The new space race is already a war race

1. A rapidly expanding satellite ecosystem

Satellites have played a significant role in shaping how societies live and operate. For instance, the 1962 launch of the first commercial communications satellite, Telstar 1, developed by AT&T in partnership with NASA, marked a key milestone in global communications. The satellite's advanced technology helped meet the growing demand for transatlantic communications by enabling the transmission of television signals and the simultaneous handling of multiple telephone calls.

Since then, the satellite landscape has evolved dramatically.

By 2024, there were an estimated 10,000 active satellites in orbit, a tenfold increase from roughly 1,000 satellites in 2014, with the majority operating in LEO. Starlink alone was estimated to operate around 60 percent of these functioning satellites in 2024, and as of July 2025, the company reports having more than 7,800 satellites in orbit.

At the end of 2025, according to media reports, on the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) official website suggested that China had submitted applications for frequency spectrum and orbital resources covering more than 200,000 additional satellites.

On July 2025, the U.S. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) awarded contracts to sixteen companies for proliferated LEO satellite-based services. Proliferated Low Earth Orbit (PLEO) refers to the deployment of large constellations of coordinated satellites in low Earth orbit, as opposed to individual or small numbers of satellites.

A few decades ago, entering the satellite market was prohibitively difficult due to high capital costs, complex technology, and regulatory hurdles. As we can see, today satellite operations are expanding rapidly.

So, these companies, along with the countries they are partnering with, are scaling up aggressively. But, are we prepared for the political, economic, and social consequences of this transformation?

2. Satellite data: from observation to infrastructure of power

Satellites are not only enablers of communications. They are also embedded with significant capabilities as data collectors. A satellite can host different types of sensors and other technologies, and depending on its orbit and technical configuration, it can collect different kinds of data [See: What are satellites? (A brief primer)].

The data they collect can be used for a wide range of applications, such as measuring ocean temperatures, estimating socio-economic well-being, monitoring the growth of plastic waste sites or methane emissions, and identifying or tracking illegal mining and gold extraction operations.

As an example, we can see how these capabilities are already being used in migration and border control. Satellites equipped with optical and active sensors can monitor the size of towns and other settlements such as refugee camps, or track the movement of large objects such as boats at sea. Many of these systems operate in Low Earth Orbit satellites (LEO), as explained above, as they are closer to the earth and enable them to capture multiple images of an area every day. Use of satellite imagery for monitoring borders has been around for over two decades, with examples reported by Amnesty International in 2007 of the Spanish authorities presenting satellite photos to the Mauritanian authorities to demonstrate that migrants had departed Mauritanian territory.

Beyond border control, one of the most strategically significant roles satellites play today is in modern warfare and conflict analysis. Remote sensing, open-source intelligence (OSINT), and visual forensics have become essential tools for documenting conflicts without physical presence on the ground. Satellites can also detect information not visible to the human eye, such as nighttime illumination patterns, atmospheric signals, or changes obscured by cloud cover. This makes them particularly powerful for analysing events in otherwise inaccessible areas. Such techniques have been widely used to map developments in Ukraine following Russia’s invasion, as well as to document and corroborate conditions in Gaza.

3. Who owns this satellite observation data, and who benefits from it?

Satellite capabilities raise another important question: Who produces and controls this data? A significant and growing share of Earth observation capacity is now concentrated in commercial companies. These firms provide near-real-time imagery and analytical services during active conflicts, often through exclusive contracts with governments and military actors. While some satellite imagery and geospatial data are open source and widely used by journalists, researchers, and civil society actors (for example, to investigate the scale of destruction in war zones), the most advanced capabilities are increasingly controlled by commercial providers.

As a result, the same technologies that enable public-interest investigations also feed into military decision-making, while much of the underlying data remains inaccessible behind multi-billion-dollar contracts.

Let's have a look at some examples.

In the United States, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the U.S. Space Force have signed an agreement establishing cooperation through the Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Tracking Program (TacSRT), of which the main goal is to acquire unclassified commercial satellite imagery, advanced sensing capabilities, and data analytics for military and strategic applications. More recently, the U.S. Space Force's Space Systems Command launched a new initiative called Orbital Watch, designed to "enhance unclassified threat information sharing with commercial space companies."

