Voter Disenfranchisement: A Privacy Issue

Democratic institutions are facing growing challenges in respecting and protecting the right to privacy during the election cycle. Likewise, certain groups of voters, often including minorities, are being excluded from participating in elections. How are these two trends related, and what role does technology play in voter data protection and voter disenfranchisement?

States are increasingly employing technologies to coordinate the running of their electoral processes, which poses challenges for privacy. When administering elections, technologies are being employed in many countries to carry out processes like biometric voter registration, voter identification, e-voting, and so on. Election officials collect, process and store large amounts of voter data throughout these processes. The running of elections has thus become an increasingly data-driven exercise, and clear protections are needed to ensure that voter data is handled securely and privately.

With this increase in the use of tech and data during elections, it is critically important that those running the elections, political actors, and social media companies adhere to privacy and data protection laws, and that these laws are up to date. These laws could ensure that voter data is protected and that tech failures do not lead to incorrect results or the annulment of elections, but also that voters are not disenfranchised.

Disenfranchisement - the deprivation of the right to vote - erodes election integrity. The increasingly prominent role of data and tech in elections can lead to a chilling of political participation, particularly for specific and often minoritised groups. For instance, as we discuss below, voter ID requirements necessitate the collection and retention of voter data that may not otherwise be necessary, violating voter privacy while also disenfranchising voters who are less able to obtain identification. This risk is further heightened when biometrics-based technology is used to facilitate voter identification. Data irrelevant to voting - such as religious beliefs - when collected in the voter register is both a privacy violation and fertile ground for disenfranchisement. And when introducing new voting technologies, a failure to sufficiently accommodate certain populations, like people with visual disabilities, can either risk the secrecy of their vote or disenfranchise them.

Democracy cannot be upheld if certain groups of people are categorically excluded from voting. It is therefore crucial that the technology used and data required during the electoral process does not lead to the exclusion of voters.

Voter ID requirements

Minoritised groups are often underrepresented in elections and political processes due to access and inclusion issues. Ensuring that tech is inclusive but at the same time adheres to data protection standards is key for protecting the right to political participation, the right to non-discrimination and the right to privacy.

A recurring limitation on the right to vote is linked to difficulties in obtaining the identification documents necessary for voter registration and authentication. Election-related ID requirements differ per context, but patterns have emerged globally showing that voters are experiencing ID-related obstacles when registering or turning up to vote.

Ethnic and religious minorities, as well as people living with disabilities and other minoritised groups such as LGBTQ+ people, are disproportionately disenfranchised as a result of ID requirements.

During England’s 2023 local elections, photo ID requirements led to racial and disability discrimination according to an all-party parliamentary group report. According to the report, the voter ID system “disenfranchises more electors that it protects”. It found that there was a higher chance that polling clerks would reject the photo IDs of people from ethnic minority backgrounds or those with disabilities. The report called for the types of acceptable ID to be expanded.

In England and Wales, thousands of people living with disabilities were disenfranchised by the introduction of photo ID requirements under the Elections Act 2022, as it is more difficult for them in many cases to obtain, for example, a driving licence. According to Disability Rights UK, many of those without access to photo ID are individuals living with disabilities - including those with intersectional experiences i.e. trans people living with disabilities, or people living with disabilities experiencing domestic abuse.

Data also implies that access to accepted forms of photographic ID is linked to age, socio-economic status, education, and social grade which affected voter turnout in both local and general elections in England in 2023 and 2024. According to a study on the electoral implications of the Elections Act 2022, around five percent of electors in Great Britain did not own a recognised voter ID. Those who did not own such an ID were more likely to be in poorer and less educated groups, as well as among supporters of left-leaning political parties.

Furthermore, as noted by the Secretary-General of the UN in a 2024 report on Electoral participation and protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, the most commonly reported limitation of suffrage based on a voter’s gender is linked to problems with acquiring ID documents corresponding to the accurate gender of voter. This lack of access to correct ID documents can lead to the person being denied the right to vote.

