As migration continues to be high on the social and political agenda, Western countries are increasingly adopting an approach that criminalises people at the border. Asylum seekers are often targeted with intrusive surveillance technologies and afforded only limited rights (including in relation to data protection), often having the effect of being treated as “guilty until proven innocent”.
A recent report explains how the central German migration authority uses mobile phone extraction technology in the asylum application procedure, and why it is highly problematic.
As Google notifies the European Commission of its proposed acquisition of the health and fitness tracker Fitbit, Privacy International calls for the merger to be blocked because of concerns over Google’s growing digital dominance.
Here are a few suggested tips, based on our own experience with Data Subject Access Requests (DSARs). This is based on DSARs under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), but we hope our tips may be useful in other jurisdictions too.
Past protests show a pattern of systematic, selective tracking of protesters from racial minorities after participating in anti-racist protests. If nothing is done individuals taking part in the current wave of protests are at a higher risk of being over-policed for no other reason than exercising their right to protest.
In December 2019, the Information Rights Tribunal issued two disappointing decisions refusing appeals brought by Privacy International against the UK Information Commissioner relating to the transparency of the use of IMSI catchers by law enforcement. This piece sets out why PI has decided not to appeal these decisions.
Everyone has the right to a safe, open, and inclusive education, free from commercial exploitation, that enables their full and free development and promotes human flourishing regardless of race, religion or country of origin.
Le Niger a adopté une loi qui permet au gouvernement d’intercepter les communications, dans un cadre légal, avec un manque de contrôles indépendants et une protection insuffisante des droits de l’homme. Retrouvez la version en anglais de cet article ici.
Niger passed a law allowing the government to intercept communications on a broad legal basis, with insufficient oversight mechanisms and human rights safeguards. Find the French version of this article here.
Our relationships and interactions with governments are increasingly dependent on us providing more and more data and information about ourselves. We are seeing how this often strips people and communities of their privacy and dignity, especially those already disadvantaged, rather than empowering and helping them.
This is why we support the request of UK charities to scrap No Recourse to Public Funds policy.
Concerned about the increasing use of social media monitoring by Government authorities and in particular use by local government authorities, on 7 October 2019, we sent a Freedom of Information Request to 251 local authorities in Great Britain using the platform What Do They Know.
This methodology outlines what we did and the results we found, which informed our report.
In October 2019 Privacy International sent Freedom of Information Act requests to every Local Authority in Great Britain in relation to their use of social media monitoring. This is a full copy of that request. You can read our report here.
In October 2019 Privacy International sent Freedom of Information Act requests to every Local Authority in Great Britain in relation to their use of social media monitoring. You can find our report here.
A number of policies and guidance documents developed by Local Authorities which have been disclosed to Privacy International in response to the Freedom of Information Act requests relating to social media monitoring, cite the Home Office Covert Surveillance and Property Interference Code of Practice, August 2018.