georgia is deemed to follow the conditions and procedures set out by the restrictive measures adopted pursuant to Article 215 TFEU²⁰.

5.3.1 Grants: call for proposals for twinning projects (direct management)

(a) *Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results*

Objective: These projects will contribute to the specific objectives 2.1: **To strengthen cyber security capacities** and 2.2 **To further improve resilience against cybercrime, cyberterrorism and other threats against critical infrastructure.**

Fields of intervention: Cyber security capacities of the Data Exchange Agency, Cyber Security Centre of the Ministry of Defence, State Security Service of Georgia and other relevant stakeholders; coordination of relevant agencies; cooperation with ENISA; Cybercrime and cyberterrorism investigative capabilities (including via relevant programmes/system support) of law enforcement authorities and protection of critical infrastructure.

Expected results and eligible actions are those relating to leading to compliance with the NIS Directive and to stronger cyber resilience and to further strengthening institutional and infrastructural capabilities of law enforcement authorities in addressing cybercrime and cyberterrorism.

Please see section 4.1 for more details.

(b) Eligibility conditions

²⁰ https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8442/consolidated-list-sanctions_en

In line with Article 4(10)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014, participation in Twinning calls for proposals is limited to public administrations of the EU Member States, being understood as central or regional authorities of a Member State as well as their bodies and administrative structures and private law bodies entrusted with a public service mission under their control provided they act for the account and under the responsibility of that Member State.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The rate of co-financing for Twinning grant contracts is 100%²¹.

(e) Indicative timing to launch the calls

3rd trimester 2019

(f) Use of lump sums/flat rates/unit costs

Twinning contracts include a system of unit costs and flat rate financing, defined in the Twinning Manual, for the reimbursement of the public sector expertise provided by the selected Member State administrations. The use of this system of unit costs and flat rate financing, which exceeds the amount of EUR 60 000 per beneficiary of a Twinning contract, is authorised through the Commission decision C (2017)1122.

5.3.2 Grants: Call for proposals to strengthen resilience of citizens and capacities to oversee the security sector (direct management)

(a) Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

There will be 3 objectives:

- Strengthen resilience of citizens and vulnerable communities to prevent the use of drugs and engagement in criminal and terrorist activities;
- Strengthen community resilience to prepare for and manage emergency response to disasters;
- Strengthen oversight of the security sector and participation in policy making.

The type of actions eligible for financing are linked to specific objectives **1.3 To strengthen the resilience of citizens to avoid engagement in criminal activities and the use of drugs; 3.1 To improve preparedness and emergency response to disasters and prevention plans for the protection of citizens and 4.2 To strengthen external oversight of the security sector.** Activities related to achieving specific objectives 1.3 and 3.1 may be implemented in the breakaway region of Abkhazia.

²¹ As defined in the Twinning Manual.

(b) Eligibility conditions

The essential eligibility criteria for applicants include, among others, to be legal entities of the wider civil society (e.g. media organisations) and NGOs established in an EU Member State or in Georgia.

Subject to information to be published in the call for proposals, the indicative amount of the EU contribution per grant is EUR 400 000 – EUR 700 000 and the grants may be awarded to sole beneficiaries and to consortia of beneficiaries (coordinator and co-beneficiaries).

The indicative duration of the grant is 36 months.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants under this call is 80% of the eligible costs of the action.

If full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100 %. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(e) Indicative timing to launch the call

1st trimester 2020

5.3.3 Grants: Direct award to HALO Trust (direct management)

(a) Objective: This project will contribute to the specific objective **3.2: To reinstate and improve human security around ammunition storages Abkhazia**

Fields of intervention: Clearing of explosive remnants and possibly mass destruction of outdated ammunition

Expected results and eligible actions are those leading to the reinstatement of an UXO free environment and human security.

(b) Justification of a direct grant

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified because the Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia is in a crisis situation referred to in Article 2(21) FR.

Access to Abkhazia remains limited with only a few organisations in a position to operate in the sensitive environment. HALO Trust is the only organisation in Abkhazia with the expertise and the capacity able to respond to the needs emerged from the crisis situation described above.

HALO Trust started working in Abkhazia already in 1997. Through the previous work on mine clearing, bulk demolitions of surplus and unserviceable ammunition for the Abkhaz military, road and bridge rehabilitation projects with a focus on connecting communities of different

ethnicities and improving access to schools, it has gained the trust of the *de facto* authorities, also through employing both Abkhaz and Georgian teams. Not only does this show the technical competence of the organisation but also its suitability to operate in the politically sensitive environment of Abkhazia and to cooperate with both the Government of Georgia and the *de facto* Abkhaz authorities.