In Great Britain, voter identification legislation has reportedly restricted the participation of trans, non-binary and gender non-conforming people in electoral processes. As part of the 2022 Elections Act, the rule that voters must present photo ID was introduced. As a result, trans, non-binary or gender non-conforming people might face barriers when voting, as polling clerks are authorised to deny them the right to vote if they have “reasonable doubt” that the person on the photo ID is not the same as the person presenting it. This is more likely to be the case if the photo, gender marker, or name on the ID card doesn’t reflect the voter’s gender identity. Apart from interfering with voters’ rights to political participation and non-discrimination, excluding people in this way could interfere with their right to privacy. Everyone has the right to get their ID checked privately. Additionally, this process might expose the person’s gender identity without their consent.

Difficulties in accessing photo ID that correctly reflects a voter’s gender identity disproportionately affects LGBTQ+ people who experience discrimination based on intersecting characteristics such as ethnicity and disability. Removing gender markers or prefixes from ID systems, as well as accepting different forms of ID that do not include photographs, could be positive steps towards protecting people’s privacy and enabling them to exercise their right to vote.

Despite all of these difficulties, some positive examples exist too. In Mexico, the Electoral Management Body enables voters to use their preferred gender identity markers on voting registration documents without needing to present a corresponding ID. Canadian voters are required to present an ID, but not one that includes sex or gender indicators.

The UK Electoral Commission enables people who don’t have an accepted form of photo ID, are not sure whether their photo ID still looks like them, or are worried about using an existing form of ID to apply for a free Voter Authority Certificate to vote at a polling station. The Voter Authority Certificate includes the voter’s name, address, and photo. It does not contain sex markers. The certificate has however been criticised for not being a maintainable form of ID; for not being sufficiently promoted; and for othering LGBTQ+ people.

ID requirements and biometric tech

Many democracies are increasingly looking to employ technology - including biometrics - to coordinate the running of their electoral processes. Biometric voter registration is a technology that creates a digital representation of an individual’s biometrics such as fingerprints, iris/eye scans, and facial photographs, and adds them to a voter register alongside other individual biographic details such as name, address, and date of birth.

Biometric voter registration raises significant privacy concerns and can lead to disenfranchisement, especially for voters who struggle to provide the biometrics required. For instance, voters who do not have recognisable fingerprints due to age, manual labour or disability might be excluded.

Kenya’s adoption of a biometric voter registration system raised both concerns. After the 2007 post-election violence, in an attempt to rebuild the voter register to remove “ghost voters”, and for increased transparency, Kenya mass introduced technologies into its election processes. The system is known as the Kenyan Integrated Elections Management System (KIEMS), which includes biometric voter registration (BVR) and electronic voter identification (EVID).

When such technologies are adopted in the absence of a strong legal framework and strict safeguards, they pose significant threats to privacy and personal security, as their application can be broadened to facilitate discrimination and mass surveillance.

Due to the sensitive nature of biometric data and its potential to exclude, it should only be used for voter registration if it is necessary to effectively authenticate voters. Voters who are unable to provide biometric data should be given alternative registration options, to avoid their disenfranchisement.

Additionally, according to the Council of Europe’s guidelines on the processing of personal data for the purposes of voter registration and authentication, “no biometric data should ever be shared with political parties, political candidates, campaign organisations, or other third parties. Only the EMB or processors on their behalf should have access to the biometric data processed for voter registration.”

Exclusionary voter registers

An additional potential restriction of the right to vote is related to voter registers that exclude voters on the basis of personal data irrelevant to the voting exercise, or outdated/unreliable data. In some cases, voter registers requiring information that is not necessary for the purpose of voter registration can lead to disenfranchisement. In others, eligible voters are removed from voter registers on the basis of data from which their residence status is inferred - again something which is likely to disproportionately affect minoritised communities. In both of these cases, there is a potential for a violation of the right to privacy. There must be a limit to the collection of personal data about voters to what is strictly necessary in order to complete the voting process and there must be prohibitions on using this data for any other purpose.

