Long Reads
In October 2019 Privacy International sent Freedom of Information Act requests to every Local Authority in Great Britain in relation to their use of social media monitoring. This is a full copy of that request. You can read our report here.
Dear Sir/Madam, Freedom of information act request RE: Social media monitoring / social media intelligence FOIA REQUEST For definition of social media intelligence please see background explanation below. We further note the comments of the Office of Surveillance Commissioners Annual Report 2016
UK Local Authorities are looking at people’s social media accounts as part of their intelligence gathering and investigation tactics.
It is common for families with no recourse to public funds who attempt to access support from local authorities to have their social media monitored as part of a ‘Child in Need’ assessment. This practice appears to be part of a proactive strategy on the part of local authorities to discredit
In October 2019 Privacy International sent Freedom of Information Act requests to every Local Authority in Great Britain in relation to their use of social media monitoring. You can find our report here.
Below are extracts from the annual reports of the The Office of Surveillance Commissioners (OSC) and Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC) which relate to Local Authorities use of social media monitoring.
The Office of Surveillance Commissioners (OSC) and subsequently the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC) regulate and oversee how public authorities use the investigatory powers available to them under existing law.
The Chief Surveillance Commissioner, The Rt Hon Sir Christopher Rose’s Annual Report 2011 - 12 did not refer to social networks but to overt investigations using the internet as a surveillance tool, stating that: “5.17 A frequent response to my Inspectors’ enquiries regarding a reduction in directed
In October 2019 Privacy International sent Freedom of Information Act requests to every Local Authority in Great Britain in relation to their use of social media monitoring. You can find our report here.
A number of policies and guidance documents developed by Local Authorities which have been disclosed to Privacy International in response to the Freedom of Information Act requests relating to social media monitoring, cite the Home Office Covert Surveillance and Property Interference Code of Practice, August 2018.
Below are the relevant extracts from the Home Office Covert Surveillance and Property Interference Code of Practice, August 2018 which relate to social media monitoring conducted by Local Authorities.
Online covert activity 3.10 The growth of the internet, and the extent of the information that is now available online, presents new opportunities for public authorities to view or gather information which may assist them in preventing or detecting crime or carrying out other statutory functions, as
Office of Surveillance Commissioners Guidance - Covert surveillance of Social Networking Sites (SNS)
In October 2019 Privacy International sent Freedom of Information Act requests to every Local Authority in Great Britain in relation to their use of social media monitoring. You can find our report here.
The Office of Surveillance Commissioners (OSC) and subsequently the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC) regulate and oversee how public authorities use the investigatory powers available to them under existing law.
Below is an extract from the Office of Surveillance Commissioners Guidance - Covert surveillance of Social Networking Sites (SNS) - Note 289
Covert surveillance of Social Networking Sites (SNS) 289. The fact that digital investigation is routine or easy to conduct does not reduce the need for authorisation. Care must be taken to understand how the SNS being used works. Authorising Officers must not be tempted to assume that one service
As Governments, Apple and Google compete in proximity tracing, here’s our take on building tech in times of crisis.
Covid Apps are on their way to a phone near you. Is it another case of tech-solutionism or a key tool in our healthcare response to the pandemic? It’s fair to say that nobody quite knows just yet. We’ve been tracking these apps since [the early days](https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3675
This country case-study was informed by research carried out by Hiperderecho.
This research was commissioned as part of Privacy International’s global research into data exploitative technologies used to curtail women’s access to reproductive rights. Reproductive Rights and Privacy Project. Read about Privacy International’s Reproductive Rights and Privacy Project here and
Our partner organisation InternetLab has been researching the Bolsa Familia Program and its consequences for gender and privacy, here are the first results.
This article has been written by our partner organisation InternetLab. Read this article in Portuguese here. Over the last months, the organisation InternetLab has researched privacy, data protection, gender, and social protection, focusing on the beneficiaries of the Bolsa Familia Program (PBF)
As the UK is about to launch its app to trace potential Coronavirus patients; as it launches its 'pilot' we look at its technical functionalities.
This week saw the release of a coronavirus tracking app within the United Kingdom, initially to be trialled in the Isle of Wight. Privacy International has been following this closely, along with other ‘track and trace’ apps like those seen in over 30 other countries. The UK’s app is no different
Palantir, the US data giant which works with intelligence and immigration enforcement agencies, has responded to our questions about its work on a highly sensitive National Health Service (NHS) project, providing some assurances, passing the buck to the NHS, and raising additional questions.
On 12 April 2020, citing confidential documents, the Guardian reported Palantir would be involved in a Covid-19 data project which "includes large volumes of data pertaining to