The indicative duration of the grant is 30 months.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are the financial and operational capacity of the applicant;

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of action; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for this grant is 90% of the eligible costs of the action.

However, if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100 %. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(e) Indicative timing to conclude the grant agreement

3rd trimester 2019

5.3.4 Grants: Direct award to European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) (direct management)

(a) Objective: This project will contribute to the specific objective **1.2: To strengthen institutional and operational capacities of law enforcement agencies to prevent and combat crime.**

Fields of intervention: Support to development and monitoring of drug policies.

Expected results and eligible actions are those leading to evidence based drug policies and drug prevention measures.

(b) Justification of a direct grant

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to EMCDDA on account of its technical competence and high degree of specialisation in the monitoring of illicit drug use and trafficking.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified because this action has specific characteristics requiring a specific type of beneficiary for its technical competence and specialisation.

The EU agency EMCDDA has gained a unique knowledge, technical competence, and high degree of specialisation in drug monitoring and improving the availability of reliable drug information. EMCDDA has been previously engaged in implementing EU-funded programmes managed by DG NEAR.

The indicative duration of the grant is 36 months.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are the financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for this grant is 100 % of the eligible costs of the action.

(e) Indicative timing to conclude the grant agreement

2nd trimester 2020

5.3.5 Procurement (direct management)

	Type (works, supplies, services)	Indicative number of contracts	Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure
Support to PAR, accountability anti-corruption, AML; support to fighting and preventing crime, in particular organised crime and terrorism, including trafficking of drugs, trafficking of human beings; advancing international cooperation (including through Member State engagement); prison management Objective 1.1; 1.2	Services	Up to 3	1st trimester 2020
Support to Emergency Management Service, including support to the implementation of the CBRN Threat Reduction Strategy Objective 3.1	Services	Up to 2	3 rd trimester 2019
Support to strengthening oversight of the security sector Objective 4.1	Services	1	1 st trimester 2020

5.3.6 Indirect management with the International Organisation for Migration "Support to Integrated Border Management"

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)). This implementation entails support to specific priorities and actions to ensure sustainable follow-up to the implementation of IBM Strategy in the framework

of and as a follow-up to VLAP for Georgia, as concerns the activities related to integrated border management, including risk analysis (including the reporting of relevant agencies and analysis on all administrative levels), and investigation of cases of organised facilitated irregular migration (including effective cooperation between relevant agencies), supporting Georgia's competent authorities in upgrading their skills and practices in line with the best EU practices in the fields of transnational organised crime (including trafficking in humans, particularly women and girls). This part of the action contributes to specific objective 1.2.

This implementation is justified because IOM is best positioned to contribute to the sustainable follow-up to the implementation of technical assistance and procurement of supplies in the area of border management in line with EU IBM standards on account of its particular technical competence, high degree of specialisation as well as strong management capacity. The action also requires a high degree of involvement of expertise from EU Member States, and IOM has proven effective cooperation with such experts.

IOM would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: management of all operations related to technical assistance and transfer of expertise, hiring of external experts, running public procurement, grant award procedures and concluding and managing the resulting contracts, including making the related payments.

If negotiations with the above-mentioned entrusted entity fail, that part of this action may be implemented in direct management in accordance with the implementation modalities identified in section 5.3.8.

5.3.7 Indirect management with the United Nations Office for Project Services "Support to advancing technical capacities in the fight against crime"

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with UNOPS. This implementation entails the identification of equipment needs, procurement of equipment and supervision. This part of the action contributes to the specific objectives 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1. It is justified thanks to UNOPS' expertise and experience in procurement of equipment for the security sector. UNOPS is currently the only technical and financial partner that is capable of carrying out diverse procurement activities in the sensitive security sector. The organisation will therefore be able to build upon their experience and organise efficiently procurement in the security sector for Georgia.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: needs analysis, technical specifications, procurement and supervision of delivery and maintenance as well as related trainings.

If negotiations with the above-mentioned entrusted entity fail, that part of this action may be implemented in direct management in accordance with the implementation modalities identified in section 5.3.8.

5.3.8 Changes from indirect to direct management mode due to exceptional circumstances

An alternative option for implementing the actions described in 5.3.6 and 5.3.7 is procurement of services and supplies (direct management), if the preferred modality (indirect management) cannot be implemented due to circumstances outside of the Commission's control.