To add to these examples, SpaceX, the parent company of Starlink led by the same founder, is building a classified satellite network for US intelligence agencies. Under the Starshield programme, which is designed to "support national security", satellites will carry Earth-imaging sensors and relay data to intelligence and military officials to strengthen surveillance, intelligence gathering, and target tracking capabilities for military operations.

However, not all data is behind a contract wall. A Chinese geospatial intelligence company has reportedly been tracking US military assets and activities during operations against Iran, publishing analyses of their movements, including the locations of F-22 fighters, command-and-control aircrafts, and aircraft carrier strike groups. Unlike intelligence produced under exclusive government contracts, these analyses were shared publicly on social media. According to one report, some of the facilities and assets featured in the company's posts were later targeted in Iranian missile and drone strikes.

Taken together, these developments illustrate a broader shift: commercial satellite-derived data is no longer only a tool for observation or research, but an operational component of modern military and security infrastructures, increasingly blurring the boundaries between commercial services, intelligence gathering, and warfare.

4. The dual-use narrative: between humanitarian purposes and military control

The way these companies present their services reflects a fundamental tension. On one hand, they frame their services as solutions to global challenges by connecting remote communities, supporting education and journalism, and enabling disaster response. On the other hand, they are consolidating control over critical infrastructure and transforming satellite networks into strategic assets with significant military and geopolitical influence.

Let's explore some examples.

Starlink has consolidated significant influence by driving a “global communication revolution,” extending internet access to remote regions, including rural areas of the Amazon. In some of these locations, it has become the only available provider, placing the company in a uniquely strategic position.

The economic motivations behind initiatives framed as “bridging the digital gap” are often opaque, but their deployment in specific contexts can offer some insights. In 2025, Starlink was projected to reach $11.8 billion in revenue, with an increasing share linked to U.S. government and military contracts. These include a $537 million Pentagon contract to provide satellite communications support for Ukraine’s military through 2027, an initiative that originally emerged in the early stages of the war in Ukraine as a humanitarian effort to maintain connectivity. 

Airbus also offers a clear illustration of this dual-use approach. Its Pléiades Earth observation satellites are openly marketed as “an ideal source of data for both civil or military projects.” They provide defence and security customers with capabilities for threat monitoring, target identification, border control, and battle damage assessment, while simultaneously promoting civilian applications such as urban planning, resource exploration, infrastructure monitoring, agriculture, and forest management.

Viasat is another interesting example of the narrative behind bridging the digital gap. The company presents itself as “a pioneering global technology company helping businesses, governments, and communities transform their world through connectivity”. At the same time, it has been awarded an important contract by the U.S. Space Force, covering tracking, telemetry, and command, satellite and network operations, and cybersecurity requirements.

Taken together, these examples illustrate how satellite infrastructures are shaped by overlapping civilian and military logic, sometimes blurring the lines between them. While the benefits derived from these infrastructures and systems are often presented as undeniable, so too are their risks. As these networks become increasingly embedded in everyday life, understanding and governing the power they concentrate becomes more complex and more urgent.

5. Governance under pressure or too big to regulate?

The modern satellite ecosystem illustrates how corporate power, state backing, and dual-use narratives have created an environment in which satellites are becoming critical infrastructure for the provision of essential civilian services while simultaneously serving as strategic military assets, making the commercial companies behind them increasingly "too central and too big to regulate". Satellite networks now span multiple jurisdictions, blending commercial, civilian, and military functions in ways that traditional oversight frameworks were never designed to manage.

In an unclear and inadequate regulatory landscape, important questions arise. For example, what happens when a satellite simultaneously provides connectivity to disaster-affected populations or a tool for resisting internet shutdowns while also supporting international military operations?

