

1. INTRODUCTION

The Operational Plan has been agreed with the authorities of the host Member State¹, in consultation with the authorities of the home Member States participating in the joint operation coordinated by Frontex. It covers all necessary elements for a proper and timely organization of the joint operation coordinated by Frontex.

The Operational Plan contain detailed and specific information related to the particular joint operation, while the Annexes enclose operational information applicable to all joint land borders operations. Annexes complement the Main part of the Operational Plan by providing complete and comprehensive description of the implementation of the joint operation. (*This training document has no Annexes*)

The Main part and Specific Annexes of Operational Plan are marked as "Limited" without prejudice to the public right of access to documents as laid down in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001, regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, while the General Annexes to the Operational Plan have no classification mark indicated.

Operational Plan shall only be made available to the authorities referred in each MS as "Law Enforcement". This document shall be made available to other interested parties only on a need-to-know basis and in accordance with European and national rules on the protection of sensitive/classified information. Such dissemination of this document shall be done only on a case-by-case basis.

This Operational Plan may be revised at any time in order to correspond with the new operational developments. A copy of the amended Operational Plan shall be immediately distributed by Frontex to the participating MS via FOSS.

2. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

EUROPIA is a country, which has joint the Europan Union in 2014 and has fully implemented the Schengen Acquis.

During the last months a significant increase of irregular migration has been detected from neighbouring country USANSKI, which is used as transit. Irregular migrants were crossing the green border mainly in the south-east. Due to political crises in North African countries, further increase of irregular migration is expected in near future.

EUROPIA has therefore reinforced border control measures at the border to USANSKI and detected in coherence to these measures criminal activities an increased number of trafficking of human beings and smuggling as well.

¹ For the purposes of the present document, the term "Member State" includes also the States participating in the relevant development of the Schengen acquis in the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union.



In order to tackle the current situation, EUROPIA has requested human support for border control from the European Union.

3. OPERATIONAL AIM AND OBJECTIVES

3.1. Operational aim

The operational aim of the joint operation is to implement coordinated operational activities at the EU external land borders in order to control irregular migration flows towards the territory of the MS of the European Union (EU) and to tackle cross border crime.

The operational aims will be implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the relevant international law, including the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951, the respect for fundamental rights in particular the access to international protection and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum.

3.2. Operational objectives

- Enhance border security
- Enhance operational cooperation
- Enhance exchange of information
- Identify possible risks and threats
- Establish and exchange best practices

4. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

- Provide support to local authorities in border surveillance activities at land borders:
- Share experiences and exchange expertise as well as to constantly update knowledge on the irregular migration trends in order to adopt countermeasures to tackle the phenomena;
- Collect and assess information in order to improve the detection of human smuggling and trafficking in human beings facilitation by individuals and/or criminal networks and assist wherever possible identification and detention of facilitators;
- Provide a clear and updated situational picture concerning the operational areas, modus operandi, main trends and possible rapid changes in this respect;



5. IMPLEMENTATION

5.1. Period of implementation²

Commencement	18:00
Termination	24:00

5.2. Additional information

A detailed duty schedule will be provided before the activity and updated on daily base.

5.3. Operational Briefings / Debriefings

All participants taking part in joint operation will receive the operational briefing and debriefing delivered by representatives of Frontex and national authorities of host MS. The operational briefing will take place on Tuesday morning in the operational area; the debriefing will take place on Friday at HQ conference room.

6. COORDINATION STRUCTURE

6.1. Partnership

Frontex is the EU coordinator, initiating, promoting and facilitating the EU MS synchronized efforts to control the external borders.

The local authorities are the direct partners of Frontex and responsible for all border related activities within the joint operation.

The home MSs will support the achievement of operational objectives and implementation of activities by deploying their resources to the defined locations in particular periods of time.

² Foreseeable duration of the joint operation as indicated in the Article 3a (1) (b)- of the Frontex Regulation.



6.2. Main operational structures / actors and their tasks

7.2.1. Member States

- Members of the teams
- Local staff of the hosting MS

7.2.3. Frontex

Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC)

7. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND REPORTING

7.1. Command and control


Command and control of members of the team remain with the competent national authority of the host MS.

7.2. Operational communication

Communication plan Joint Operation Europia:



Communication Plan Europia





7.3. Communication with Press

Frontex is strongly committed to the principle of transparency, therefore, as a general rule, media should be granted access to operational areas.