	Type (works, supplies, services)	Indicative number of contracts	Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure
Alternative to indirect management with IOM	Services	1	4 th trimester 2019
	Supplies	Up to 5	
Alternative to indirect management with UNOPS	Services	2	4 th trimester 2019
	Supplies	Up to 5	

5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply, subject to the following provisions.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2) (b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

5.5 Indicative budget

	EU contribution (amount in million EUR)	Indicative third party contribution (amount in million EUR)
5.3.1 Grants: call for proposals for twinning projects (direct management) Objective 2.1, 2.2	2.6	
5.3.2 Grants: calls for proposals (direct management) Objectives 1.3, 3.1, 4.2 – Strengthen resilience of citizens and capacities to oversee the security sector	4.0	1.0
5.3.3 Grants: direct grant to Halo Trust "Clearing of explosive remnants in Abkhazia" (direct management) Objective 3.2	1.0	0.11

5.3.4 Grants: direct grant to EMCDDA “Support to drug demand reduction and monitoring” (direct management) Objective 1.2	0.8	
5.3.5 Procurement of services (direct management) Objectives 1.1, 1.2, 3.1, 4.1	9.2	
5.3.6 Indirect Management with IOM “Strengthening Integrated Border Management” Objective 1.2	6.0	
5.3.7 Indirect Management with UNOPS “Support to advancing technical capacities in the fight against crime” Objectives 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1	3.9	
5.8 Evaluation 5.9 Audit	0.5	
Totals	28.0	1.11

5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

The Delegation of the European Union to Georgia will be responsible for the management of the programme and will monitor its overall implementation. It will also be the focal point for any communication with the contractors or the beneficiary institutions.

5.7 Performance monitoring and reporting

The European Commission and the partner country will regularly review progress made in the overall implementation of the action through a Programme Steering Council (PSC) which meets twice a year. Apart from steering the overall process, the PSC also aggregates information about progress in implementation which will be made available to relevant stakeholders.

At the level of the individual projects funded under this action, specific Steering Committees (SCs) will be convened by the beneficiary institutions involving the EU Delegation and other relevant stakeholders. These SCs will meet regularly to review progress on the basis of periodic reports.

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner’s responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix. The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent

monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.8 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, a final evaluation will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants contracted by the Commission. It will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision).

The Commission shall inform the implementing partners at least 1 month in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partners shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partners and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

Indicatively, one contract for evaluation services shall be concluded under a framework contract in the 3rd trimester of 2023.

5.9 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

Indicatively, one contract for audit services shall be concluded under a framework contract in the 3rd trimester of 2023.

5.10 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in the Action “Support for the Implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement”²² under Component 1 Strategic Communication..

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities.

²² Annex 3 of the Annual Action Programme 2018 in favour of Georgia.

Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in the financing agreements or delegation agreements.

With regards to the Neighbourhood East, all EU-supported actions shall be aimed at increasing the awareness level of the target audiences on the connections, the outcome, and the final practical benefits for citizens of EU assistance provided in the framework of this action. Visibility actions should also promote transparency and accountability on the use of funds.

Outreaching/awareness raising activities will play a crucial part in the implementation of the action, in the case of budget support the national government shall ensure that the visibility of the EU contribution is given appropriate media coverage. The implementation of the communication activities shall be the responsibility of the implementing organisations, and shall be funded from the amounts allocated to the Action.

All necessary measures will be taken to publicise the fact that the action has received funding from the EU in line with the Communication and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions. Additional Visibility Guidelines developed by the Commission (European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations) will be strictly adhered to.

Where relevant, the provisions of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement concluded between the European Union and the selected international organisations shall apply.

It is the responsibility of the implementing organisation to keep the EU Delegations and, where relevant, the Commission (DG NEAR), fully informed of the planning and implementation of the appropriate milestones specific visibility and communication activities.

The implementing organisation shall report on its visibility and communication actions, as well as the results of the overall action to the relevant monitoring committees.

This action will be communicated externally as part of a wider context of EU support to the country, and where relevant to the Eastern Partnership region in order to enhance the effectiveness of communication activities and to reduce fragmentation in the area of EU communication.

The implementing organisation shall coordinate all communication activities with EU Delegations as well as regional communication initiatives funded by the European Commission to the extent possible. All communication strategies developed as part of this action shall ensure they are in line with the priorities and objectives of regional communication initiatives supported by the European Commission and in line with the relevant EU Delegation's communication strategy under the "EU4Georgia" umbrella initiative.

APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY)²³

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines²⁴ (incl. reference year)	Targets²⁵ (incl. reference year)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Overall objective: Impact	To increase the security of people in Georgia by strengthening good governance and enhancing the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of security related actors	-Extent to which state institutions can better prevent and fight crime and society is more resilient to such threats	TBC	TBC	Oversight body reports	Government of Georgia remains committed to implement security sector reform programmes
		-% of implemented recommendations of oversight bodies			CSO reports	
		-Extent to which the perception of safety and security at citizens level is improved	Baseline perception survey	Perception survey	#of participants in capacity building events	
		-Extent to which criminal behaviour trend is decreased	2018 statistics	2024 statistics	WGI	
		-Worldwide governance indicator (WGI) on rule of law**	WGI 2016: 64	Improvement	WGI	
		-Worldwide governance indicator on control of corruption**	WGI 2016: 74	Improvement	WJPI	
		-World Justice Project Index (WJPI)*	2017:0.61	Improvement	WJPI	
-WJPI- corruption*	2017:0.71	Improvement				

²³ Mark indicators aligned with the relevant programming document with '*' and indicators aligned with the EU Results Framework with (**)

²⁴ Indicators, baselines and targets have been updated following stakeholder workshops with SSR experts in the spring of 2019. They will be defined further at project level and may require dedicated surveys.

²⁵ Indicators, baselines and targets have been updated following stakeholder workshops with SSR experts in the spring of 2019. They will be defined further at project level and may require dedicated surveys.

Specific objective(s): Outcome(s)	Component 1: Prevention of and fight against crime					<p>Government of Georgia remains committed to implement security sector reform programmes.</p> <p>The beneficiary institutions staff is available and willing to participate in capacity building activities.</p> <p>The EU and the Government maintain their high level of cooperation and continue to communicate and coordinate reform efforts.</p> <p>The beneficiary institutions are willing and able to implement and benefit from the proposed actions. The institutions' capacity in maintaining staff, planning and coordination is sufficient for a sustainable implementation of the actions.</p> <p>Authorities are willing to plan and organised preventive work.</p>
	<p>SO 1.1 To boost the public administration reform, as well as the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the institutions in the security sector, in particular in the fight against corruption and money laundering</p>	<p>% of the population expressing their confidence in the LEA in combatting corruption and money laundering, their competence and integrity, their concern for the well-being of the citizens and their respect for human rights</p> <p>Existence of a harmonized data system on corruption cases</p> <p>- # of assets declaration introduced, verified and followed-up because of irregularities *</p> <p>- Track record (# of cases and value) for identification, freezing, management and confiscation of unjustified wealth*</p>	<p>To be defined through a perception survey</p> <p>The existing data collection system/methodology needs upgrade</p> <p>2017: 5,800 declarations introduced, 287 verified, 224 negative (financial sanction + 7 sent to law enforcement), no info. on further follow-up</p> <p>Track record not fully established</p>	<p>To be defined based on findings of the survey</p> <p>The harmonised data system developed and functioning</p> <p>...</p> <p># of verified declarations increased and # of sanctioned declarations decreased</p> <p>Track record fully established</p>	<p>Public perception and victimisation surveys</p> <p>GEOSTAT</p> <p>GRECO and OECD Anti-corruption network reports</p> <p>MONEY VAL reports</p> <p>FATF Reports</p> <p>EUROPOL</p> <p>SOCTA</p> <p>Eurojust Reports</p> <p>Project Reports</p> <p>Steering Committees</p> <p>Awareness raising materials</p> <p>Reports of MIA, SSSG, Prosecutor General Office,</p>	