This is not merely a theoretical question. The Starlink case illustrates how dependence on a commercial satellite provider can evolve into a matter of strategic significance. In Ukraine, it began as a self-funded emergency effort to restore internet and communications in the early days of Russia’s invasion. It subsequently became integrated into formal defence procurement arrangements supported by the U.S. Department of Defense. According to Quilty Analytics, a contract awarded through the Proliferated Low Earth Orbit (PLEO) programme includes $537 million in funding to support Ukraine’s military.

Starlink is now an indispensable layer of communications infrastructure in Ukraine, supporting both civilian connectivity and military operations. This dual-use role has embedded the system within operational decision-making and battlefield logistics, transforming a service initially framed as humanitarian connectivity into a strategic communications asset and further blurring the boundary between civilian infrastructure and military capability.

In this context, further questions arise: can these systems become legitimate military objectives despite their civilian functions? International humanitarian law (IHL) prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Yet the growing convergence of civilian and military uses, as illustrated by the Starlink case, complicates these assessments. How should the loss of connectivity, journalistic research, navigation, or other essential satellite-enabled services be weighed in a proportionality analysis? Can the disruption of services relied upon by entire populations be treated as mere collateral damage?

The challenge of answering these questions, however, extends beyond legal analysis and requires a broader understanding of structural power. As commercial satellite networks become embedded in emergency response, public communications, and military operations, governments and institutions may become increasingly dependent on private providers that exercise significant influence over critical infrastructure. Such dependency can reduce regulatory leverage, making it more difficult to impose restrictions, demand accountability, or replace services without disrupting essential functions.

Once governments become reliant on a private satellite network, they have fewer practical options to regulate, replace, or disengage from the provider without jeopardising critical services.

The Starlink case further demonstrates this. Starlink's strategic role in remote and crisis settings also strengthens SpaceX's influence over broader regulatory debates concerning global satellite infrastructure. For example, the European Commission has proposed new rules for mobile satellite services under its resilience and competitiveness agenda, including spectrum allocation for direct-to-device connectivity, partly to reduce dependence on U.S. and Chinese providers. SpaceX has argued that aspects of these proposals could restrict access to satellite services or increase the risk of harmful interference with global satellite operations, including emergency communications such as those supporting Ukraine. More broadly, the episode illustrates how a provider's operational importance can translate into significant leverage in debates over digital and infrastructural sovereignty.

This dependency also creates new vulnerabilities. Reports describe how two Israeli companies have developed tools capable of locating and identifying Starlink users by fusing multiple layers of satellite and network data. One reportedly markets its capabilities exclusively to government clients, with limited transparency or oversight.

As has been noted, existing norms are not adapted to contemporary challenges. The rapid expansion of commercial satellite capabilities has occurred within an environment of regulatory flexibility, a dynamic that is also reflected in procurement and contracting models. Rapid innovation, multi-award contracting models, and flexible procurement strategies enable governments and industry to partner more quickly and at greater scale. However, this increased efficiency can also come at the expense of robust oversight and accountability mechanisms. In this context, regulatory gaps become easier to exploit, increasing opportunities for misuse and creating new risks.

 6. What's next?

We now live in an era of the militarisation of technology, and satellite policy cannot remain static if governance frameworks are to address these changing realities. Existing governance structures are fragmented, reactive, and constrained by jurisdictional boundaries that do not align with the transnational and dual-use nature of satellite networks.

Existing regulatory frameworks must adapt to a new reality in which satellites function as critical infrastructure with both civilian and military applications. Accountability mechanisms will need to evolve as private companies increasingly operate systems that are not merely strategic assets, but are embedded in security, communication, and everyday life. This will require stronger human rights due diligence throughout the development, deployment, and operation of satellite technologies; transparent procurement and contracting processes for public authorities; and auditable documentation that clearly defines how companies access, process, retain, and share data generated through their systems. At the same time, governments will need to address growing dependence on (and the leverage exercised by) a limited number of commercial providers while preserving access to essential services

Satellites are not merely technological systems but political infrastructures. Understanding and governing them requires treating them not as neutral tools of progress, but as sites where military power is produced, exercised, and increasingly consolidated.