Members of the teams are allowed to talk to the media only within the limits set by specific guidelines for the participating officers below. Each team member taking part in the operation shall receive a laminated card with the specific guidelines.

The communication strategy on the Border Control Operational Actions is common for Frontex and the Host Members States.

7.4. Reporting

7.4.1 Reports from participants

During Joint Operation Europia all patrols are requested to prepare and submit following reports according to Annex 1 and 2 of the EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Handbook of best practice:

- Incident reports
- Shift report

Command Centre will daily announce deadline for submission.

7.4.2 Serious incident reporting

A Serious Incident Report (SIR) is an alert message aimed at informing Frontex, and other relevant stakeholders, as soon as possible (within 2 hours after recognition), about the occurrence of a SI as defined in the "Frontex Serious Incident Catalogue"³. The production and timely dissemination of a SIR contribute to improve situational awareness and increase the reaction capabilities of Frontex related to incidents occurred in the frame of activities coordinated or led by Frontex.

Type of report	Description	Responsibility
Serious Incident Report 3 Serious Incident Catalogue	The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.	of the JO



combination thereof, including any allegation of =violation of Fundamental Rights.

8. ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGMENTS AND LOGISTICS

8.1. Composition of the teams

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8.2. Transport and lodging

All transportation will be provided by the host MS Europia. All deployed staff will be accommodated at HQ in Europia.

8.3. Safety and Security Rules

- All communication will be in English language
- All participants will follow strictly the Frontex Code of Conduct
- Trainers will be visible by vests "Frontex Trainer"; all orders by trainers shall be strictly followed
- Participants will wear their proper national uniform; personal equipment is allowed after consulting trainers; NO WEAPONS

8.4 Legal aspects of EUROPIA

International Protection:

People who are in need of International Protection will be referred to the reception centre of the national office for asylum seekers. As a first measure the border authority establish identity and takes evidence before referring to reception centre.

Trafficking in Human Beings:

EUROPIA has recently launched its national program in preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, which is based on the EU Directive 36/2011. Victims of trafficking receive, after establishing identity, legal status for staying in EUROPIA till



the case is closed by court. The border authority takes all measures for proper investigation against traffickers.

9. EVALUATION

Evaluation of the Joint Operation will be done with all participants during the debriefing on Thursday.



ANNEX II

HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICE FOR LAND BORDER SURVEILLANCE OFFICERS



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As law enforcement, you must first know the law!

Introduction

A Border Surveillance Officer is facing daily challenging and demanding tasks. The spectrum of action and reaction has to be adopted to the situation, environment and local circumstances. In this regard, a Team Member deployed to any Frontex Joint Operation or Pilot Project has to rely on certain standards in cooperation with host Member State officers and vice versa.

This handbook is not replacing any national law or regulation; it should be understood as best practice in various typical Border Guard situations in order to facilitate, on one hand the enforcement of the national law of the host Member State, but also to ensure self-protection of deployed Guest Officers and their colleagues.

Worst case scenarios occur by the combination of avoidable minor mistakes, for example the misinterpretation of information received, improper use of equipment, insufficient equipment check prior to the start of duty, lack of proper briefing of the staff involved.



Diplomat in Uniform

You are the first impression a foreigner receives by entering your or the host country! We expect behavioral standards aligning the Frontex Code of Conduct and this reflects appearance, communication and professionalism in all your measures.

The respect of Fundamental Rights¹ is the main approach of this handbook and, as mentioned in the headline: "As law enforcement you must first know the law!". The enjoyment of Fundamental Rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations. In order to show you how much the Charter of Fundamental Rights affects your work, here is an example of a border related case:

Example:

Your patrol stops a vehicle close to the border and you check the identity of the driver. You recognize a forged document presented by the driver and you decide to bring the person for further clarification about his identity to the nearest field office. After one hour at the field office you have established the real identity and by checking the database you have found out an existing European Arrest Warrant issued by German authorities. The reason for the arrest warrant is that the person has been sentenced for trafficking in human beings.

Task:

Discuss and try to find out which articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are applicable to this case3.

¹ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

² Taken from the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

³ Example: To stop the person and transfer to the field office; to keep the person at the field office for one hour; arrestment due to arrest warrent – Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Establishing identity, and check with database – Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.


Using forged documents by the person as criminal act – Article 47 and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. European Arrest Warrant by court decision – Article 47 and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.