	<p>SO 1.2 To strengthen institutional and operational capacities of law enforcement agencies to prevent and combat crime</p>	<p>-Level of performance of ILECC</p> <p>- Existence of an improved data system on crimes</p> <p>-Advance Passenger Information (API) System/Technical Equipment/Software is established and its maintenance/development is ensured</p> <p>Existence of a National Drug Situation Monitoring Centre (NDSMC) that collects, stores and shares drug related data</p>	<p>Partially operational</p> <p>LEA Joint database (Crimecase – e-enforcement) is operational</p> <p>API does not exist</p> <p>The NDSMC has been established but is not operational</p>	<p>Fully operational</p> <p>The database performance improved based on the findings of public perception and victimisation surveys</p> <p>API is effectively applied in the process of combatting illegal migration and border management system is improved</p> <p>The NDSMC fully operational</p>	<p>MoJ, Revenue Service</p> <p>LEA Joint database (Crimecase – e-enforcement)</p> <p>MILHSA official statistics</p>	
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	SO 1.3: To strengthen the resilience of citizens to avoid engagement in criminal activities and the use of drugs	<p>-% of citizens aware of the major harms and consequences of criminal activities (including on radicalisation, extremism, cyber-crime, hybrid threats)</p> <p>-% of population aware of five major harms of drug (including juveniles, young people, teachers and parents)</p>	<p>to be defined through a survey</p> <p>to be defined through survey</p>	<p>To be defined based on the results of the survey</p> <p>to be defined based on the results of the survey</p>		<p>Authorities are willing and leading conduct of public perception and victimisations surveys.</p> <p>Authorities are willing to plan and implement rehabilitation programmes for drug addicts.</p>
Component 2: Hybrid and emerging threats						<p>Authorities are willing to plan and organise preventive work.</p>
	SO 2.1 To strengthen cybersecurity capacities	<p>-# of joint actions related to cyber security/cybercrime implemented by several Georgian agencies</p> <p>Level of compliance of the Georgian legislation with EU directives on cybersecurity (NIS) and Council of Europe Budapest Convention on Cybercrime</p> <p># of institutions reporting to CERT about cyber incidents</p>	<p>Joint cooperation platform established</p> <p>Partial</p> <p>12 institutions</p>	<p>10 joint actions</p> <p>Regular and Enhanced Cooperation Process and info exchange</p> <p>Full compliance</p> <p>All</p>	<p>DEA, SSSG, MOD reports</p> <p>Respective Georgian legislation</p>	<p>Authorities in Georgia remain dedicated to cooperation and reform in the security sector.</p> <p>Government of Georgia is committed to raise public awareness about cyber threats.</p>

	SO 2.2 To further improve resilience against cybercrime, cyberterrorism and other threats against critical infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of Investigated Cybercrime cases -The critical infrastructure protection framework is further developed and implemented 	<p>98 cases investigated</p> <p>Policy framework is under elaboration</p>	<p>To be agreed further</p> <p>Legislative framework completed and implemented. (including on cyber security related physical infrastructure)</p>	<p>Parliament Reports</p> <p>Disaster Loss Data</p> <p>MIA, SSSG and PGO reports</p>	
	Component 3: Civil Protection, Crisis Management and CBRN					Authorities in Georgia remain dedicated to cooperation and reform in the security sector.
	SO 3.1 To improve preparedness and emergency response to disasters and prevention plans for the protection of citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level to which EWS is functioning efficiently - Disaster preparedness and prevention system functional 	<p>EWS not in place</p> <p>DDR system not functional</p>	<p>EWS efficiently operational</p> <p>DDR system functional</p>	<p>Emergency Management Agency reports</p> <p>CSO reports</p> <p>Media reports</p> <p>Awareness raising materials</p>	
	SO 3.2 To reinstate and improve human security around ammunition storages in Abkhazia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -# of explosive remnants cleared around Primorsky -# of unserviceable ammunition demolished 	<p>70.000 remain (May 2018)</p> <p># to be determined</p>	<p>All surface remnants cleared (2021)</p> <p># to be determined</p>		
	Component 4: Oversight of the security sector and policy dialogue					Authorities in Georgia remain

	SO 4.1 To enhance the understanding of the role and value of oversight to consolidate the role and activities of independent institutions	<p>-ratio of reported ill-treatment cases investigated and prosecuted</p> <p>-Level of engagement between oversight bodies and security institutions (functioning coordination platform)</p> <p>- State Inspector's Office is functioning as a security sector oversight body</p>	<p>17 cases prosecuted in 2017; the date to be provided for 2018</p> <p>no dialogue platform</p> <p>State Inspector's Office has been established</p>	<p>Increased</p> <p>dialogue platform established/coordination mechanism established and functioning</p> <p>State Inspector's Office is fully operational</p>	<p>PDO reports</p> <p>SAO reports</p> <p>State Inspector's Office reports</p> <p>Annual reports with a focus on SSR</p> <p>CSO reports</p>	dedicated to cooperation and reform in the security sector.
	SO 4.2 To strengthen the understanding and role of citizens and civil society in the oversight of the security sector	-# of recommendations by oversight institutions/CSOs implemented by concerned entities.	PDO statistics for 2018 – 27%	Increased to 60%;	CSO reports	