In Pakistan, members of the Ahmadiyyah community were disenfranchised during the most recent parliamentary elections in 2024. Ahmadis are a persecuted religious minority who were legally declared non-Muslims by the state in 1974. Since then, this has caused Ahmadis - who self-identify as Muslim - to hide their religious identities in order to avoid government persecution and discrimination. Pakistan’s electoral law provides for all Pakistani citizens to be registered in a single electoral register, except for Ahmadis, who are registered separately. Ahmadis are thus excluded from the voter register unless they are on a separate “non-Muslim” electoral register. In order to be included in that register, Ahmadis must declare themselves non-Muslim and declare their religious founder to be an imposter. Besides this, national ID cards are required to cast your vote in Pakistan, which again, Ahmadis are only able to obtain if they declare themselves non-Muslim. This has led to many Ahmadis not voting as they do not wish to deny their beliefs. Collecting religious affiliation in connection to voting in this manner is an unjustified privacy violation which leads to disenfranchisement in cases like these.

Use of potentially unreliable data from outside electoral registers, including through the application of artificial intelligence, may also lead to disenfranchisement. In 2017 and 2018, a large number of people in Wisconsin received a letter asking them to confirm their place on the voter list. The Electronic Registration Information Center had classified these voters as no longer resident in Wisconsin on the basis of data such as voting history, driving licence, and post office records. Subsequent researched showed that those erroneously identified as no longer residents were more likely to be ethnic minorities. Although this is not an example of AI usage, a similar logic might be employed by AI to classify voters in this manner, which could lead to eligible voters being taken off a voter registration list, disenfranchising them.

Excluding people from the electoral register on the basis of their religious or political beliefs, or unreliable external data, is not only discriminatory - it is also a privacy issue. Voters should not have to disclose their identities or other personal data irrelevant to the voting exercise in order to participate in elections.

Accessibility shortcomings

An electoral system which is private, meaningfully accessible and does not disenfranchise voters should facilitate the autonomous, private, secure and secret vote for everybody, including the elderly and those who are illiterate, living with disabilities or who face linguistic or technological challenges. Accessibility shortcomings in electoral systems increase the risk of people being excluded from voting.

In Argentina’s October 2025 legislative elections, the rights to secrecy of the vote, privacy, political participation and non-discrimination were undermined. Election authorities failed to ensure universal accessibility to a secret vote in the election, infringing on the rights of people in the Argentinian electorate, including those who are blind and with low vision.

During the election, a new voting system, known as the “Boleta Única de Papel -BUP-” (Unique Paper Ballot), was introduced across the country. Local CSOs raised concerns that the system was not made accessible to blind and partially sighted people. Some electoral authorities provided NGO-supplied voting mechanisms consisting of a braille voting stencil and QR code. However, the QR codes were only accessible to those who had a device that can connect to the internet. Additionally, not all people with visual disabilities are braille literate.

Moreover, there were 22 provinces and other unknown localities in which the accessibility provisions were not implemented. In those areas, in order to cast a vote, blind and partially sighted people would have been obliged to be accompanied by a trusted person to cast their vote for them - known as an “assisted vote”. The lack of provisions ensuring people’s independent understanding and handling of the ballot slip meant that a secret and autonomous vote wasn’t possible in all cases.

This Argentinian example shows how failure to provide for accessible voting can violate the privacy and secrecy of the vote as well as disability rights. To combat this, a secret and private vote should include provision of non-internet dependent audio devices and availability and security of an accessible ballot.

Conclusion

Voter disenfranchisement can occur at several stages of the election cycle, including voter registration, voter identification, and the voting exercise itself. Voter ID requirements and the use of biometric tech to authenticate voters can violate voter privacy and lead to exclusion for LGBTQ+ and ethnic and religious minority voters, voters living with disabilities, and those with lower socio-economic status. The inclusion of unnecessary or unreliable information in voter registers can lead to discriminatory disenfranchisement. Inaccessible ballots and voting systems can exclude blind or partially sighted people from voting secretly. The increasingly prominent role of data and tech in the election process can lead to a chilling of political participation, particularly for specific and often minoritised groups. In order to avoid disenfranchisement and ensure that voter privacy is protected, we recommend the following:

• When running elections, Electoral Commissions should permit the use of a wide range of voter IDs, including those without photographs or gender markers.
• Biometric data should only be collected for voter registration or authentication purposes if strong data protection standards are in place, and alternatives should be provided for those unable or unwilling to submit their biometric data.
• Voters should not have to disclose their identities or other personal data irrelevant to the voting exercise, such as their religious beliefs in order to participate in elections.
• Voting should be made accessible to blind or partially sighted voters, by providing non-internet dependent audio devices, and availability as well as security of an accessible ballot.