Elections Technology - Our Recommendations #1: General Recommendations, BVR, EVID and Results Transmission

When it comes to elections around the world, we find ourselves in a terrain that is more and more populated by digital technologies, which have an increasingly critical impact upon the realisation of democracy. Digital technologies used in the context of elections offer new opportunities to support voter participation, whilst simultaneously posing increasing challenges for voters and those who manage and oversee elections. The introduction of technologies into electoral systems in countries across the globe further presents risks which can pose challenges to modern democracy itself, and in turn to the preservation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to privacy.

This context requires the modification of norms and practices to ensure that elections are free, fair and transparent. Election observers are also having to develop new methodologies and skills to adapt to the shifting democratic terrain.

This short article will draw from our recently launched tech explainer, "Kenyan Voting ICTs - Biometric Voter Registration, Voter Identification, Results Transmission, and Candidate Management Systems", which provides a detailed case study on the uses of data and technology as a response to Kenya's highly contested and violence-marred elections of 2007. The piece aims to draw upon lessons learnt in this Kenya case study, and highlight key considerations, challenges and recommendations when it comes to specific uses of data and techonologies for elections (read the case study in full here).

It will also draw from our "Technology, Data and Elections Checklist" which aims to give electoral observers and civil society the necessary tools to understand and assess the role of technologies in the electoral process.

Finally, these recommendations reflect lessons we have learned as a result of our work on biometric identity systems, of which the voter register is a subset.

All or some of the below listed technologies that can be used during elections may be contained within the same device or system, as with the case of the Kenyan Integrated Elections Management System (KIEMS).

Our recommendations:

1. General recommendations for use of data and technology in the electoral process

It is essential that the following is carried out before introducing a new scheme or technology into the electoral process:

1. An independent feasibility study to be conducted, which will assess the practicalities of the proposed system, its strengths and weaknesses: Even if there is evidence for a problem, it doesn’t necessarily follow that an ID scheme will solve that problem and the feasibility study might pick that up.
2. Data protection and human rights risk assessments should be undertaken well in advance in order to ensure the proposals are necessary and proportionate, identify any risks to privacy and security.
3. The relevant legal framework is in place before the new technology or scheme is rolled out: A comprehensive data protection regime is essential to protect people and it is essential it is put in place beforehand rather than enacted afterwards.
4. The system is made secure: A large-scale database can be a tempting target for criminals and others looking to gain access to the system. The security of the biometric and other databases are often a problem, often with vasts amount of data stored in a centralised database that it not properly secured. Too many people can be allowed access and data shared with too many third parties. This can lead to people's personal data being shared with third parties they did not know about, for reasons they are not made aware of.
5. Public expectations are managed:
   1. The proposal should be put out to a consultation process
6. A transparent and evidence-based process: Lack of transparency sows distrust. Lack of transparency about how the technology works and what it does may undermine confidence in the process. Lack of understanding about the scale of investment may also present problems; the technology may need updating every election and the registration process repeating, and this is expensive. A transparent and evidence-based process is thus essential.
   1. Any procurement of equipment should be transparent and clearly costed.

2. Biometric Voter Registration (BVR)

1. Biometric data is particularly sensitive, raising serious privacy concerns, and should thus be subject to heightened safeguards.
2. Biometric data should only be used for voter registration if it is necessary to effectively authenticate voters.
3. If biometric voter registration is implemented, its use must be enshrined in law and subject to accompanying safeguards, including relevant data protection legislation, prior to deployment, and overseen by the national Data Protection Authority where one exists. 
4. Only the minimum biometric data necessary to faciliate effective registration should be collected.
5. The BVR should embed privacy by default and by design. For example, systems should be designed for the specific use-case only.
6. Voters who cannot provide biometric data should be given an alternative mechanism by which to register. Reasons why voters cannot provide data may vary, including voters who do not have recognisable fingerprints due to age or use, or voters whose religious or cultural beliefs mandate they do not submit to photographs for identification.
7. Biometric data should be stored securely, separately from other data, and not be stored in any open register to which access can be purchased.
8. BVR kits are vulnerable to theft and degradation, and thus should be securely stored in order to preserve their condition and protect them from theft.
9. Data collected for voter registration should not be used for any other purpose, including sharing with police or security services. Access levels should be audited, and set by default to the lowest available.

3. Electronic Voter Identification (EVID)

1. Biometric data should only be used for voter identification if it is necessary to effectively identify voters.
2. Back-up measures should be built into BVR kits, including for example the possibility to verify fingerprints via alphanumeric lookup.
3. The voter register should not solely be stored on digital devices. Printed registers should be distributed to polling stations in case of failure of the digital system, either as a whole or for the purpose of identifying individual voters.
4. An alternative register should be provided to identify voters who have not been able to register their biometrics.
5. Before rolling out EVID kits or devices, e.g. laptops or mobile phones, for a given election, steps should be taken to ensure that locations where EVIDs will be used have enough power outlets to charge the devices, and that there is power and electricity supply to these locations.
6. Where possible, alternative power sources, such as battery operated systems with back-up battery power sources, should be rolled out alongside EVID devices as back-ups, particularly where there exist concerns about power or power outlet availability.

4. Results Transmission Systems

1. When it comes to results transmission that relies upon internet connectivity, such as 3G or 4G, it should be ensured in advance that there is 100% internet coverage at polling station locations.
2. If relying upon 3G or 4G for results transmission in locations where there less than 100% coverage such as, for example, in some rural locations, an alternative method of results transmission should be used, or at a minimum a back up method should be available, such as the use of satellite phones.
3. Transmission should be done over secure data links utilising modern encryption to protect against tampering or other corruption.
4. Ensure that passwords and/or PINs needed to access devices used for results transmission are recorded somewhere and stored securely.

Conclusion

Although we caution that the failure or misuse of the above technologies for the conduct of an election could have grave, or even catastrophic, consequences for individuals whose data is implicated or for democratic mechanisms, it is also important to recognise the potential of these technologies to offer advantages to the electorate and the democratic process as a whole if used responsibly, safely and in a manner that upholds human rights.

As in the case of Kenya, technology was put in place for the management of elections in part due to serious violence erupting in the wake of the 2007 elections in the country, which resulted in the deaths of over 1000 people and the displacement of over 600,000 people. In Kenya, the deployment of election technologies was an attempt to foster trust in the voting process by partially eliminating the potential for human corruption. However, other instances where similar technologies have been used, such as in Mozambique's 2024 election, have led to irregularities around voter registration and a decrease in confidence and independence of the election administration.

These technologies bring with them their own risks and challenges, including to privacy and equality, which must be properly addressed. The implementation of the above recommendations by states would be concrete steps towards addressing said challenges and ensuring that technology is used to galvanise, rather than undermine, the democratic process.