There is no need to commit the whole law to memory, but if you follow some general rules within all your actions, you will comply with general legal requirements:

- adapt the use of force according to the situation;
- follow the principle of proportionality in all your actions and measures, especially when using force or dealing with vulnerable people;
- any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.⁴

Use of ForceModel⁵



The officer continuously assesses the situation and selects the most reasonable option relative to those circumstances as perceived at that point in time.

Proportionality

In all your measures you should respect proportionality between the aim you want to achieve and the means you are using. Simply spoken, **do not use a sledgehammer for cracking a nut!**

internet: http://ottawa. ca/calendar/ottawa/citycouncil/opsb/2008/02-

25/item7.htm

⁴ Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

⁵ Ontario Use of Force Model (2004). 2nd July 2014,12:23 hrs, taken from





Keep proportionality of all your measures!

Chapter 1 - Border surveillance basics

Principles of green border surveillance

Within the border surveillance duties along the EU external land borders joint teams comprising officers from the border guard services of the host MSs and guest officers (EBGTs) perform preventive and repressive tasks, which are carried out following the operational plan by respecting the main purposes of the surveillance of external borders at places other than border crossing-points and surveillance of these crossing-points outside opening hours6:

- to prevent, and discourage, unauthorised border crossings;
- to counter cross-border criminality;
- toapplyortakemeasuresagainstpersonswhohavecrossedtheborder illegally.

Border surveillance duties are performed in full compliance of the relevant EU and international law, national laws of the Host Member States, obligations related to access to international protection and fundamental rights.⁷

The surveillance of the land borders may be carried out by⁸:

- patrolling
- stationing at places known or perceived to be sensitive

⁶ Schengen Handbook, Brussels, 06/XI/2006, C (2006) 5186 final, p. 75

⁷ Schengen Borders Code (SBC), Art. 3a.

⁸ Schengen Handbook, Brussels, 06/XI/2006, C (2006) 5186 final, p. 75



Joint Team's tasks are done practically through various forms of work, most frequently as patrolling, observation, intensified control and ambush (stationary and mobile units).⁹

Patrolling

Patrolling is a form of work usually done in motor vehicles and other means of transport at those operational areas (sections) of the EU external land borders where local border guards and GOs presence is required due to the operational needs, defined base on the risk assessment.¹⁰

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vehicles or other types of technical means.

Stationing

The main tasks of stationing are to:

- observe the places which are perceived to be sensitive to illegal border crossing or smuggling
- stop and bring to the nearest border guard's station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally

Observation

Observation is a form of work the purpose of which is to spend a short or long period of time observing certain operational area(s) and it is usually done on foot by use of different technical means. Observation is carried out in places where illegal crossings of the EU external borders and other criminal activities related to THB are more frequent or where they can be expected based on risk assessment and previous operational findings.



Intensified control

Intensified control is the form of work where, according the risk assessment joint teams caring out tasks in a certain area at a certain time based on common plan. In surveillance of the land border intensified control is performed in order to detect and prevent illegal crossings, to detect forged or altered passports and abuse of genuine documents, to detect and prevent trafficking in firearms, to detect and preventillicit drug trafficking and to detect stolen vehicles.

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Technical equipment for successful land border surveillance

Different technical equipment for successful surveillance of the land borders is used by local authorities and GOs during Joint Operations. Technical means¹¹ which are mainly used for land border surveillance during the Joint Operations at land borders - with the aim to apprehend individuals crossing the land borders illegally - are:

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Security and safety aspects of border surveillance

Security and safety aspects of the border surveillance as such shall be also taken into account, due the fact that the irregular migrants are often put into dangerous situations while trying to cross the EU external land borders since the terrain (landscape as such, woods, areas without inhabitants) and other circumstances (severe weather conditions, flooding, etc.) at the border areas are quite often putting them in situations requiring search and rescue measures to be taken from local authorities. Measures taken for purpose of the border surveillance shall be conducted in the way that does not put at risk of safety of the persons apprehended or rescued.

Joint Teams

Joint Teams (comprising officers from the border guard services of the host MSs and Team Members (EBCGTs)-are obliged to maintain the highest standards of integrity, ethical conduct, professionalism and respect for and promotion of



fundamental rights. While patrolling at the EU External land borders they are obliged to comply with the European, international law, fundamental rights and national law of the Member State. While performing their duties at EU external land borders (observation, patrolling) they shall not discriminate persons on grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion, belief, age or sexual orientation and they are expected to treat every person with courtesy, respect and due consideration for the nature of any legitimate activity in which they are engaged.



Chapter 2 - Communication/Reporting

The Four Communication Skills



The strongest weapon for law enforcements is communication!

In this chapter we will focus on communication and reporting as one of the most important tasks of law enforcement. We will generally distinguish between internal and external communication. As "internal communication" we regard the communication between Border Guards and within the respective Border Guard authority, which could be used, but not limited to:

- inform colleagues about an incident or emergency case;
- gain intelligence;
- share intelligence with colleagues in order to initiate actions in border control;
- request support;
- fulfil obligation to report (Serious Incident Report), so that senior management can react accordingly;
- prepare criminal investigations; etc.

The main language in any Frontex activity is English¹⁴, therefore it is necessary for the staff deployed to be familiar with common standards in reporting and communication.

As "external communication" we regard the communication between the law enforcement authority (in this case you as Border Guard) and any other member of the public who could be a traveler, perpetrator, victim of trafficking, witness, irregular migrant or anybody else approaching you in respective situations.

Always adjust your behavior and communication to the situation and the person in front of you.



Examples:

- communication with children differs from communication with adults;
- communication with victims differs from communication with perpetrators.

Internal communication in practice

Radio communication skills

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International phonetic alphabet (NATO/ ICAO):

 A Alpha B Bravo C Charlie D Delta E Echo F Foxtrott G Golf H Hotel 		
C Charlie D Delta E Echo F Foxtrott G Golf		
D DeltaE EchoF FoxtrottG Golf		
E EchoF FoxtrottG Golf		
F Foxtrott G Golf		
G Golf		
H Hotel		
I India		
J Juliette		
K Kilo		
L Lima		
M Mike		
N November		
O Oscar	Oscar	
P Papa		
Q Quebec		
R Romeo		
S Sierra		
T Tango		
U Uniform		
V Victor		
W Whisky		
X X-Ray	0.00	
Y Yankee		
Z Zulu		

General instruction for transmitting messages ¹⁵:

- Decide in advance what you are going to say, ensuring it will be clear and brief.
- Make sure no one else is speaking on the net when you start.
- Remembertodivideyourmessageintosensiblephrases, make pauses and maintain a natural rhythm to your speech.
- Avoid excessive calling and unofficial transmissions.
- Use standard pronunciation. Emphasize vowels sufficiently.
- Avoid extreme pitch, speak in a moderately strong voice, do not shout.
- Keep a distance of about 5 cm between the microphone and your lips.



Shield your microphone from background noises and wind

Radio procedure words¹⁶

PROWORD	MEANING	
ACKNOWLEDGE!	Confirm that you have received my message and will comply.	
AFFIRMATIVE	Yes/Correct	
NEGATIVE	No/Incorrect	
ALL AFTER	Everything that you (I) transmitted after (Keyword)	
ALL BEFORE	Everything that you (I) transmitted before (Keyword)	
CORRECT (THAT IS CORRECT)	What you have transmitted is correct.	
CORRECTION	An error has been made in this transmission. It will continue with the last word (group) correctly transmitted. An error has been made in this transmission. The correct version is That which follows is a correct version in answer to your request for verification.	
WRONG	Your last transmission was incorrect. The correct version is	
DISREGARD THIS TRANSMISSION -OUT	This transmission is an error. Disregard it.	
SILENCE – SILENCE – SILENCE	Ceasealltransmissions on this net immediately. Will be maintained until lifted.	
SILENCE LIFTED	Silence is lifted. The net is free for traffic.	
END OF MESSAGE – OVER (OUT)	This concludes the message just transmitted (and the message instructions pertaining to a formal message).	
END OF TEXT	The textual part of a formal message ends. Stand by for the message instructions immediately following.	

FETCH the shift-leader!	Iwishtospeakontheradiotothatperson(inthiscase the shift-leader)
SPEAKING	Requested person is now using the radio by him or herself.
FIGURES	Numerals or numbers will follow.
MESSAGE	I have a message for you.
OVER	This is the end of my turn of transmitting. A response is expected.
OUT	This is the end of my transmission to you. No answer or acknowledgment is expected.
SAY AGAIN!	Repeat all of your last transmission.



SEND YOUR MESSAGE! Go ahead with your transmission.		
SPEAK SLOWER!	Reduce the speed of your transmission.	
SPELL	I shall spell the next word, group or equivalent phonetically. (Normally used in connection with request for repetition)	
RELAY TO	Transmit the following message to all addressees or to the address designation immediately following.	
MESSAGE PASSED TO	Your message has been passed to	
ROGER	I have received your message, understand it and will comply.	
ROGER SO FAR?	Have you received this part of my message satisfactorily?	
WILCO	I have received your last transmission satisfactorily. The identity of the station calling or with whom I am attempting to establish communication is unknown.	
UNKNOWN STATION		
VERIFY	Verify entire message (or part indicated) with the originator and send correct version. To be used only at discretion of or by the addressee to which the questioned message was directed.	
I VERIFY	That which follows has been verified at your request and is repeated.	
WAIT – OUT	I must pause for a few seconds	

Example of radio conversation¹⁷:

The proword THIS IS or FROM is used to indicate the calling station.

- ALFA THIS IS CHARLIE MESSAGE OVER
- FROM ALFA SEND OVER
- THIS-IS-CHARLIE-WATCH-FOR-FALLEN-ROCKS-ON-ROAD-BIRKET-I
- -SPELL-BRAVO-INDIA-ROMEO-KILO-ECHO-TANGO-BIRKET-OVER
 - FROM ALFA WILCO OUT

Report writing

A report is a key element in the Border Guard work. It is a documentation of your performance and could be the basis for follow-up decisions like criminal investigations, preventative measures, risk assessment, etc. A report also ensures gathering of intelligence for your authority.

In general, a report should provide answers to following questions:

- Who?
- What?
- When?



- Where?
- How?
- Why?

In the Annexes of this handbook you can find examples of a case and shift reports.

Serious Incident Report (SIR)18:

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Template with requested content if available:

Serious Incident Report

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



	·		
ect of the case			

What happened; when and where did it happen; who was involved/affected; why did it happen; how did it happen; with what did it happen (which means were used):

Source of information

2. Measures

Actions taken: Frontex actors and actions from Host/Home MS or others (intended, initiated, completed)

3. Assessment

Brief description of possible consequences, effects, reactions, further comments

Example:

Serious Incident Report

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.



1. Fact of the case

·__·

00.10 a.m.

- An emergency call from people in distress in the area of Kraynovo was received on the emergency number 112.
- Immediately after receiving the call, 4 border police patrols (1 TVV) were dispatched in the area of BPU Bolyarovo.

09.15 a.m.

- An emergency helicopter was launched.

10.10 a.m.

- A group of 5 persons (irregular migrants) was detected north of BM219 in the area of Kraynovo village by the helicopter.

10.45:

- A patrol from BPU Bolyarovo arrived at the spot and found a group consisting of 3 children and 2 women.
- One of the women was found lifeless.

11:15:

- After an initial medical examination, the death of the person was confirmed by the alerted doctor.
- The body of the woman was transported for an autopsy to Yambol hospital.
- The reason for the death is under examination.
- The migrants claimed to be from Syria.

2. Measures

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The autopsy

External communication in practice

Basics:

- present friendly and appropriate appearance;
- build trust;
- show empathy;
- explain the reason for your measures;
- be patient;
- listen actively;
- always reduce own dominant behavior to a minimum;
- be clear to avoid any misunderstanding;
- communicate constantly to gain information about the situation, and for your personal risk assessment;
- be attentive;
- use your bodylanguage;
- follow tit-for-tatstrategy/survivability.

Being attentive is a corner stone in the behavior of law enforcement officers. Obviously harmless situations could lead to an unexpected reaction of the person addressed, with serious consequences for you or your colleagues.

Sample pictures – Body language/non-verbal communication





Hands during conversation: <u>in front and ready for action</u>, depending on behaviour and reaction of the interlocutor.



Chapter 3 - Preparation for duty/team briefing

Equipment Check

The professional use of your equipment is a prerequisite for a successful operation. This includes means of communication as well as means of coercion.

Before starting your duty, you should check your equipment properly:

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Patrolling by vehicle

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Please be aware:

The meaning of a weapon could be, from legal perspective, interpreted in different ways in certain Member States, with different legal consequences (i.e. for obligatory warning procedures or storage of a weapon)!

Belt Configuration

equipment alway	/s available	according to	graduation	of force;

□ attention: protection of backbone!

First Aid/hygiene Always use hand gloves!

Are you aware on how to react in case of



- i.e. how to treat person in shock?
- How to use first aid kit? Is it available?
- Do you have number of ambulance available?



Team briefing

A proper preparation for each operation requires a thorough briefing by the team leader. The following aspects should be the minimum taken into consideration for a briefing prior each shift/patrol:

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.